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Narratives of Low- Carbon Transitions
This book examines the uncertainties underlying various strategies for a low- 
carbon future. Most prominently, such strategies relate to transitions in the 
energy sector, on both the supply and the demand side. At the same time they 
interact with other sectors, such as industrial production, transport, and build-
ing, and ultimately require new behaviour patterns at household and individual 
levels. Currently, much research is available on the effectiveness of these strat-
egies but, in order to successfully implement comprehensive transition path-
ways, it is crucial not only to understand the benefits but also the risks.
 Filling this gap, this volume provides an interdisciplinary, conceptual framework 
to assess risks and uncertainties associated with low- carbon policies and applies this 
consistently across 11 country cases from around the world, illustrating alternative 
transition pathways in various contexts. The cases are presented as narratives, 
drawing on stakeholder- driven research efforts. They showcase diverse empirical 
evidence reflecting the complex challenges to and potential negative consequences 
of such pathways. Together, they enable the reader to draw valuable lessons on the 
risks and uncertainties associated with choosing the envisaged transition pathways, 
as well as ways to manage the implementation of these pathways and ultimately 
enable sustainable and lasting social and environmental effects.
 This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and practitioners of 
environmental and energy policy, low- carbon transitions, renewable energy 
technologies, climate change action, and sustainability in general.
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Preface and acknowledgements
In the face of climate change, resource depletion, environmental pollution, and 
other global challenges, attempts to transition to a low- carbon society are 
ongoing across the world. International negotiations and agreements, national 
policy strategies, and choices at firm and household levels all contribute to the 
development and uptake of technological innovations, and are crucial for any 
sustainable, low- emission future. The interplay of these multi- level activities, 
choices, enabling factors, and potential negative side effects are complex and 
difficult to disentangle. One important step towards this is to explore national, 
regional, and local transition efforts. Here we can consider both specific 
technologies and enabling policies, and the social context in which they are 
supposed to function.
 This book illustrates some of the risks and uncertainties associated with low- 
carbon transitions, which are tightly linked to changes and innovations in the 
sector, as they are currently happening, planned, or envisaged in different 
national contexts. We experiment with narratives to present our results, aiming 
to make our research accessible to a wider audience that includes, but goes 
beyond, our academic peers. We firmly believe that it is important for scientists 
and researchers to communicate their research findings in multiple ways, 
channels, and formats. We aim to reach as broad an audience as possible in 
order to inform science, policymaking, and other relevant social processes.
 Our format, which we employed across all case study chapters, allows us to go 
beyond the limitations of scenario building based on models. Formalised model 
frameworks cannot adequately represent the many non- quantifiable aspects of 
policies and their associated risks and uncertainties. Our format allows us to 
include the perceptions and, more importantly, the expertise of a wide range of 
stakeholders in energy transition development, in an effort to make 
recommendations that are socially acceptable and robust.
 Our work is interdisciplinary throughout and transdisciplinary in many 
instances. The lengthy process needed to move from merely talking about 
interdisciplinary work to actually doing interdisciplinary work is indicative of the 
time it will take to master the much more recent idea of transdisciplinary work, 
where the focus lies on co- development with non- academic stakeholders. We hope 
this book will help us move closer to real transdisciplinary knowledge production.
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Susanne Hanger- Kopp, Jenny Lieu, and 
Alexandros Nikas
In this book, we tell stories of low- carbon transitions – which are almost always 
also energy transitions – as a means to illustrate associated risks and uncertain-
ties. Stories or narratives are descriptive, non- technical accounts of work that 
goes beyond single academic disciplines, highlighting the perspectives of the 
stakeholder groups involved. They allow for a thorough qualitative account of 
case- specific detail with respect to policy and governance processes and stake-
holder perceptions, which are important for understanding both transitions and 
the risks and uncertainties associated with and inherent in these transitions. 
They allow for a comprehensive inter- and transdisciplinary view of risks and 
uncertainties, which is critical for enhancing risk governance. Finally, they 
allow for a writing style accessible to a wider, non- academic audience, which is 
particularly important for informing policymaking processes.1
 Most recently, storytelling found its way into international policy processes. 
The Talanoa Dialogue, introduced at the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(UNFCCC, 2015), aims at sharing stories and building empathy and trust. 
Talanoa is a tradition of inclusive, participatory, and transparent dialogue from 
the South Pacific. Such a process enables participants to advance knowledge 
through common understanding and prospectively contributes to better col-
lective decision making that advances the global decarbonisation and adapta-
tion agenda (UNFCCC, 2016). Where are we? Where do we want to go? And 
how do we get there? These are the key questions structuring the dialogue, 
essentially leading to narratives about low- carbon transitions.
 These transitions are essential to achieve decarbonisation and combat climate 
change but come with a host of associated risks and uncertainties. As a key 
element in each of the narratives presented in this book, transition pathways 
describe what the world should look like over time for realising a common goal. 
Said descriptions can include, but are not limited to, technological choices, insti-
tutional set- ups, and drivers for behavioural and infrastructure changes. Aiming at 
a low- carbon future, such pathways include global agreements and climate targets, 
national strategies and emission targets, as well as concrete policy instruments to 
implement them. These in turn rely on resource allocations and investments, as 
well as behavioural change at both organisational and individual levels. Such 
pathways are not forecasts but represent deliberately defined cases of past, present, 
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and future system development. They allow useful exploration of, and learning 
from, states of the world, given that their narratives are salient, credible, and legit-
imate (Cash et al. 2003, Rounsevell and Metzger, 2010).
 The narratives in this book have been developed through the work of the EU 
Horizon 2020-funded TRANSrisk project. They refer to national and sub- 
national levels but are considered in the broader context of global climate 
change and decarbonisation governance. Globally, the Paris Agreement consti-
tutes the most important overarching aim for low- carbon transitions. It is a 
high- level legal framework attempting to pave the way for global low- carbon 
and resilient development. The agreement’s binding nature is weakened by the 
absence of sanctions, its non- punitive, non- adversarial design, and the lack of 
clear implementation policies. Its key elements are the organisation of the con-
tributions in terms of emission reductions by the parties; the relationships and 
transactions between developed, developing, and least developed countries; and 
funding mechanisms to realise actions. The Paris Agreement addresses both 
mitigation and adaptation concerns – with respective implications for and 
explicit focus on finance, technology transfer, and capacity building – and most 
recently also considerations for loss and damage. With respect to mitigation, the 
most surprising outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) was the 
introduction of the new, highly ambitious mitigation target aiming to limit tem-
perature rise to below 1.5°C. Although the target of 2°C remains part of the 
agreement as the upper limit temperature target, this implies a radical redefini-
tion of low- carbon pathways as discussed, analysed, and assessed up until 2015.
 Parties’ contributions to the agreement are embodied in their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs). Based on the agreement and the newly 
introduced stocktaking mechanism, each party prepares, communicates, and 
maintains their NDCs autonomously, taking full responsibility for their imple-
mentation while respecting the principles of environmental integrity, transpar-
ency, accuracy, completeness, comparability, and consistency. The Paris 
Agreement, however, does not provide procedures and methodologies for the 
determination of NDCs. This means that, ultimately, any specific action towards 
the targets of the Paris Agreement is the responsibility of individual countries.
The EU as a unique regional player for climate governance
Among the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the European Union (EU) is the only supranational body, 
which provides another level of coordination and legislation. Indeed, the EU acts 
as a single party in international climate change negotiations, adding to the levels 
at which EU progress must be monitored: community and member state. Three 
main strategies are at the heart of the EU’s decarbonisation policy: the 2020 
climate and energy package; the 2030 climate and energy framework; and the 
2050 low- carbon economy roadmap.
 The 2020 climate and energy package is binding legislation to ensure that the 
Union meets its climate and energy targets for the year 2020. It sets out the 
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20-20-20 targets, i.e. a 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), a 
20% share of EU energy from renewables, and a 20% improvement in energy 
efficiency.
 The 2030 climate and energy framework also includes three key targets: a 40% 
cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), a 27% share of EU energy 
from renewables, and a 27% improvement in energy efficiency.
 Finally, the 2050 low- carbon economy roadmap represents the EU’s long- term 
vision towards a ‘virtually zero’ emissions society. The roadmap is solely focused 
on cutting emissions, aiming at an aggregate reduction of 80% (from 1990 levels) 
and an intermediate target of 60% by 2040. The 2050 low- carbon economy cur-
rently represents a mere ‘statement’ and most of its framework is still under 
development.
 In light of the Paris Agreement and the challenging actions it entails, the 
European Commission (EC) is presently updating its long- term decarbonisation 
strategies for 2050 and beyond, and is seeking public consultation in the revision 
process. The new strategy will need to consider how the EU can meet the ambi-
tious 1.5°C target, which has not yet been reflected in its current climate policies.
 EU targets provide an important indicative framework, but the Emissions 
Trading System (ETS), as a market instrument, and regulatory instruments, such 
as the Renewable Energy Directive, more concretely structure the Union’s 
pathway towards a low- carbon future. Whereas the ETS applies one instrument 
across the EU, community regulations acknowledge the needs for tailored strat-
egies in each member state.
The national, sub- national, and local pathways needed to achieve these inter-
national and national decarbonisation targets are much more complex than 
international agreements let on. Indeed, any such high- level policies are not 
meaningful if lower-level contexts are insufficiently understood. Top- down 
approaches, in terms of both policy choices and policy analysis, insufficiently 
reflect the realities on the ground. They should be complemented by bottom- up 
approaches that consider the unique circumstances of a varied group of stake-
holders – particularly in order to understand barriers to the implementation of 
relevant policy choices, as well as their potential negative consequences and 
positive side effects. Fully understanding such risks and respective opportunities 
requires a diverse and flexible set of methods, and deep involvement of stake-
holders. This is because a risk is not only context dependent but also largely 
depends on its perception, i.e. the eye of the beholder. Risk categories drawn 
from a single discipline therefore only constitute a limited subset of possible 
risks. These are often risks for which data is available and can therefore be 
quantified in terms of mathematical probabilities or variance. However, because 
they neglect risks that cannot be grasped by computable data, they may not be 
able to provide a complete picture for decision making or may insufficiently 
explain decisions made.
 This book attempts to illustrate the diverse set of risks and uncertainties – 
both quantifiable and non- quantifiable – associated with low- carbon transition 
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pathways, and thus contribute to informed decision making and improved risk 
management. This is particularly important considering the need for a transpar-
ent and sustainable decision- making process that leads to socially just and legiti-
mate outcomes that are also politically and economically acceptable.
 Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides the conceptual background 
for our understanding of risks and uncertainties. This framing is innovative in 
its simplicity and its interdisciplinary, cross- thematic applicability. It is neces-
sary to understand some of the terminology in the narrative chapters, but not an 
essential read to understand the main messages conveyed. Our framing of risk 
and uncertainty builds on the premise that risks are always context specific, 
perhaps more so than the transition pathways with which they are associated, 
and that risk perception plays a key role in understanding, communicating, and 
mitigating risks. It is therefore important that we use clear and complete descrip-
tions of the risks we talk about.
 In Chapters 3–13 we introduce transition pathways from countries across the 
globe, which derived from research processes integrating socio- economic model-
ling and stakeholder engagement efforts. The narratives presented here do not 
cover all possible contexts exhaustively, but rather attempt to present a broad 
range of pathways demonstrating the variety of actions needed at various levels 
within different cultural contexts, in order to deliver on the decarbonisation 
objectives of the Paris Agreement. Indeed, every country, every sub- national 
region even, will have specificities that make it unique. We thus attempt to 
achieve diversity in terms of political setting, socio- economic context, main 
levels of governance, and technological innovation systems.
 Each narrative provides the relevant context to understand the current state 
of policy in the specific area discussed (‘Where are we?’), the respective aims for 
the sector (‘Where do we want to go?’), and the risks and uncertainties associ-
ated with the policy choices that could get us there (‘How do we get there?’). 
The inter- and transdisciplinary methods used to obtain these narratives are 
kept short and distinct from the main narratives themselves, in order to create a 
more fluent reading experience. The respective detailed methodological descrip-
tions can be found elsewhere for further consultation.
 The 11 narratives are organised into four Parts that represent four main 
themes: (1) pathways for the transition of large- scale incumbent industry 
systems; (2) pathways towards renewable electricity systems; (3) pathways for 
energy efficiency in the building sector; and (4) pathways focusing on renewable 
energy technologies at household and community levels. The themes indicate 
the main level of analysis, but all consider (inter)action at multiple scales of 
governance, particularly with respect to risk perception of relevant stakeholders. 
As we will see in the next few paragraphs, some narratives fit more than one 
thematic description.
 Under the first theme (Part II), we explore pathways for the transition of 
incumbent large- scale technology systems in Austria (Chapter 3), Canada 
(Chapter 4), and the United Kingdom (UK) (Chapter 5). Many countries 
across the globe still have dominant incumbent industries at the heart of their 
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markets, which are strongly rooted in society and provide employment to large 
numbers of people. They can prove difficult to touch for politicians. Apart from 
the cases described here, this is, for example, the case with countries that invest 
heavily in fossil fuels, such as Poland (coal), Australia (coal), and Brazil (oil). 
Subjecting such industries to major changes with many associated uncertainties 
is economically and politically difficult. However, many of these industries are 
major contributors to climate change. They have also reached their limits with 
respect to incremental emission reductions, such as increasing efficiency. If they 
want to play a role in a low- carbon future, they face more fundamental changes, 
such as replacing coal as the major source of energy in the steel- making process.
 In this book, we describe three large- scale industrial pathways and their asso-
ciated risks and uncertainties. For Austria, we focus on energy supply for the 
iron and steel sector. For Canada, we discuss the Alberta oil sands, including 
the Athabasca oil sands from the perspective of the Indigenous people affected. 
For the UK, we examine the expansion of the nuclear power sector, which is a 
realistic option, vis- à-vis a nuclear phase out in favour of renewables. Kenya and 
Indonesia, featured in Part V, also illustrate regional and national technological 
lock- ins, complementary to local- level transitions. Both countries currently rely 
heavily on coal and oil for electricity production. In Indonesia one replacement 
for fossil fuels is biogas- for-electricity production, whereas Kenya has large geo-
thermal resources as an opportunity to replace fossil energy.
 The second theme (Part III) includes pathways towards renewable 
electricity systems in Chile (Chapter 6), the Netherlands (Chapter 7), Spain 
(Chapter 8), and Switzerland (Chapter 9). Solar power technologies have 
developed with incredible speed over the past two decades, with solar 
photovoltaics (PV) in particular becoming a competitive alternative to fossil 
fuels. As a standalone technology, or in combination with wind power, it has 
become an integral part of most national energy strategies. However, a range of 
barriers may still hinder successful implementation, and potential negative 
consequences resulting from implementation at scale are still insufficiently 
understood. In this book, we discuss the risks and uncertainties of transitioning 
to a solar- based electricity system for Chile, considering particularly its potential 
effect on energy poverty. The Netherlands’ narrative includes the development 
of solar power and explores two alternative pathways, one centred on a large- 
scale solar parks, the other on small- scale rooftop installations. The Spanish 
case study offers lessons learned from the past: as a frontrunner in solar power 
technology and other renewable energy, the country was also among the first to 
experience unsuccessful strategies and their consequences. Finally, Switzerland 
illustrates the challenges in actually implementing a high- level strategy in a 
decentralised and multi- level democratic system, and potential to scale up 
renewable energy technologies in light of a planned renewable- based nuclear 
phase out.
 In theme three (Part IV), we explore energy efficiency pathways for the 
building sector, illustrated with cases in China (Chapter 10) and Greece 
(Chapter 11). Improving energy efficiency can be most cost- effective and thus a 
8  Susanne Hanger-Kopp et al.
principal measure to reduce emissions. However, it can involve rebound effects 
where increased efficiency leads to increased energy consumption, reducing its 
potential impact. In particular, the building sector is a popular target that holds 
immense potential. We explore China’s very different path to more energy- 
efficient buildings. Here, the focus is naturally on the country’s ever- growing 
cities, which provide an intriguing narrative on increasing energy efficiency at 
an unprecedented scale. We also look at one European case, Greece, which has 
a large remaining energy efficiency potential in its building stock but is strug-
gling to achieve its near- term targets. The Greek narrative highlights how 
short- and long- term action requires different considerations for risk and uncer-
tainty assessments.
 Finally, theme four (Part V) covers pathways focusing on renewable energy 
technologies at household and community levels in Indonesia (Chapter 12) 
and Kenya (Chapter 13). At the end- user level, individuals and households 
constitute the most fundamental levels of decision making, and the perception 
of end- user changes at the small scale can often bely their importance. 
Behaviour at these scales can be the among the most challenging changes 
required to realise a low- carbon future.
 For Indonesia, aside from large- scale biogas for electricity, we explore the 
potential to increase farm- level and communal biogas use in Bali by means of 
biogas digesters and cookstove technology. In Kenya we similarly draw attention 
to cookstove technologies, which need modernisation towards both more effi-
cient technologies and alternative fuels in order to reduce deforestation and 
emissions.
 The narrative style allows us to highlight the national, regional, and local 
specificities of each low- carbon transition pathway. The common focus on risks 
and uncertainties adds value in enabling us to draw conclusions across cases. 
The synthesis chapter (Chapter 14) highlights the lessons learned across all 
cases, emphasising the complexities in risk and uncertainty assessments with 
stakeholders, the ambiguity of any risk categorisation, and the joint challenges 
we face across the globe.
 Overall, this book aims to contribute to the transdisciplinary dialogue on 
low- carbon transitions, particularly for energy. It offers narratives on some 
decarbonisation pathways in order to illustrate the associated risks and 
uncertainties. It also aims to encourage the uptake of this format of knowledge 
sharing, which ideally enables mutual understanding and learning and ulti-
mately helps us make more salient, credible, legitimate, and – most importantly 
– sustainable decisions.
Note
1 Our narratives have the benefits of, but a broader basis than, narrative inquiry, which 
is a social–empirical (observational) research method exclusively based on an individ-
ual’s experiences (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000); this and similar methods have been 
critiqued (Wood, 2000) for a lack of analytical definition and trustworthiness.
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2 Framing risks and uncertainties 
associated with low- carbon 
pathways
Susanne Hanger- Kopp, Alexandros Nikas, and 
Jenny Lieu
This chapter introduces a broad conceptual framework for assessing risks and 
uncertainties across disciplines and subject matter. The framework enables 
transdisciplinary analysis for understanding risks and uncertainties associated 
with low- carbon energy transition pathways based on a consistent application in 
different country contexts. For this purpose, we require flexible epistemologies. 
We acknowledge that risks are socially constructed. Albeit related, we distin-
guish risk as a narrower concept from uncertainties. Within the social realm, we 
find some level of agreement on what important risks are, such as death, neg-
ative impacts on health, and excess loss of money. Some of these risks we can 
quantify, for example as probabilities or point estimates. Risks that cannot be 
quantified but which can be specified by stakeholders are no less important. 
Even concerns over issues that are low- risk according to quantitative probabilis-
tic assessment need to be taken seriously, as they may have serious impacts on 
human behaviour, decision making, and acceptance.
 Some economic approaches allow for risk to refer to positive impacts, i.e. oppor-
tunities (Markandya et al., 2018). In this book we focus on the negative connota-
tion of risk because we believe that this aspect may be neglected, given that 
low- carbon energy technologies, and associated policies and practices, are often 
considered to be inherently positive. However, in order to guarantee their legiti-
macy and lasting success, risks need to be anticipated and appropriately managed.
Risk and uncertainty
First, we introduce the baseline definitions for risk and uncertainty, which we 
find useful for inter- and transdisciplinary approaches, in order to identify and 
assess risks and uncertainties in the domain of decarbonisation policies. We 
believe that these may apply to other subject matter but this remains to be 
investigated. Second, we provide a short overview of relevant disciplinary 
approaches and state of the art discussions on uncertainty and risks, with the 
aim of identifying common ground to support interdisciplinary communica-
tion. We do not question disciplinary conventions on uses of the concepts, 
but rather suggest areas where leniency may be required to allow for inter- 
and trans-disciplinary understanding.
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 Risk and uncertainty are often used synonymously, as if they were one 
concept; this is particularly the case in the climate change research and policy-
making community, and in the context of mitigation policy. For instance, in 
the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assess-
ment report, working group III introduces risk management as a key pillar of the 
assessment report (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b), and the IPCC overall provides 
detailed guidance on how to address uncertainty in its work (Mastrandrea et al., 
2011). However, even in this co- ordinated assessment, we find several different 
interpretations of risks and uncertainties. This is potentially a spill- over from 
economics, which is among the most influential disciplines in this research area 
of climate–economy interactions and modelling, but where no one standardised 
understanding of either concept is provided.
 At least for analytical clarity, but also for clarity in communicating across 
scientific boundaries, it is worth acknowledging and explaining how we avoid 
using these two concepts as synonyms in this book. Most often academic work, 
including pieces of the ‘grey literature’, when talking about ‘risks and uncertain-
ties’ actually only address one of the two concepts. While this is not wrong, this 
interchanging use of the two terms may hinder effective academic work in 
support of climate policy. It may also cause confusion to both policymakers and 
those new to the study of risk and/or uncertainty.
 We understand uncertainty as a general lack of knowledge of possible out-
comes and states of the world. Uncertainty is a broader concept than risk, which 
refers to a calculated or perceived potential for negative impacts when the 
outcome is uncertain. Thus, uncertainty always retains an element of risk and, 
conversely, risk is always a form/subcategory of uncertainty. Risk is a reduced 
form of uncertainty, and one that we can better manage than most other forms. 
When we present disciplinary approaches to uncertainty, we only consider those 
that go beyond risk.
Perspectives on uncertainty
Since Socrates and then well into the seventeenth century, awareness of uncer-
tainty and ignorance had been recognised as the key to wisdom. However, Des-
cartes heralded three centuries of ‘ignorance of ignorance’, that is complete 
confidence in rationalism to provide certainty/truth, which became the normal 
state of the educated classes of Europe, particularly those in science (Ravetz, 
2009, pp. xv–xvi). It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that a 
renewed awareness of uncertainty and ignorance returned. Thus, Ravetz argues, 
modern dealings with uncertainty have come to the fore with probabilistic risk 
assessment in the 1950s related to nuclear technology. Indeed, most concrete 
disciplinary work has been done in the context of risk as one specific form of 
uncertainty, as discussed in the following section. Broader ideas of uncertainty 
are rare and lack a disciplinary home. Some useful categorisations may help 
better distinguish and understand such uncertainties based on the extent of 
uncertainty, the sources of uncertainty, and the ability to measure uncertainty.
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 Former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously distinguished 
that there are:
known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there 
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do 
not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we do not 
know that we do not know. And if one looks throughout the history of our 
country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the 
difficult ones.
(Rumsfeld, 2012)
It is the realm of the known unknowns that is most accessible to researchers, 
and thus the subject of most academic discussion.
 Within the realm of the known unknowns, uncertainty may result from 
different sources. Engineers, for example, broadly distinguish between uncer-
tainty that can be reduced (epistemic uncertainty) and uncertainty that cannot 
be reduced as it is in the nature of things, such as the throwing of dice (aleatory 
uncertainty). Contributors to the latest assessment report of the IPCC (2014b), 
in addition to epistemic uncertainty as a result of a lack of information, consider 
paradigmatic uncertainty (resulting from disagreement about the framing of a 
problem) and translational uncertainty (resulting from incomplete or conflict-
ing scientific findings).
 Quantitative models can address uncertainty mathematically, most often by 
means of discrete scenarios that comprise specific values for the multiplicity of 
uncertain parameters, or other times by assigning joint distributions to uncer-
tain parameters. The latter is usually done by means of sensitivity analysis – 
assessing effects of changing variables – and Monte Carlo simulations, which are 
essentially multiple random model runs. Qualitatively, uncertainty is more diffi-
cult to address. The IPCC, for example, uses qualitative rating scales for scien-
tists to express the level of (un-)certainty which they associate with the key 
findings in their assessment report. First, scientists rate the validity of findings 
based on the type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence. Second, they 
rate the findings probabilistically, based on statistical analysis of observations or 
model results, or expert judgement (Mastrandrea et al., 2011). In the case of a 
negative outcome, we would talk about a risk assessment, according to the 
framing provided in this chapter. Both approaches assume that uncertainty is 
objective and external to a specific social reality.
 By contrast, Smithson (2009) highlights the constructed nature of uncer-
tainty and proposes a more flexible distinction based on how people talk about 
uncertainty (the nature of uncertainty), what they think it is (motives 
and values associated with uncertainty), and how they deal with it (coping/
management). Such fully positivist and constructivist approaches are mutually 
exclusive. This remains true for risk.
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Disciplinary approaches to risk
Most risk work has its origins in one of four subject areas: insurance and finance; 
natural hazards and disasters; technological innovation; or health. It has been 
inspired by multiple disciplines, such as mathematics, economics, psychology, 
and sociology, in an effort to reduce and manage uncertainty (Renn, 2008). 
Since the 1980s, we observe a shift from mathematical- and engineering- based 
work towards approaches stemming from social sciences, which is in line with 
the expansion of risk analysis from risk assessment to risk management and 
finally to risk communication. This represents a move towards the idea of sub-
jective risk perceptions (Glickman and Gough, 1990).
 Natural science approaches to risk are, for example, causal models in medi-
cine and chemistry. Causal models test safety- related issues with organic and 
artificial substances by means of experiments. Mathematics provide the basis for 
actuarial and probabilistic risk assessment, which found its practical applications 
in the insurance sector and in the context of natural hazards. It is in these areas 
where natural sciences and social sciences, particularly economics, find common 
ground.
 The natural sciences consider risks as objective and independent of social 
contexts. The social sciences assess risk either through the individual or through 
the collective. The economics of risk address risk taking and risk attitudes at the 
level of the individual. With their seminal work, and departing from the 
expected utility model, Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt laid the groundwork for 
an extensive literature on individual behaviour towards risk and risk aversion 
(Machina and Viscusi, 2014, p. xxxi). Indeed, the approaches of behavioural 
economics largely coincide with psychological methods of risk analysis, which 
also consider risk at the level of the individual.
 The psychology of risk is in stark contrast to much of the mathematical risk 
analysis in the natural sciences and finance (Raue, Lermer, and Streicher, 
2018). It traditionally followed a cognitive approach, assuming rational choos-
ers who are constrained by their capacity to reason and learn (bounded ration-
ality). Value- expectancy theory, the theory of reasoned action, and the theory 
of planned behaviour have been frequently used in psychological risk (Ajzen, 
1991; Wigfield and Eccles, 2000). Classical methods such as experiments, obser-
vations, and interviews have been complemented with psychometric methods 
to measure risk perception and risk- related behaviour, which are also popular in 
behavioural economics (Slovic, 2000). The main tools here are standardised 
survey instruments. They are frequently criticised for systemic biases they may 
create, and sociologists have insisted on the importance of more in- depth 
methods to understand risks. Discourse analysis and in- depth interviews are the 
key methods used for this in sociology.
 The sociology of risk, unlike economic and psychological approaches, applies 
at the collective level and is grounded in the assumption that risk is socially 
constructed. It purports that cultural biases and practices across social groups are 
effective drivers of ideas about risk and risk management. Prominent approaches 
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are the Cultural Theory of Risk (CT) of Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) and 
Beck’s Risk Society (1986).
 Taylor- Gooby and Zinn (2006) highlight that economic, psychological, and 
sociological approaches are increasingly overlapping. They also emphasise the 
potential for cross- disciplinary fertilisation, particularly across psychological and 
sociological approaches but also with economics. This leaves bridging the gap 
between positivist and constructivist thinking. We find middle ground following 
a critical realist approach (Bhaskar, 2008; Sayer, 2000), where we create space 
for subjective risk perceptions and assessment, recognising the importance of 
concern (Fischhoff, Hope, and Watson, 1990) while conceding that within this 
social realm there are certain risks and assessments that can be considered 
objective, in the sense of a common understanding across stakeholder groups.
An interdisciplinary framework for assessing risks and 
uncertainties
The simplest common denominator to define risk across all these disciplinary 
approaches would describe it as the probability, chance, or potential for a 
negative outcome, impact, or consequence. Any further specifications of risk 
will always be context specific. Indeed, Fischhoff, Hope, and Watson claim that:
the definition of risk, like that of any other key term in policy issues, is 
inherently controversial. The choice of definition can affect the outcome of 
policy debates, the allocation of resources among safety measures, and the 
distribution of political power in society.
(Fischhoff, Hope, and Watson, 1990, p. 30)
 In this book, we are interested in the risks associated with low- carbon trans-
ition pathways – or more precisely in the risks associated with the policy choices 
which constitute the foundation of such transition pathways – by promoting or 
mobilising the necessary transitions, principally with energy pathways. Fre-
quently, such risks are termed as policy risks. Figure 2.1 illustrates how policy 
risk consists of two fundamental categories, which we call ‘implementation risk’ 
and ‘consequential risk’.
•	 Implementation	risk	refers	to	the	potential	 for	diverse	causes	to	affect	the	
design, implementation, or success of a given policy; it introduces potential 
failure of policy implementation to the idea of barriers or challenges.
•	 Consequential	 risk	 refers	 to	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 certain	 policy	 to	 cause	
diverse negative consequences. Any anticipated consequential risk may 
become a cognitive barrier to the implementation of a pathway, i.e. an 
implementation risk.
Making this distinction explicit, and thus highlighting the importance of clearly 
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 constitutes the strength of this framing. Conventionally, such a distinction is 
only implied and remains opaque for anybody who is not familiar with the spe-
cific context.
 The ideas of implementation and consequential risks easily translate to more 
conventional language, such as barriers and negative impacts, which is useful in 
dialogues with stakeholders.
 For the sake of clarity, the stylised depiction of risks and uncertainties in 
Figure 2.1 omits several more complex aspects. First, the cause of any implemen-
tation risk, and the negative effect of any consequential risk, are not isolated 
but can be traced back and forth in cascades respectively. For example, public 
acceptance/opposition as an implementation risk may have several different 
root causes, such as experience, fundamental values, or common social practice, 
to name just a few. Similarly, negative impacts on the environment may result 
in negative impacts on health or other ecosystems services, which in turn may 
lead to economic implications for both economic sectors and individuals. 
Second, the framework does not address trade- offs and benefits. In any decision- 
making effort, benefits will play a role as well as risks, and trade- offs will be 
made. We neglect this in the framework as we assume that low- carbon pathways 
are mostly designed with their eventual benefits in mind, and that under-
estimating potential negative outcomes is one of the greatest implementation 
risks to any such pathway. Third, the distinction between implementation and 
consequential risks does not always completely hold. For instance, a badly 
implemented pathway may have negative impacts that affect the pathway itself, 
which has been the case in some emissions trading schemes.
 Across all disciplines we find consensus that risk is context dependent. To 
account for this, the overarching framing for each narrative is based on the 
human innovation systems (HIS) idea, a framework developed based on the 
extended approach of the technology innovation system (TIS) framework 
(Hekkert et al., 2007). The framework explicitly acknowledges the spatial 
context and dimension of time, while considering the interaction between the 
natural ecological system (resource potential and limitations) and the human 
system. A low- emission pathway choice depends on the interaction between the 
environmental context (ecological system) and the HIS that encompasses 
social, economic, technological, administrative, and political contexts. Within 
the HIS there are also differing priorities at various scales (community, city, 
national, regional, etc.) governed by formal and informal institutions com-
prising actors with individual preferences.
 Categorising barriers and potential negative outcomes in low- carbon path-
ways related to the contextual factors can help to conceptually disaggregate 
broadly defined categories of implementation and consequential risks, and spe-
cifically identify the problem. Systematically thinking through each category 
may help to identify the point from which the problems or barriers stem (e.g. 
lack of monetary funds, social resistance, level of technological readiness, etc.). 
The exercise can then help to identify the actors, institutions or policies that 
can address the barrier and prevent negative outcomes. These context categories 
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are not clearly distinct from each other and inevitably overlap, for example in 
social and economic impacts. Thus, flexibility and at the same time clarity in 
the specific case- based application are paramount.
Methods for assessing risks and uncertainties
All narratives presented in this book draw on quantitative modelling, tightly 
interlinked with stakeholder consultations, to develop the transition pathways at 
their heart. The general equilibrium and optimisation models used for this purpose 
provide outputs as point estimates rather than probabilities, creating a false level 
of precision sometimes known as deterministic uncertainty (Nikas, Doukas, and 
Papandreou, 2018). Models suffering from this issue may be unsuitable if one 
wants to produce strategies that are less vulnerable to a large range of plausible 
outcomes. Moreover, for these models it is more difficult to consider implementa-
tion than consequential risk. It was thus of utmost importance to involve stake-
holders not only for the specification of pathways but also for the identification 
and assessment of associated risks (Doukas et al., 2018). For this purpose, we 
designed stakeholder engagement processes, all of which built on the same set of 
fundamental data collection formats, including: desktop research for the identifi-
cation and analysis of policy documents; open and semi- structured expert- and 
stakeholder interviews (face- to-face, e- mail, telephone); and different focus groups 
and workshop formats. At the stakeholder identification and selection stage, we 
made sure that different, even opposing perspectives were considered in the ana-
lysis, so that different views could be heard and compared. This made the stake-
holder consultation an as- good-as- possible representation of the actual fields of 
tension in our case study contexts. With stakeholders, we discussed risks and 
uncertainties qualitatively in interview and workshop settings, and with the 
option of a standardised assessment using Likert scales. This facilitated the charac-
terisation of risks along different dimensions such as likelihood, severity of impact, 
timing of impact, mitigation capacity, and general level of concern.
 Any of these social- empirical methods comes with certain limitations or 
potential biases, which can be reduced but not eliminated. For the best under-
standing and interpretation of our results, readers should be aware of the most 
important biases that potentially affect our research. These are:
(1) the selection of stakeholders: although the aim in each case was to select a 
comprehensive set of stakeholders using a stakeholder matrix approach, it is 
often not possible to include all relevant voices; and
(2) the capacity of stakeholders to assess risks, as stakeholders may or may not 
be experts with respect to the policies in questions.
Therefore, this is not a formal expert elicitation process (Morgan, 2014) aiming 
at quantified probabilities for very specific events, but an informed assessment of 
perceived potential barriers and negative outcomes. This is particularly the case 
for those risks and uncertainties that depend on individual and collective 
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behaviour. As said previously, during stakeholder elicitation it is important to 
identify concerns and areas of disagreement across stakeholder groups in order 
to arrive at a broad qualitative assessment of transition pathways. Expert elicita-
tion could then be useful as a potential follow- up on individual risks, where this 
is possible. An important aspect to keep in mind in this respect is that the con-
sultations were not aimed at generating objective information from stake-
holders, as there is no such thing as an objective point of view, particularly with 
respect to risks and uncertainties. The main goal, instead, was to make these 
points of view explicit so that they can be considered and valued in the devel-
opment of the transition pathways.
 The complementarity of the modelling and stakeholder approaches allowed 
for a broad consideration and detailed understanding of risks, taking into 
account the different perspectives of individuals and/or stakeholder groups. 
While the details of the modelling aspects of these pathways and the particular 
interactions with stakeholders are published elsewhere (Dalla Longa and van 
der Zwaan, 2017; e.g. Lieu et al., forthcoming; van der Zwaan et al., 2018). The 
narratives in this book provide a non- technical and in- depth approach to 
the respective low- carbon pathways. These are based on the findings from the 
extensive stakeholder engagement processes used in the respective case studies. 
Many of these use one or more specific stakeholder- driven methods for identify-
ing risks, uncertainties, opportunities, and benefits in the specific national con-
texts. These include system mapping (SM), fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM), 
and multiple- criteria group decision making (MCGDM).
 SM (Albu and Griffith, 2006) is a qualitative mapping method recently 
applied to the climate change and policy domain (Nikas et al., 2017). It consti-
tutes a novel approach to defining system boundaries, capturing interactions 
among institutions and technological value chains and describing enabling 
environments for these value chains, such as cultural aspects, existing policies 
and regulation, and habits. Based on the mapping, system inefficiencies or other 
obstacles can be identified that potentially block the successful implementation 
of the transition pathway: implementation risks. Moreover, the mapping can 
reveal potential opportunities within a system to benefit from when pursuing 
the transition. The identified risks and opportunities may directly or indirectly 
facilitate or hinder a transition pathway, or a policy aiming to promote that 
pathway. Once elicited from policymakers and other relevant actors, this know-
ledge is translated into a diagrammatic form. In this book, the SM framework is 
based on the components of a TIS: enablers and barriers affecting the develop-
ment of a system include policy instruments, contextual factors, institutions, 
and infrastructure. The method is widely used in the following chapters to help 
inform integrated assessment modelling and other policy support activities.
 With a more quantitative approach, FCM is a semi- or quasi- quantitative 
modelling technique that essentially comprises a visual (mapping) component 
and a mathematical (simulation) component. It aims to identify how a par-
ticular change to the system is perceived to affect it. This change can be a 
socio- economic driver or a policy instrument, the impacts of which are useful 
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to assess when seeking the optimal policy strategy. As a semi- quantitative 
modelling framework, FCM cannot offer insights into the exact outcomes 
resulting from a specific change to a system. The assessment is, however, 
meaningful in a comparative manner, offering insights into how a policy 
instrument or mix is perceived by stakeholders compared to all other policy 
instruments or mixes.
 In a similar fashion to system mapping, the visual component of FCM 
involves designing a map of concepts into which different systems processes can 
be broken down. However, this map is intended to represent only relationships 
that express influence, causality, and system dynamics. Based on the captured 
causality, the system is then simulated in order to rank the alternative policy 
instruments or mixes in terms of positive influence on the system variables rep-
resenting the ultimate objectives (Nikas and Doukas, 2016).
 Finally, MCGDM is a sub- discipline of operational research, aimed at sup-
porting decision making in complex problems where multiple views (decision 
makers) on multiple dimensions (criteria) must be considered before reaching a 
solution. Multi- criteria analyses have long been used to support decision making 
in energy (Doukas, 2013) and climate policy (Nikas, Doukas, and Martínez 
López, 2018). In the context of this book, MCDGM is based on the TOPSIS 
method (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) and is used for assessment of implementation 
and consequential policy- related risks against a consistent family of evaluation 
criteria. The criteria include: the likelihood to manifest; the level of impact on 
the policy framework (for implementation risks) or the severity of impact (for 
consequential risks); and the mitigation capacity, as perceived by stakeholders.
Final remarks
The fundamental outline and categorisation above provide us with an interdis-
ciplinary language for identifying and assessing risks and uncertainties which 
can easily be translated to practical, inter- and transdisciplinary needs in the 
narratives presented in this book. The meaning remains the same, while the ter-
minology and other context- specific elements can be adapted. Its value lies in 
its simplicity and transparency. Transparency, as we make clear where we must 
deviate from disciplinary approaches at either end of the wide spectrum of risk 
assessment methods, most importantly mathematics and sociology. The simpli-
city lies in our approach to describing risk, where we emphasise and realise the 
need to describe clearly the fundamental components of each risk identified. 
Ultimately, this approach enables us to synthesise and compare our findings 
with respect to the risks and uncertainties associated with each pathway.
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Co- designing a low- carbon transition 
pathway focusing on energy supply for 
the iron and steel sector
Brigitte Wolkinger, Jakob Mayer, Andreas Tuerk, 
Gabriel Bachner, and Karl Steininger
The EU’s decarbonisation goals for 2050, as laid down in the Roadmap for 
moving to a competitive low- carbon economy in 2050, aim for reducing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions by 80 to 95% (compared with 1990 levels) and requires 
steep emission reductions after 2030 (EUR- Lex–52011DC0112–EN–EUR- Lex, 
n.d.). So far, decarbonisation efforts have relied on gradual improvements in 
energy efficiency or expansion of renewables, but over coming decades there is a 
need to accelerate efforts through breakout technologies and cost reduction. De 
Pee et al. (2018) emphasise in their analysis that decarbonisation pathways for 
the industrial sector are less defined (than, for example, when compared with 
the power sector) as the sector is embedded in a global context and has a relat-
ively high share of emissions from feedstocks and high- temperature heat. In 
Austria, GHG emissions from energy production, transport and other energy 
sources in total decreased between 1990 and 2014 by about 5% while emissions 
from industry (including process emissions) increased by 12% (European 
Environment Agency, 2016). Besides energy efficiency measures, further and 
stronger mitigation and more radical action is required, such as substituting 
current industrial processes with low- emission alternatives. For some industrial 
sectors this could be the most fundamental change of the production process in 
their history.
 Industrial production, and especially basic material production such as iron and 
steel, is often strongly interrelated with other sectors of the domestic and inter-
national economy. Its centrality in economic production has been empirically 
tested and detected in several regional economies deploying network theory on 
input–output tables (e.g. for the US, Canada, and Mexico by Aroche- Reyes 
(2002) and by Muñiz, Raya, and Carvajal (2008) for the case of Europe). This 
implies a relatively wide range of possible risks and indirect effects when decar-
bonising these key sectors. However, as technical options are being developed, 
the associated risks of their implementation are often insufficiently assessed 
because the scope of analysis for such options is often set very narrowly (e.g. 
Fischedick et al., 2014) and thus salient aspects like system- wide effects and reper-
cussions are disregarded. A quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic effects 
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of iron and steel decarbonisation is presented in Mayer, Bachner, and Steininger 
(2019). This chapter aims to make an important qualitative contribution to this 
discussion by revealing risks perceived and stated by different stakeholder groups, 
which might emerge when it comes to the implementation of ‘climate neutral’ 
steel production technologies, taking into account the interrelated transition of 
the energy supply sector.
 In Austria, the iron and steel industry and energy supply sectors comprise 
nearly half of the country’s GHG emissions, both within the ETS (Emissions 
Trading System) and outside the ETS. These two sectors contribute 16% to real 
gross domestic product (GDP). Within Austria’s economy, iron and steel form 
15.5% of total GHG emissions and contribute 2% to domestic value added 
(Anderl et al., 2017a; Statistics Austria, 2018b). The iron and steel sector also 
stands out because of the high risks associated with a low- carbon transition due 
to its exposure to geo- political developments, its dependence on global (feed-
stock) markets (especially for coal and gas, iron ores and scrap), the extraordi-
narily long economic lifetime of investments, and prevailing overcapacity issues. 
For the steel industry there is little scope for significantly reducing carbon emis-
sions while continuing with the current production method (Mayer, Bachner, 
and Steininger, 2019). The sector therefore faces several options: either its 
replacement with new business activities based on alternative materials such as 
wood or polymers (demand- side measures); a switch to hydrogen- based steel 
production (as fuel, feedstock or in electrolysis); the use of zero- carbon electri-
city; the use of biomass for feedstock (charcoal) and carbon capture and storage 
(CCS); or carbon capture and use (CCU) – or a combination of all these 
options. Hydrogen- based steel production is a major consideration for Austria’s 
largest steel producer. As this would require a large amount of zero- carbon elec-
tricity, the transition of the Austrian electricity sector is being systematically 
considered as an interrelated pathway.
The role of the iron and steel sector in a low- carbon transition
Austria’s long tradition of high- quality steel production renders the case of a 
low- carbon transition for the sector particularly complex. Since 1970 steel 
output has doubled, now amounting to eight million metric tons per year. Each 
ton of steel produced is associated with process emissions which emerge from 
chemical reactions during processing of iron ores (‘oxygen reduction’), thus they 
differ from combustion emissions. The theoretical minimum process emission 
intensity of the currently applied technology, a blast furnace (BF ), is about 1.3 
tons of CO2 per ton of steel (Scholz et al., 2004; Kirschen, Badr, and Pfeifer, 
2011), with Austrian production being slightly above that at 1.5 tons of CO2 
per ton of steel (Anderl et al., 2017b). Hence, further efficiency efforts would be 
restricted to a maximum reduction of 13% in CO2 process emissions. Although 
the emission intensity of a single ton has significantly improved over recent 
decades, total CO2 process emissions have not declined since output of the steel 
sector increased much faster. Hence, the sector is still a major contributor to 
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the national GHG inventory (Anderl et al., 2017a). With the theoretical 
lower bound of emission intensity being insufficient for reaching long- term 
climate objectives, it is apparent that more radical mitigation options have to 
be explored, such as: (i) a major steel output decline requiring substitutes with 
similar versatile product characteristics for specific applications, e.g. wood 
(composites) or polymers; (ii) the deployment of best- available technology 
options combined with carbon capture and storage/usage; (iii) turning to 
 secondary steel production with sufficient high- quality scrap feedstocks; or 
(iv) fuel switches from carbon- intensive to no- carbon processes with com-
petitive relative unit costs for comparable steel grades. The most relevant side 
constraint for each of these four options is indicated here in a simplified way. 
(For a more detailed discussion see Mayer, Bachner, and Steininger, 2019). 
Recently, Austrian steel producers, in particular Voestalpine AG (the largest 
steel- producing company in Austria and one of the leaders worldwide), have 
acknowledged the last option to be one possible pathway to follow, which 
would require switching to new processing technologies within the coming 
two decades (i.e. hydrogen- based instead of coke- based oxygen reduction of 
iron ores), thereby rendering deep decarbonisation of the sector possible 
(Mayer, Bachner, and Steininger, 2019).
 The necessary provision of sufficient renewable electricity for hydrogen pro-
duction puts pressure on the electricity sector. However, it is possible (and 
intended) to store hydrogen (either on site or by a third party) and to use it on 
demand in iron and steel production. For Austria, and according to stake-
holders, electrolysis- based hydrogen generation would mean 33 TWh (terawatt 
hours) per annum of electricity devoted to the iron and steel industry in order 
to maintain the national steel output at current levels. Current total electricity 
generation in Austria amounts to about 60 TWh, having doubled since 1970. 
Hence the electrification of this single industry is perceived by stakeholders to 
necessitate a massive expansion of the domestic electricity generation system. 
In Mayer, Bachner, and Steininger (2019) and Bachner et al. (2018a; 2018b) 
we emphasise that this ‘additionality’ in terms of increased domestic electricity 
generation can be questioned because the implementation of hydrogen- based 
iron and steel technologies triggers relative price and thus foreign trade effects 
which lead to lower ‘additional’ domestic electricity supply and demand than 
anticipated bottom- up. Likewise, mitigation efforts are endangered if electricity 
demand is provided carbon intensively, which would merely lead to a shift of 
emissions from the steel industry to the energy supply sector.
 Investigating the current electricity mix, hydropower clearly dominates elec-
tricity production in Austria, comprising about two- thirds of generated electri-
city, with fossil- fuel-based generation representing about 18% (in Austria about 
75% of its electricity production is from renewables (Oesterreichs Energie, 
2018)). In this context it is worth noting the Federal Constitutional Act for a 
Nonnuclear Austria (Federal Constitutional Act for a Nonnuclear Austria, 
1999), which prohibits the construction and operation of installations for the 
production of energy by means of nuclear fission. Moreover, in recent years 
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Austria lost its status as a net exporter of electricity. This contextual framework 
raises questions around self- sufficiency, further options for the expansion of low- 
carbon generation (e.g. cost- competitive spots for hydropower complying with 
environmental legislation are almost completely exploited), the coupling of 
historically separated sectors, as well as other electrification trends (mobility, 
digitalisation, etc.).
 Moreover, industry representatives have frequently confronted climate policy 
measures with concerns about potential added value losses due to decreasing com-
petitiveness against competitors in non- policy regions, caveats regarding carbon 
leakage, as well as unfavourable job market implications. However, evidence on 
the consequences of unilateral environmental regulation like carbon pricing is 
mixed. Particularly, the dynamics such unilateral measures may set in motion are 
diverse as, for instance, suggested by the hypothesis of Porter and Linde (1995). A 
recent review by Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) finds statistically significant 
adverse effects of environmental regulation which, however, are limited to the 
short run and are comparably small because production, trade, and choices of loca-
tion are shown to be mostly determined by other factors such as sunk capital and 
costs of transportation. However, this review mainly builds upon observations 
from the past, where carbon prices were moderately low, thus evidence against a 
plausible threshold level of carbon pricing for which adverse effects of unilateral 
environmental measures dominate is lacking. Consequently, re- location measures 
of heavy industries remain a prevalent threat in public controversies.
The point of departure for a low- carbon transition
This chapter gives a brief overview of current socio- economic, technological, 
and political framework conditions that have to be considered when moving 
towards a low- carbon society. The insights are based on a stakeholder dialogue 
described in the Research process and methods box.
Research process and methods
In Austria a range of projects and stakeholders address future low- carbon energy 
scenarios. The broad transition pathways covered in this chapter, and an under-
standing of the related risks, were developed applying different methods of stake-
holder participation.
 First, semi- structured interviews were conducted to gain information on the 
Austrian socio- economic and political context related to a low- carbon transition.
 In two stakeholder workshops visions for a low- carbon society in 2050 and associ-
ated transition pathways were developed, with corresponding risks and uncertainties 
assessed and prioritised. In the first workshop the specific Austrian context was dis-
cussed and transition pathways towards a low- carbon society in 2050/2030 were 
developed using the back- casting approach, i.e. starting from a desired future. Risks 
and uncertainties were developed along these pathways in an interactive group 
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workshop setting. Two main dimensions to be considered in the pathways emerged, 
which were: i) a detailed description of the needed technological change and a time-
line for implementation of mitigation technologies for the two focus sectors, as well 
as their future sectoral interrelationships; and ii) the institutional framework and 
corresponding milestones, emphasising the institutional and political needs for initi-
ating and staying on the decarbonisation track until 2050.
 Throughout the process of development of transition pathways, about 100 risks 
and uncertainties were worked out by stakeholders and the research team in an 
iterative co-creation process (first workshop and bilateral calls). These risks were 
first clustered for further processing and ranking in the second stakeholder work-
shop, in a World Café setting, and comprise implementation as well as consequen-
tial risks. Although stakeholders were asked about these different kinds of risk in 
the first round, going into detailed exploration of the core problem and the ques-
tion behind each risk (as well as ranking the risks) is much easier by thinking in 
thematic complexes.
 Bilateral calls between the two workshops were also used to refine and discuss 
assumptions and results of the specific pathways (for the steel and iron and corre-
sponding electricity pathway), which were entered into the macroeconomic model 
for assessing impacts.
 The feedback on macroeconomic assessments were essential for deploying the 
WEGDYN computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (Mayer, Bachner, and 
Steininger, 2019) and the E3ME econometric model (Barker et al., 2012) to 
inform and quantify selected consequential risks.
 Furthermore, a survey was conducted to evaluate risks by different criteria (e.g. 
impact of risk, timing, and probability).
 The most important participating stakeholder groups were from industry (the 
iron and steel, cement, petrochemical, and innovative technologies for renewable 
energy), power supply companies, the chamber of labour (as part of the ‘social 
partnership’ which is part of the Austrian consensus- based political system), min-
istries (Environment, Finance), political parties (only from the Green Party; other 
parties were invited but did not attend the workshop due to elections), and 
NGOs. Our approach has been to collect risks over a very broad spectrum by 
inviting relevant stakeholders from diverse fields. Hence, we only focus on 
different (categories of ) risks and rarely differentiate between perceptions. While 
the risks for industry were not sufficiently clear to other stakeholders, societal 
risks, such as distributional effects, were highlighted by NGOs or the chamber of 
labour. Instead of necessarily finding a consensus on all major risks, the range of 
risk was illustrated to provide a basis for policy design, as Austrian policymakers so 
far have a limited understanding of the risks related to a low- carbon transition.
 Austria is a country with a strong industrial base and a large electricity gen-
erating sector. The latter has a high share of renewables, although there is still 
potential to increase this. The country is highly developed and wealthy, with 
large natural resources and a highly educated population. In principle, it has the 
institutional and financial prerequisites needed for a transition to a low- carbon 
economy and to be a driver and frontrunner within the EU.
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 Awareness of a need for change is presently strong among policymakers. 
However, most political parties fear to discuss and promote climate change 
issues, arguing that there would be a threat of deindustrialisation (this has been 
repeatedly discussed in the context of the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
between major industrial players in Austria and policymakers). Short planning 
horizons driven by budgetary constraints are also a limiting factor here. These 
factors result in stagnation at the policy level and lack of awareness regarding 
the degree of needed reforms. The country’s new government came up with an 
updated climate strategy in early 2018 (Ministry of Sustainability and Tourism 
and Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology, 2018); however, this 
lacks a concrete timetable for transition. Climate and sustainable development 
are not yet sufficiently recognised as public issues affecting employment, equal-
ity, or education, and a corresponding public discourse is missing. Despite these 
uncertainties with respect to public action, it can be observed that sections of 
Austrian industry take more action than actually required by policymakers. In a 
project called ‘H2Future’, the leading Austrian steel company, the leading 
power company, and international partners are developing cross- sectoral solu-
tions for a hydrogen- based production (Voestalpine AG, 2017). In a further 
H2020 project called Steelanol, the Austrian service provider Primetals Tech-
nologies supports a European steel maker in commercially operating one of the 
first industrial- scale plant using greenhouse gas emissions from steel production 
as feedstock for bio- ethanol production (Steelanol, 2018).
 There are possible diverging interests between national and provincial gov-
ernments due to Austria’s federalist administration, as well as opposing views in 
Austria’s ‘social partnership’. This social partnership is an influential block of 
constitutional interest groups that are involved in policymaking that is able to 
block mitigation measures. Spatial planning policy, for example, which is a local 
and regional competence, has caused irreversible and inefficient structures that 
Austria has to deal with. These structures cannot be ignored when designing 
low- carbon transitions but have to be integrated into a future governance 
system. Introducing new technologies, such as electric vehicles, only makes 
sense when reforms in spatial planning have been introduced first in order to 
avoid redundant transportation. However, political resistance on the local and 
regional level for changing current legislation is significant and counteracts 
national decarbonisation strategies. Thus, continuing policies that favour urban 
sprawl not only increase transportation but also imply massive infrastructural 
requirements when large electric vehicle penetration rates are targeted, e.g. by 
implementing a charging network.
 Elements of the transition, such as for a more decentralised energy supply in 
Austria, are slowly emerging and gaining acceptance. However, technological 
and socio- economic shifts are also necessary. According to stakeholders’ percep-
tions, technologies that are able to initiate transitions are already available but 
are not implemented on a large scale due to uncertainties, which are described 
in detail later on. Currently, alternative lifestyle scenarios with absolute reduc-
tions in demand for products and services, and thus energy throughput, are not 
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being discussed in Austria. A societal problem that may hinder the transition is 
the increasing income gap between cities and rural areas, as well as between rich 
and poor (real income in the lower segments has declined over the last 20 
years). The lowest quartile of equivalent income spends 5.7% on energy con-
sumption while the highest quartile only spends 3.9% (Statistics Austria, 
2018a). Possible increases of energy prices will thus be borne to a larger extent 
by the lower- income group. Stakeholders also question the access to new tech-
nologies for low- income groups.
Process emission- free iron and steel transition pathway and 
corresponding low- carbon electricity pathway
The desired low- carbon future and the corresponding transition pathways to get 
there, as developed by stakeholders, are here synthesised and described for the 
iron and steel sector and the energy sector.
 The desired low- carbon future as a starting point for transition is characterised 
by a highly efficient, yet still energy intensive, complex industry that produces 
specialised, complex products. Companies are almost free of waste and there are 
closed material cycles (including carbon). Most of the energy used is renewable 
electricity, both domestic and imported (e.g. wind electricity from northern 
Europe or PV from northern Africa). There are centralised and decentralised ele-
ments (storage as well as production) which are fully integrated and controlled via 
digital technologies and artificial intelligence. Mobility is fully electrified and 
multimodal. There are no individual cars anymore; instead cars are shared and co- 
ordinated via artificial intelligence. People live in denser spatial patterns, espe-
cially in cities, with short distance ways and in comfortable plus- energy houses. 
Steel is likely to be still produced in Austria and in the same quantities as today, 
but with a hydrogen- based technology with hydrogen being produced via renew-
able electricity (power to gas). Research co- operation on hydrogen production 
and storage between the main Austrian steel producer, the largest energy supply 
company, and the regulator ensures Austrian electricity supply are successful. 
Policymakers on a national level are supporting these efforts. Steel production 
with gas (methane) is planned as a bridging technology.
 Technological advancements, however, will support not only decarbonisa-
tion but also improvements in general the quality of life. Austria will be charac-
terised by a high R&D quota and innovation. In the industrial sector, 
centralised solutions will still be needed as there is need for large amounts of 
energy. Decentralised solutions are linked to stronger citizen participation 
regarding a low- carbon economy. Therefore, national, regional, and local 
policymakers will play a crucial role in ensuring these prerequisites for com-
panies, individuals, or collectives producing renewable electricity.
 In order to reach the desired future of deep decarbonisation in the steel and 
iron sector, different technological options are proposed: hydrogen- based direct 
reduced iron (DRI) and plasma- direct-steel- production (PDSP). Assuming 
different timing of implementation and electricity costs, the macroeconomic 
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model revealed impacts on GDP and employment (Mayer, Bachner, and Stein-
inger, 2019).
 A promising transition pathway not only needs industry (e.g. steel produc-
tion) to be electrified, but also a broader electrification of a range of other eco-
nomic activities including, for example, e- mobility. The transition towards an 
electrified economy is thus simultaneously a precondition for the transition of 
the steel sector. There is consensus among stakeholders in Austria that energy 
supply in 2050 will be 100% renewable (PV, wind, H2 produced from renew-
ables) and that new opportunities from digitalisation will lead to a highly 
energy- efficient economy. Part of the transition pathway in order to reach this 
target are assumptions on the sectoral electricity generation portfolio under spe-
cific socio- economic developments. The socio- economic development included 
in modelling is based on the shared socio- economic pathway framework (SSP2) 
(O’Neill et al., 2014). For the 100% renewable target, additional investments 
for storage (power to gas and batteries) are becoming necessary from 2036 
onwards. This has been modelled by a macroeconomic model which in turn is 
based on a proposed pathway by Pleßmann and Blechinger (2017) with refine-
ments by stakeholders (especially for the wind capacity).
The broader vision
The draft transition pathway for the iron and steel sector was also seen as a 
broader pathway to move to a hydrogen economy by 2050. It considers bridging 
solutions, such as natural gas, that can cause lock- in effects, as well as upstream 
value chain requirements (e.g. renewables- based hydrogen generation).
 As the need for hydrogen in sectors other than steel is still unclear, possible 
supply chains are not well understood, posing an important risk. Stakeholders 
highlighted that inter- sectoral relationships should, however, be actively 
explored as part of a circular economy. Demand for hydrogen produced via 
renewables for process emission- free steel production might compete with 
hydrogen needs in other sectors of the economy (e.g. the chemical industry, 
mobility). Relevant caveats apply with regards to the simultaneous transition in 
the electricity supply subsystem towards renewables in order to prevent a shift 
from process emissions in the iron and steel sector towards combustion- based 
emissions in power generation.
 Austrian stakeholders suggested rethinking the concept of ‘decarbonisation’, 
rather aiming for ‘carbon management’, as carbon itself might still play a crucial 
role in a future economy. Carbon management is distinct from a fully decarbon-
ised future as the focus is on the management of the balance of GHG emission 
sources and sinks. It allows for CO2 reduction by using intelligent grids and elec-
tricity from renewables in combination with chemical storage to avoid the fluctu-
ations of renewables. Carbon- intensive production and consumption is in 
principle permitted; however: (i) the atmospheric net balance should not be 
positive, and (ii) this intent can be facilitated by achieving an as- far-as- possible 
decarbonised economic system. Besides sequestering, remaining carbon emissions 
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can be methanised with green hydrogen, stored and traded in gas tanks/pipeline 
systems. In this circular economy, material and energy cycles are well adjusted to 
each other and mostly closed.
 New processes can convert CO2 into CH4 which can be re- used as basic 
material. Also, materials such as concrete can play a role in storing energy. 
Stakeholders emphasised the crucial importance of pursuing (in parallel) the 
exhaustion of energy efficiency potentials, the change of the energy mix, and 
the implementation of storage technologies.
 Austria is embedded in the European Union which has developed towards 
more integration and the capacity to act commonly, particularly facilitating 
cross- border action within the EU (e.g. harmonisation measures intended for an 
‘Energy Union’), as well as negotiating more effectively with larger regional 
blocks such as China or the USA. There is already significant EU action to 
stimulate a low- carbon transition until 2020 and to provide a reliable regulatory 
framework. At the EU level, a strategy will be developed that enables electricity 
production and transfer across countries. Given the large quantities of electri-
city that Austria would need in the midterm if steel production is based on 
hydrogen, stakeholders stress that domestic potentials are insufficient. Also, 
import possibilities might decline since neighbouring countries might also 
choose electrification pathways. South- eastern Europe with its large potential 
regarding renewables could – under consideration of nature protection require-
ments – provide potential for imports to Austria. Besides the possibility of 
importing electricity, Mayer, Bachner, and Steininger (2019) and Bachner et al. 
(2018a; 2018b) show that deep decarbonisation of Austrian steel making is 
within domestic renewable potentials.
 As an essential aspect of a transition towards decarbonisation of economic 
activities, or of carbon management, in Austria by 2050, a deliberate institu-
tional framework is needed, plus an end to any public support for fossil fuels.
 In 2050, Austria is net climate neutral and resilient overall to ecological, 
social, and economic challenges. Co- operation between the private and the 
public sector is strongly developed. ‘Know how’ exchange and co- operation in 
the triangle of public services, the economy, and sciences are made via a dedic-
ated climate secretariat and supported by a centre for climate studies. In the 
industrial sector there will be refineries, in particular for supplying non- energetic 
by- products. CCS is allowed in the meantime as part of a carbon management 
(as described above). Policy measures are therefore designed in an integrative 
way and a fragmentation of different interests is reduced.
Risks and uncertainties related to the pathways
In the stakeholder co- production process, clusters of risks have been created 
in order to get a more holistic picture of risks both before and during imple-
mentation of the Austrian transition pathways (Figure 3.1). These clusters 
and accompanying sub- clusters comprise implementation risks (barriers) as 
well as consequential risks (impacts). While some clusters intrinsically focus 
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on implementation risks only (like cluster 2), others contain mainly conse-
quential risks (like cluster 3).
Cluster 1: Energy infrastructure
Many debates came up among different stakeholder groups when energy infra-
structure clusters of risks and uncertainties were discussed. Changing demand for 
electricity from renewables, challenges for the grid (stability), and the issue of 
flexibility of the energy system are involved in this cluster. A controversial issue 
was which segments of society will carry the burden of a transition in the energy 
sector. A well- designed energy infrastructure, be it centralised or decentralised, 
is a prerequisite for the energy transition and therefore involves many imple-
mentation risks in this cluster. However, risks can also occur after or during the 
transition, like the supply and price volatility of renewable energy.
 Misleading market rules and market design (pricing and regulations) were 
mentioned as the main barriers for transition in the energy sector. Market over- 
regulations and subsidies on fossil fuels were criticised as well, and so was the 
current electricity market not including the grid.
 For the energy- intensive iron and steel industry, the question of sufficient 
















































Figure 3.1  Risk clusters for the transition in the iron and steel sector and the energy sector.
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demand from other sectors potentially interfering with security of supply. When 
switching to the hydrogen- based direct reduction route (with subsequent 
processing of pig iron in electric arc furnaces), large amounts of electricity are 
needed. The way in which the future energy supply (and demand) system is 
designed determines the scale and composition of auxiliary infrastructure, like 
transmission and distribution grids, or gas pipelines and storage caverns. For 
instance, it is not currently clear which party will generate and eventually 
supply hydrogen to the market – it may eventually be the currently incumbent 
power utilities, the iron and steel sector itself, or a providing third party. It is 
also conceivable that the generation of electricity and/or hydrogen is organised 
in a much more decentralised manner, such that on- site generation of ‘green 
hydrogen’, for example, decreases the upstream dependence of the iron and steel 
sector.
 Along the pathways there is the risk that the sudden increase in electricity 
demand from renewable energy in Austria or Europe cannot be met by poten-
tials, or that the supply side has not been prepared to meet it. This risk could 
increase substantially if large industries decide to switch to carbon- neutral elec-
trified processes and/or individual transport switches to e- mobility. A second 
branch of consequential risks concerns the electricity grid with different percep-
tions. While some stakeholders expect an increase in grid instability due to the 
volatility of renewable energy (especially when expansions in subordinate grids 
are lagging), others perceive the risk as being very low due to intelligent digital 
solutions. In addition, there is a risk that the system is not flexible enough to 
cope with expected variations in energy supply from renewables and that storage 
capacities are too small. This risk increases when a 100% renewables- based elec-
tricity mix is targeted and should include insights from increased efficiency of 
co- generation.
 There is no consensus among stakeholders concerning the system design of 
future electricity infrastructure. Some favoured an expansion of central power 
grids to transfer large amounts of power away from renewable power plants, 
especially in peak times. Others argued that such investments are sunk costs, 
and that one should start with decentralised energy from a very local level in 
response to the electricity demand there, then supply the electricity demand of 
the next level. This would also increase the local or regional added value (e.g. 
engineers, plumbers, etc.). However, a central–decentral mix is seen as reason-
able depending on the overall energy supply system design (cf. the cases with 
on- or off- site ‘green’ hydrogen generation for the iron and steel sector).
Cluster 2: Political and institutional framework
Another cluster of mainly implementation risks hindering, postponing, or jeop-
ardising transition is endemic in the political and institutional framework. Here we 
saw a broad consensus. While on a meta- level there is the risk of lacking or 
missing co- ordinated national initiatives, on a very specific lower level legal reg-
ulations may be counterproductive. Furthermore, national transition depends 
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on future international co- operation and developments, which are uncertain 
and bear risks.
 First of all, there is no integrated climate and energy strategy in Austria with 
clear milestones and measures. An additional barrier for transition is the lack of 
a roadmap for hydrogen, which would be instrumental for solving the need for 
storage and reliable supply. This leads to uncertainty due to lack of liability, 
planning security, commitment on a clear target, and the timing of implementa-
tion of technologies. In Austria, responsibilities for one specific topic are spread 
over different levels of authorities (local, regional, and national) and therefore 
co- ordinated legislation is often blocked by differing interests.
 Furthermore, the national transition depends on future international co- 
operation and developments. One important indicator for planning further 
climate mitigation projects is the development of a CO2 price, which is cur-
rently uncertain, especially for governments of single EU member states since 
the design of the EU ETS (Emissions Trading Scheme) is ruled at the EU level. 
When the regulatory framework for a transition is missing or even counterpro-
ductive, a transition will not be initiated; for the private sector in particular, 
planning security is a prerequisite for financing investments. For instance, regu-
lations for the use of decentralised electricity are unclear, as is stability for 
 reinvestment in renewable energy sources (RES) and legal regulations within 
the clean power law. Various stakeholders stress that phase- out laws for fossil- 
fuel-based energy technologies are missing, and long approval procedures and 
time lags for expansion projects (e.g. hydropower), due to concerns around 
nature protection, are seen as barriers for fast transition by the energy sector.
 Lack of international co- operation can bear the risk of an industry resettling 
towards regions with a less restrictive climate policy. A switch to new technolo-
gies in the European iron and steel industry will be influenced by either 
increased tariffs or cheap gas imports, making it less competitive to switch from 
conventional blast furnace routes to (currently more expensive) hydrogen- based 
routes. However, for the leading steel company in Austria, two- thirds of its 
revenue from operations in the USA (€1.2 billion in 2017) is generated as a 
local manufacturer in the USA itself (Voestalpine AG, 2018). Clear regulations 
and financial incentives from European energy policy would be necessary to 
switch to new technologies in the iron and steel sector, thereby increasing the 
value for the products.
Cluster 3: Environment
The environment cluster mainly sees occurrence of consequential risks. Due to 
the volatility of renewable energy, storage is increasingly important. This leads 
to increasing demand for resources and, inevitably, environmental consequences 
during extraction or disposal (e.g. for lithium which is used in batteries for 
storage of electricity). The magnitude and importance of this risk was disputed 
between energy producing utilities and NGOs. When transition pathways 
include CCS technology to be able to reach the climate targets, respective 
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 consequential risks are borne. For example, induced seismic activity may lead to 
leakage and thus to (in)direct human/animal suffocation (through soil acidifica-
tion). In addition to expected intermittency, there might be negative feedback 
loops with climate change affecting the renewable energy supply, e.g. for hydro-
gen power when rivers dry up. Increasing resistance to the construction of new 
overhead high- voltage power lines could be a barrier to transition projects or 
impose increased costs for power supply companies along the transition pathway 
via the need to install underground cables. The disposal of infrastructure, e.g. of 
wind turbine rotors which are made of composite material which are not easily 
disposed of, can be seen as further consequential risks along the transition 
pathway which are often not considered because only the energetic flows enter 
into the analysis.
Cluster 4: Consumer/acceptance
The consumer/acceptance cluster includes mainly implementation risks. The ‘not in 
my backyard’ (NIMBY) effect (e.g. van der Horst, 2007) refers to the risk of resi-
dents opposing renewable energy projects (e.g. hydropower due to nature protec-
tion concerns) is seen as a main implementation risk within this cluster. The 
neglect of social equity issues and the role of behavioural change along the trans-
ition pathways are further – mainly consequential – risks that should be considered.
 Implementation risks opposing transition are the play- off between social 
justice and climate mitigation, lacking planning or investment security, and the 
role of behavioural change in transition. In Austria, PV and wind are gaining 
importance. There is not much remaining potential to construct large hydro 
power plants, while small power plant projects can receive opposition from 
nature conservationists. Hydropower will, however, definitely play a key role in 
domestic energy transition (e.g. pumped hydro). Stakeholders consider the risk 
that, in the public debate, social justice and climate mitigation are seen as con-
tradicting targets. The fact that climate mitigation strategies can make an 
important contribution to social justice is not communicated sufficiently. For 
households, risks around investing in or planning their energy supply can lead 
to reluctance and uncertainty. For example, whether to invest in a private PV 
installation or a co- generation system depends on the legal framework and clear 
political commitment. In this context, there is the risk that private households 
make too high or unnecessary investments in storage technologies at home due 
to high feed- in tariffs. For instance, a 10 kWh battery for at- home storing costs 
about €10,000, while an electric vehicle can store 40 kWh while simultaneously 
being used for private mobility.
 If all actors are not considered, there is the risk of energy poverty for those 
who have to pay potentially higher prices or who have no access to new tech-
nologies. One example of when this may occur is through net metering (a usage 
and payment scheme in which a customer generating their own power is com-
pensated monetarily) if the additional cost of providing these schemes is borne 
by other electricity customers.
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 Another risk occurs before or during implementation of the transition 
pathway, when there is no incentive for behavioural change and its contribu-
tion is not sufficiently considered or communicated. Especially when transition 
pathways are mainly focused on technological changes, the contribution of 
behavioural change is not incorporated into projections. To overcome this risk, 
stakeholders suggest clearly communicating which parts of society are able and 
willing to contribute to behavioural change and the extent of change required. 
When changing behaviour (such as saving energy or producing electricity) is 
associated with status, then all parts of the society could be involved. For 
example, smartphones can be seen as a status symbol for all parts of society. To, 
for example, show one’s power consumption and production in real time could 
become a trend, and be an incentive for private investment and behavioural 
change.
Cluster 5: Conditions of competition of (financial) markets
The cluster conditions of competition of (financial) markets includes mainly finan-
cial risks and the lack of planning security for investors as a prevalent imple-
mentation risk. Increasing dependence on electricity imports and international 
policies (e.g. steel policy in the USA) as well as the underestimation of market 
dynamics are seen as further risks within this cluster.
 Lack of foresight and efficiency as the main criteria for decision and plan-
ning, as well as missing education for professions needed in future, are further 
risks that may hinder transition. If politics fosters transition, there is the risk 
that the intended direction will harm some sectors or companies in 
unintended ways.
 The risks stemming from financial markets is appraised by stakeholders ten 
times higher than from the real economy. As decarbonisation is highly 
dependent on financial capital, developments in financial markets are very 
important for the transition. Additional risks occur for the proposed transition 
pathway in the iron and steel sector. For its implementation, electricity prices 
between €0.03 and €0.05/kWh, together with modest CO2 pricing, guarantee a 
cost- efficient transition as they level out unit operating expenditures of 
hydrogen- based steel production with conventional carbon- intensive produc-
tion (details are given in Mayer, Bachner, and Steininger, 2019). However, 
these prices are uncertain at the current state. Which sectors will compete for 
hydrogen produced by renewable electricity (the demand by mobility, housing, 
the chemical industry, etc.) is also unclear. The potential for a hydrogen 
economy exists, but emerging new dependencies and asymmetric market power 
relations may have to be dealt with. For instance, pipeline owners possess to 
some extent monopoly positions because hydrogen can be transported mainly by 
pipelines.
 In general, corporate risk management always has to consider aspects like 
market concentration, foreign trade, predictability, and political interventions. 
More specifically, in the future risk management will change when the iron and 
Austria  39
steel pathway includes profound switches from coal, coke, or gas to electricity or 
hydrogen. This is because steel producers will interact in different value chains 
and on different markets with different risk profiles.
 An additional consequential risk mentioned relates to increasing market 
penetration of electric vehicles. This could discriminate against the domestic/
European automotive industry, which is currently producing cars with conven-
tional combustion engines. Moreover, the net employment effect of such 
switches is unclear. For the given case, traditional jobs like mechanics might be 
put under pressure while electricians and IT technicians might gain.
Cluster 6: Innovation and technology choice
Risks in the cluster innovation and technology choice comprise consequential and 
implementation risks, e.g. the risk of lock- in effects for new technologies and 
corresponding path dependency, lack of information infrastructure (smart solu-
tions), the risk of large investments for private households when investing in 
decentralised solutions, and the question of timing to finance an investment.
 Another implementation risk refers to non- existing co- ordination across 
sectors for their technology choices. Furthermore, there is a lack of public finan-
cial support for innovation and research, which is especially critical for projects 
that are between pilot technology and industrial application (upscaling).
 Path dependency and lock- in effects (e.g. through capacity mechanisms) are 
consequential risks along the transition pathway. A diversification of risk can be 
achieved by initiating different technological options. The risk of timing is one 
along the transition pathway but also a kind of implementation risk. For 
instance, the right time for installation of hydrogen- based technology to be 
competitive is very difficult to predict.
Prioritisation of risks by cluster
The comprehensive number of risks collected through the stakeholder process 
has been prioritised in a World Café setting. The scoring procedure has been 
done by risk cluster, i.e. the prioritised risks represent the most important risks 
for each cluster but cannot be compared across risk categories. They were then 
allocated to the implementation and consequential risks category. High- scored 
implementation risks are lack of a national strategy and co- ordinated European 
policy and the lack of a regulatory framework (thus poor timing of investments). 
On a more individual level, the play- off between climate mitigation and social 
justice and the role of behavioural change were also highly scored. High- scored 
consequential risks from a stakeholder perspective are the stability of grids and 
flexibility of the energy system, the possibility of lock- ins, and the fear that 
households bear the main part of the costs due to misleading signals from pol-
itics or markets. The risk that resources are not considered in transition calcula-




















































































































































































































































































































































































 Besides stakeholder perceptions of the most relevant implementation and 
consequential risks, appraising and modelling impacts of the transition pathways 
and correlated risks can only be done in the light of uncertainties. Within the 
modelling process of transition pathways, several uncertainty layers were identi-
fied (Bachner et al., 2018b). There are several technological options for trans-
ition and corresponding costs statements that are uncertain and lead to different 
effects along transitions. The possible developments of population and eco-
nomic growth lead to socio- economic uncertainty and are based on the shared 
socio- economic pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill et al., 2014). The stringency and geo-
graphic scope of climate policy is uncertain and highly influences other factors 
to be considered in modelling transition pathways. The uncertain macro-
economic state of a country along the transition pathway influences the degree 
of capacity utilisation.
Conclusions
The co- developed narrative presented in this chapter highlights the risks associ-
ated with disruptive technological changes that are implied by transition to low-
 carbon energy production for Austria’s iron and steel sector. It illustrates the 
strong sectoral interrelationships and resulting risks, making the transition in 
the iron and steel sector dependent on the transition in the energy sector as 
well as other sectors. The technology choice in one sector will influence the 
transition pathway of the other sectors and vice versa; for example, whether 
mobility will be electrified or supplied by hydrogen will be crucial for the iron 
and steel sector.
 Stakeholders from all kinds of affiliation stress that missing long- term policy 
frameworks, and the lack of cross- sectoral alignment of technology choices and 
supply chains, can hinder transition.
 Technological innovation in Austria is currently strongly driven by the 
industry itself with public financial support (mainly by the EU), while the socio-
 political framework on the national level is not to date pushing for a substantial 
transition. This implies that industry would need to take risks with possible neg-
ative consequences but also with the possibility of becoming technological 
pioneers.
 Another main implementation risk stressed by stakeholders is the trade- off 
between climate mitigation and social justice. If there is no clear policy frame-
work that considers and mitigates threats posed to social justice by the trans-
ition, there may be fear and opposition towards changes. In addition, the 
question of who pays for the transition is fundamental here. The companies 
involved need planning security for investment and a clear regulatory frame-
work. This is crucial for private investment in decentralised solutions. If it is not 
clear to ‘prosumers’ to what extent the investment is part of a higher- level 
energy strategy, they will restrain their investments. In our understanding, such 
long- term subsidy guarantees are part of comprehensive energy strategies. If 
information regarding such instruments is lacking, so will be planning security 
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for prosumers. Yet the Austrian climate policy rather follows past patterns of 
gradual improvement and does not provide a clear framework that would reduce 
uncertainty and most of the implementation risks. Neither the opportunities 
nor the need for fundamental changes to the stable, wealthy, and consensus- 
seeking Austrian society are well enough understood.
 While short- term goals or decisions are associated with risks, long- term goals 
are seen as introducing a broad set of socio- economic opportunities. A ‘mission- 
oriented’ approach could be a solution, i.e. a truly ‘entrepreneurial state’ which 
not only corrects market failures but also actively creates and shapes (new) 
markets through investing and signalling credibility: a state that consciously 
takes on risks that the private sector either will not or cannot accept. This, 
however, could lead to the ‘public risk–private benefit’ issue (Mazzucato, 2016). 
In particular, in the energy sector the low- carbon transition is seen as a way 
towards a better quality of life, a more inclusive way where citizens are more 
involved in the energy system beyond their narrow role in reducing emissions.
 The stronger need for co- operation between the public and the private sector 
to mitigate transition risks will increase the overall societal resilience to ecolo-
gical, social, and economic challenges. Sector coupling may also increase the 
efficiency of the economy and lead to overall carbon management of the 
economy instead of implementing individual and sectoral measures. Carbon 
management is more than just decarbonisation: it includes synchronisation of 
material and energy cycles in a sustainable circular economy, and allows for CO2 
emission reduction by using intelligent grids and electricity from renewables in 
combination with chemical storage.
 With a new set of risks emerging, policies need to be designed in an inter- 
sectoral way. These policies will reduce and achieve more effective management 
of the risks in individual sectors but will also need new institutional formats and 
policy processes to design them. If Austria aims to remain or become a frontrun-
ner in innovation, a detailed planning process for a risk- reducing climate and 
industrial policy far beyond the 2030 horizon needs to be initiated.
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4 Canada
Finding common ground – the need 
for plural voices in lower- carbon 
futures of the Alberta oil sands
Luis D. Virla, Jenny Lieu, and Cecilia Fitzpatrick
Sustainability in the Alberta oil sands
The knowledge of oil sands has been part of the Frist Nation cultural heritage 
for centuries, not as an energy source but as an isolation material for canoes. 
The first historical documents date to the eighteenth century when European 
explorers and crown emissaries, brought to the region by fur trading economic 
interests, observed and described the abundance of bitumen near the Athabasca 
River as a natural substance emanated from the ground (Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), 2016). One hundred years later, the first 
government- sponsored geological study on the Alberta oil sands was performed 
and, along with additional expeditions, unveiled a big economic potential for 
the use of the resource. During this time, natural gas and conventional oil were 
discovered, developed, and used as primary energy source for the communities 
in the province (Alberta Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2016). However, 
commercial development of the Alberta oil sands did not begin until the early 
1920s with some failed attempts to extract the oil using drilling wells between 
1906 and 1917 (Regional Aquatics Monitoring Program, 2016). From this 
moment, technologies for oil separation from the sand using hot water were 
developed using the same principle as the First Nations people had used in the 
past. This technology was mainly applied at a pilot scale and was supported by 
governmental institutions such as the federal Department of Mines and the 
Alberta Research Council.
 The main focus of Alberta oil sands exploitation by that time was roofing 
and road surfacing applications (Alberta Ministry of Energy, 2016). It was not 
until 1962 that the large- scale oil sands development began. That year, the 
government of Alberta developed a specific oil sands policy to supplement 
the conventional crude oil policy already in place. The inaugural project was 
the Great Canadian Oil Sands (GCOS) Project, later transformed into the 
current Suncor Energy, which brought the first oil sands operation ‘on stream’ 
in 1967. Along with the GCOS, the Syncrude consortium was formed and 
shipped its first barrel of oil in 1978, becoming the second major oil sands 
producer in Canada (Insitute for Oil Sands Innovation, 2016). Today, the oil 
sands attract local and foreign investments. The oil sands region in Alberta is 
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divided in three major deposits – Athabasca, Cold Lake, and Peace River oil 
sands – which are the world’s third- largest proven oil reserves (see Figure 4.1) 
(Alberta Energy Regulator, 2015). Two methods are vastly used to recover the 
oil sands deposits: surface mining and in- situ recovery. Most of the efforts are 
put on developing technologies to decrease production cost and the 
environmental impact of the oil sands while keeping a competitive price for 
exports to the international markets.
 The Alberta oil sands in Canada are one of the biggest fossil- fuel energy 
resources in the world. For Canada, the fossil- fuel sector is both a major 
economic driver and source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. By 2016, 
energy contributed to 9.9% of Canada’s GDP, of which 2.2% was from crude oil 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2018). Canada is ranked as one of the world’s top 
ten emitters, contributing 1.6% of global emissions (International Energy 
Agency, 2015). Fossil- fuel production and transportation are the largest 
contributing sectors to the total GHG emissions in the country, with 27% and 
23% of contributions respectively (Natural Resources Canada, 2016). Alberta 
contributed 37.4% of national emissions in 2014, representing the biggest 
emitter among all Canadian provinces (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, 2017).
 Canada has the second largest oil reserves in the world, most of which primarily 
exist in the form of crude bitumen. The majority of proven reserves are found in 
oil sands in western Canada. Unproven reserves, however, are expected to be 
Figure 4.1 Location of Alberta’s oil sands areas and selected deposits.
Source: Alberta Energy Regulator, 2015.
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significantly larger and are likely to reside in Alberta’s oil sands. Extracting crude 
bitumen, or synthetic crude oil, from the oil sands generates significant GHGs and 
other polluting emissions (methane, sulphur, aromatics) that has led to damaging 
environmental and health impacts. Historically, developing the oil sands and 
protecting the environment have been a challenge for policymakers and industry 
representatives (Chastko, 2000). After World War II, the oil and gas sector 
became the dominant economic industry in the province, and by the 1970s this 
industry accounted for 40% of the province’s income. The rapid growth of the 
sector in the twenty- first century has also influenced politics since actions towards 
regulation of the industry could be perceived as detrimental to the economic 
progress of the province (Finkel, 2000). Today, as part of the Paris Agreement, 
Canada has agreed to decrease GHG emissions to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030, 
mainly by applying regulatory measures to change the transportation and 
electricity sectors, control landfill emissions, and promote clean energy 
technologies (Government of Canada, 2017). To ensure a successful 
implementation of different lower- carbon policies, it is critical for policymakers to 
account for socio- economic effects and social acceptance. Particular attention is 
needed to understand the needs and interests of the communities most vulnerable 
to the impacts of the Alberta oil sands production.
 Oil sands companies claim that sustainability is an issue of importance in the 
sector. The industry has been making efforts to address the problem by 
developing new technologies to cut GHGs. From the technical perspective, 
sustainability is approached by air pollution monitoring, decreasing water usage, 
optimising existing processes, and land reclamation. The main oil sand 
producers have teams dedicated to sustainability issues. Presently, interactions 
with neighbouring communities and development programmes are included as 
part of their sustainability strategies. Although technical concepts of 
sustainability are being applied in the sector, many environmental degradation 
issues continue to persist. Decreased flow in the Athabasca River, increasing air 
pollution (claimed to be associated with increasing incidences of disease among 
the local population), shrinking caribou and moose ranges, and the 
disappearance of certain animal species are all a result of decades of resource 
development in the northern Alberta boreal forest (Tenenbaum, 2009; 
McLachlan, 2014; Parajulee and Wania, 2014; Russell, Pendlebury, and Ronson, 
2016; Harner et al., 2018).
 The perspectives and interests of various sub- national groups most impacted 
by climate action and policies are not currently reflected in international and 
regional climate policies, such as the UN’s 1.5–2.0°C target, Canada’s 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), and the Alberta Climate 
Leadership Plan. The exclusion of different perspectives leads to a roadmap that 
is disconnected from local realities and can threaten the implementation of 
climate change actions. The Paris Agreement specifically called to respect, 
promote, and consider the rights of local communities including Indigenous 
peoples among others. Indeed, pathways developed from views from Indigenous 
or local communities, in which generations of knowledge are embedded, can 
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help inform policymakers on necessary actions to address climate change. The 
local narratives can be the basis of developing lower-carbon transition pathways 
that represent and address the needs and priorities of the Indigenous 
communities and complement other pathways defined by policymakers, industry 
players, and the public at large.
 This chapter presents three lower- carbon transition pathways which are 
based on the priorities of policymakers, the community of Fort McKay First 
Nation, and a diverse mix of industry, grid operators, and NGOs in Alberta. 
Risks associated with these three pathways were elicited considering the 
perspectives of various types of stakeholders. These risks could act as barriers for 
the materialisation of the lower- carbon pathways, or as negative impacts from 
the implementation of them. In addition, the analysis of these risks sets the 
grounds for the development of effective policies in the midst of governmental 
changes in a Canada looking to meet its commitments in the Paris Agreement.
Reseach process and methods
The approach selected for the development of the narrative consisted of two stages: 
pathway development, and elicitation of preference and risks associated with the 
pathways. The broader public sentiment with regards to climate action policies and 
lower- carbon futures for the Alberta oil sands was collected through media articles. 
These included newspapers, blogs, and government, industry and institutional 
(NGOs, companies) websites. We also collected information from Statistics Canada 
(Canada’s national statistical agency). The three pathways represent three distinct 
views originated from policymakers, an Indigenous community (Fort McKay First 
Nation), and institutions (including firms, electricity regulators, experts, and NGOs) 
with regards to potential solutions for decreasing the environmental impact of the 
Alberta oil sands. The pathways were developed from existing policies and studies 
that consulted a range of stakeholders.
 The first pathway takes the government as the dominant narrator and was 
developed based on the Alberta Climate Leadership Plan. The Alberta Climate 
Change Advisory Panel was formed to provide insight from a broad group of 
stakeholders that include the Indigenous communities, industry, farmers, 
researchers, and the general public. Two public open houses were organised with 
input from over 1000 participants and an online survey (including questions using 
the Likert scale and open- ended questions) with over 25,000 respondents 
(Hill + Knowlton strategies, 2015; Leach et al., 2015).
 The second pathway focuses on the local needs and interests of the Fort McKay 
community. The details for the pathway were inspired by a project commissioned 
by the Fort McKay Sustainability Office (Cumulative Effects Project) and carried 
out by the ALCES and Integral Ecology Group (ALCES and Integral Ecology 
Group, 2013). The results of the study explored the cumulative effects of oil sands 
development and proposed a paced approach to industrial development in their 
traditional territory. The report emphasised the community’s interest in protecting 
the ecological integrity of an area of land while allowing its responsible industrial 
development and economic benefits for the society. This study identified specific 
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ecological indicators the community was interested in studying since they 
observed drastic changes in the population (the availability of these species) that 
had directly impacted the community’s way of life: moose, fisher, native fish, and 
edible berries. These indicators were not typically part of the government’s 
indicators for climate change action, which primarily consists of CO2 emissions. 
The views and thoughts presented for this pathway correspond to the authors’ own 
analysis to the best of our knowledge, and do not reflect the formal stands of the 
Fort McKay First Nation or any of its members not listed as authors on this piece.
 The third pathway, deployment of distributed renewables, is proposed by the 
Energy Futures Lab, a branch of The Natural Step Canada, an NGO that pushes an 
agenda to promote a sustainable transition in Alberta. The Energy Futures Lab is a 
platform that brings together a diverse range of partner organisations including 
industry, government, NGOs, and Indigenous communities. The proposed pathway 
is supported by energy associations, city economic development organisations, and 
electricity systems operators.
 Aside from including existing policies and research initiatives, we have 
independently carried out 17 open- ended interviews with stakeholders over the 
period of November 2016 to April 2018: academics (four interviews), Indigenous 
community members (six interviews), industry players (five interviews), a non- 
profit organisation (one interview), and a policymaker (one interview).
 We also carried out a risk elicitation by capturing the opinion of stakeholders 
during two public workshops. The first workshop was part of an existing 
conference, the Alberta Ecotrust Environmental Gathering. Researchers carried 
out a ‘Solution forum’ to explore how consensus can be reached within groups 
with various perspectives about sustainable development of natural resources in 
Alberta. The event took placed at Mount Royal University on 10 March 2018. 
There was a total of 24 participants. The attendees consisted of government 
bodies, politicians, industry members, researchers, and NGOs. Reponses were 
captured through small group role- playing exercises and a live polling.
 The second workshop, ‘Creating a common language for lower- carbon futures 
in Alberta’, was organised within an existing seminar series run by the Graduate 
Colleges at the University of Calgary. The workshops consisted of a panel 
discussion. The interview panel including an industry representative, a policy 
consultant, an Elder from the Fort McKay community, a representative from the 
Fort McKay Sustainability Office, and an academic. The panel discussion took 
place on 12 March 2018.
Lower- carbon futures for the Alberta oil sands
This narrative considers three lower- carbon pathways for the Alberta energy 
sector including the Alberta oil sands: ‘cap the emissions hat’, developed as the 
government of Alberta’s formal stance on capping emissions in the oil sands 
sector; ‘hold your horses’, which is inspired by the collective desired future to 
pace oil sand development of the Fort McKay community, representing over 
775 Dene, Cree, and Métis people; and ‘mix and round it all up’, created from a 
combination of views that includes renewable and alternative energy while 
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reducing emissions from the oil sands, as conveyed by the Energy Futures Lab. 
These different futures represent pathways that are not mutually exclusive and 
are partially complementary. They reflect alternatives developed under different 
contexts but aiming for a similar goal: to create a sustainable future for Alberta. 
These three futures will be presented by considering the views and expectations 
of stakeholders and the potential implementation and consequential risks of 
following a specific pathway.
‘Cap the hat’: carbon emissions cap for the oil sands and methane 
reduction
This future considers the government of Alberta’s current effort to decrease 
emissions in the oil sands sector. As stated by Alberta’s premier, leader of the 
New Democratic Party (NDP) responsible for development of the new policy 
for climate change abatement, Alberta is looking to develop a plan capable of 
decreasing the environmental impact of the oil sands sector while securing the 
economic benefits of that sector:
Responding to climate change is about doing what’s right for future 
generations of Albertans – protecting our jobs, health and the environment. 
It will help us access new markets for our energy products, and diversify our 
economy with renewable energy and energy efficiency technology. Alberta 
is showing leadership on one of the world’s biggest problems, and doing 
our part.
(Rachel Notley, Premier of Alberta, in Alberta Ministry of Environemnt 
and Parks, 2015)
As part of its Climate Leadership Plan, Alberta proposes an output- based 
allocation system for carbon emissions based on three main actions: (i) a 100 Mt 
emissions cap for the oil sands sector; (ii) establishing a credit trading system 
between emitters; and (iii) setting a C$30/ton carbon tax for facilities that exceed 
100,000 CO2 tons/year (Leach et al., 2015). The carbon tax is expected to 
increase to C$50/ton by 2022 in order to meet federal targets (Government of 
Canada, 2016). With this plan, the government expects to reduce emissions by 
encouraging companies to implement new low- emission technologies. The 
industry is envisioned to continue growing, as the cost of production has decreased 
to around C$25/barrel due to technological efficiencies and will continue to 
decline in costs over forthcoming years (Erickson, 2018). At the current carbon 
tax rate, the cost of oil sands production has increased by C$1 (Ignjatovic, 2016). 
The carbon tax is expected to encourage industry to reduce emissions from 
bitumen extraction and production processes. Additionally, the carbon tax is 
expected to promote energy efficiency and the application of renewable energy in 
the extraction and production process, along with reducing methane flaring.
 Aside from carbon emissions, targets have been set to decrease methane 
emissions by 45% by 2025. Methane cuts are expected to be achieved through 
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setting emissions standards, improving monitoring, reporting, and verification of 
methane emissions, and detecting leaks and repairing (Leach et al., 2015). In 
this future, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is anticipated as a game- changing 
technology. Starting from 2018, Alberta was expected to capture 2.76 million 
tons of CO2 per year, equivalent to the emissions of around 600,000 cars/year 
(Alberta Ministry of Energy, 2017). We can anticipate the development of CCS 
to continue to grow once the cost of the technology falls. The Albertan 
government intends to lead the way towards a more sustainable energy system 
while respecting the current system that is largely dependent on fossil fuels. 
Technological advancements are expected to reduce emissions and 
environmental impact while increasing productivity. However, some 
technologies being tested, such as solvent- assisted in- situ bitumen extraction, 
although capable of generating a significant decrease in carbon emissions, raise 
many concerns due to their potential environmental impact and unknown 
cumulative effects in the local ecosystems. Alberta’s lead is in line with federal 
intentions to reduce emissions through its Pan- Canadian Framework on Clean 
Growth and Climate Change. This framework contributes to Canada’s 2017 
National Determined Contribution to reduce emissions to 30% below 2005 
levels by 2030.
 The reception of this pathway among industry stakeholders is mixed. Some 
players consider that the Pan- Canadian framework could bring clarity and 
stability to the sector and potentially open new markets if the carbon footprint 
of the Alberta oil sands can be lowered through technological innovation. 
However, for other industry stakeholders, this future is harmful to the sector and 
lacks inclusion of the industry’s current concerns. Although this future 
represents a change widely expected by many, the collapse of oil prices in 2014 
changed the sector’s outlook. Low oil prices, especially for the Alberta oil sands, 
forced producers to significantly cut spending and concentrate their efforts in 
reducing production costs to at least break even at oil prices below C$50/barrel 
(Erickson, 2018). Under this reality, the new cap on emissions, a trading system, 
and the carbon tax was an additional cost unwanted during a time when the 
industry was struggling. While the policy was being developed, oil producers 
increased production to maintain profits, causing an increase in GHG emissions 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017).
 By contrast, these measures were welcomed by environmentalists, who also 
claimed the measures did not do enough to decrease climate change impacts. 
Moreover, this future represents a risk of double standards since the advisory 
panel that developed the Climate Leadership Plan acknowledged that such 
measures would probably not be enough to meet the emission reduction goals of 
the Paris Agreement and the Canadian NDC. Detractors of these new measures 
stress the fact that more- drastic changes are needed in order to achieve the 
global objectives. However, the limits placed of these regulatory actions were 
justified by avoiding carbon leakage – an increase of emissions in a jurisdiction 
as a result of the reduction of emissions in another jurisdiction with stricter 
climate policies. From our perspective, the actual reason was the desire to 
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maintain an important sector and an economic system that is culturally 
embedded within the province’s identity, since the majority of the oil sands 
reserves are present in Alberta. The Climate Leadership Plan considered in this 
pathway has been a political flag for the current ruling New Democratic Party 
(NDP) of Alberta. However, current economic challenges in the oil and gas 
sector have created strong opposition to this plan among various sectors in the 
province. Under a probable scenario of change in leadership by the next 
provincial elections in 2019, there is a high probability that alternative 
strategies for pollution control are implemented instead of the Climate 
Leadership Plan. For example, the United Conservative Party have promised to 
eliminate the NDP’s plan if elected. Such political uncertainty within this 
pathway can jeopardise the possibilities of Canada to meets its NDC goals.
‘Hold you horses’: paced oil sands development and land- use 
protection
This future was developed inspired by the views of the Fort McKay First Nation 
which, seeking advice from scientists and their western perspectives, developed 
a plan to protect their land’s ecological integrity and their traditional ways of 
living while offering an alternative to maintain the industrial sector operating 
in the area (ALCES and Integral Ecology Group, 2013). The perspectives 
presented on this pathway were developed by the authors to the best of their 
knowledge and do not represent the official stand of the Fort McKay First 
Nation or any of its members not listed as chapter authors.
 This pathway considers an approach to have the government of Alberta 
manage the pace of bitumen production within the Athabasca oil sands area, 
comprising of the 3.62 million (M) hectares. The size of the Athabasca oil sands 
area is equivalent to nearly 10% of the provincial- owned forest coverage. There 
is a strong emphasis on maintaining traditional land uses and protecting wildlife 
while enabling the oil sand sector to develop at a more thoughtful pace. This 
pathway suggests several implementation strategies. A key strategy is to expand 
protected areas and maintain levels of ecological disturbance below a threshold 
that allows the recovery of the area. This study suggested that increasing 
protected areas and managing industrial activity in between 10.4% and 39.2% 
(378,483–1,420,579 ha) of the Fort McKay’s Traditional Territory could 
improve the ecological integrity and biodiversity of the area (ALCES and 
Integral Ecology Group, 2013). The Traditional Territory is the land entitled to 
the people of Fort McKay to exercise their treaty rights as stipulated in Treaty 8, 
which upholds the community’s right to hunt, trap, and gather resources on the 
land (Canada, Privy Council, O.C. No. 2749, 1966). According to the words of 
Selina Harpe, a Fort McKay Community Elder:
The land is our livelihood, we live off this land all around here. We grew up 
in the trap- line, and at younger age my dad did trapping and hunting, there 
was no other way to make a living. At that time there was only native 
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people in town, before Europeans came, so everyone did whatever they had 
to do to make a living for your family, and that is the way we used to live.
(quoted in Behr, 2013)
The proposed resources management plan contemplates: the establishment of 
land disturbance limits; defining and implementing culturally relevant reclamation 
plans for damaged areas; strict monitoring, reporting and compliance to specific 
air quality standards; controlled surface and ground water withdrawals and effluent 
quality monitoring; protection and reclamation of wetlands; ensuring fish and 
wildlife impact mitigation and monitoring; and protecting traditional routes and 
areas located in the zone (Alberta Ministry of Environemnt and Parks, 2018a). 
The protected land areas can be aligned with the 2012 federal policy Federal 
Recovery Strategy for Woodland Caribou – Boreal Population which recommended 
that implementation plans should be set at the provincial level to protect 65% of 
caribou ranges by October 2017 (Environment Canada, 2012). Currently in 
Alberta, between 57% and 95% of each caribou range is disturbed by industrial 
activities (Russell, Pendlebury, and Ronson, 2016). Other important strategies are 
to demand rigorous industrial best practices for companies operating in the area to 
reduce land and water use, and to increase the footprint reclamation rate while 
considering biodiversity and potential future uses of the reclaimed land (ALCES 
and Integral Ecology Group, 2013). The implementation of this plan is expected 
to mitigate the effects of industrial development and enable the recovery of the 
ecology and biodiversity of the area. These changes could allow the members of 
the community of Fort McKay to practice their traditional way of living and 
knowledge dissemination practices. In addition, this plan is expected to still allow 
significant bitumen extraction and related industrial activities in order to 
maintain the influx of economic benefits from the traditional territory.
 The intention behind land management is to provide a protected space for 
the ecosystem and to support traditional land- use practices. Parts of the land 
have been used by families for hunting and trapping for many generations, while 
berries and herbs are collected for consumption and medicinal uses. Securing 
these ranges of land provides assurance that both environmental and traditional 
practices can be preserved while the industrial activity keeps its course. There 
are also hopes that a paced development might lead to more thoughtful 
resource- extraction practices. The communities living close to the oil sands 
would like to be able to drink tap water without the fear of health concerns 
from the effluent released by industry. They would also like to keep their 
windows open to let in the breeze without concerns of foul smells and poor air 
quality (Thurton, 2018). If the land around the community is allowed to 
recover, community members can once again pick berries and consume them 
without the fear of contamination from the land. The moose and birds may also 
return to the land and bring with them the assurance that the ecosystem is 
being restored. The protection of areas of land is expected to have a positive 
impact on the health of ecosystems needed for species to maintain their 
population. Members of the community are not only calling for the right to 
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carry out their practices, but also for the fundamental right to a clean living 
environment:
We need and have the right to clean air and water, and enough healthy 
plants and animals to harvest in need. If Alberta and the industry change 
the ways things are done, we can have this things and Oil Sands can 
continue to be develop.
(Holly Fortier, Fort McKay cross- cultural consultant and community 
member, quoted in Behr, 2013)
Based on a land- use model, the ALCES Group, a land- use consulting firm, was able 
to identify mitigation options supported by the community that, if incorporated 
into provincial regulations and implemented, could allow the recovery of the 
moose habitat and increase the livelihood of other animal and plant species, while 
allowing the economic benefits of continued bitumen extraction in the Fort 
McKay Traditional Territory. The most unique factors for this study were the biotic 
indicators appointed by the community as essential for the wellbeing of the area 
(moose, fisher, fish, edible berries, and others), and the critical areas to protect 
based on the areas traditionally used for hunting, trapping, fishing, and spiritual 
traditions. This pathway also implies strong collaboration between industry and the 
First Nations communities most directly impacted by bitumen production. Industry 
will need to collaborate to set best practices and to consult with communities in 
the expansion of oil sands extraction and reclamation of land. Government support 
would also be required to ensure that the land- use designation is respected by 
industry. The paced development should increase the quality of air and reduce the 
amount of water extracted for industrial use.
 Despite of the efforts of the Fort McKay community to implement this plan, 
since 2013 no definitive action has been seen from the government. According to 
court records, several attempts to implement this plan have been carried out with 
no success. On several occasions, Fort McKay had to pursue legal routes to stop 
development projects and promote a paced development, as evidenced in the four 
legal cases Fort McKay has conducted since 2013. More recently, Fort McKay has 
been involved in legal actions to demand the management of resource 
development near their reserve lands. To date, some authorities have heard the 
community’s proposals and have considered developing a plan for the area they 
want to be protected. Shannon Phillips, Minister of Environment and Parks, has 
publicly announced the consultation with the community, indicating:
We are moving forward in collaboration with the Fort McKay First Nation 
to protect their traditional lands, while ensuring responsible development 
near their community. By working jointly with Indigenous peoples and 
industry, we have made a lot of progress and I look forward to refining the 
plan after careful consultation.
(Shannon Phillips, Minister of Environment and Parks, in Alberta 
Ministry of Environment and Parks, 2018b)
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This pathway – although inspired by the perspectives of one Indigenous 
community defined by their particular values, traditional territory, and unique 
relationship with the oil industry – could be extrapolated to the areas of Alberta 
where the interests of industrial activities and the protection of ecosystems are 
in conflict. Parting from the knowledge and values of local communities, 
comprehensive climate change action and mitigation plans that allow 
responsible industrial activities could be developed with high chances of success, 
if implemented. However, political changes, resistance from industry players to 
a slower growth, the misunderstanding and misperceptions of the cultural values 
of the community, and potential economic and job losses could stop this future 
from being fully implemented.
‘Mix and round it all up’: supporting a clean energy mix
This future is based on the innovations pathways proposed by the Energy 
Futures Lab, which looks into leveraging Alberta’s strengths to transition 
towards a sustainable energy system. It represents collaboration among a range 
of stakeholders with vested interests in the energy sector including: fellows from 
the energy industry; First Nations and Métis communities; the provincial 
government; and environmental organisations. It also includes targets set by the 
Climate Leadership Plan. The pathway considers limited growth in the oil sands 
sector and the expansion of renewable energy, with an aim of increasing 
renewable energy to 30% by 2030 in the electricity sector. This implies limiting 
the development of existing oil sands sites and replacing Alberta’s coal- 
generation capacity with two- thirds from natural gas and one- third from 
renewable energy (adding 5000 megawatts by 2030 by the Renewable Electricity 
Program (REP)) (Alberta Electric System Operator, 2018a, 2018b). The 
development of renewable energy is estimated to bring in C$10.5 billion in new 
investment by 2030 and potentially create more than 7,200 new jobs. It will be 
rolled out through a competitive bidding process (Audette- Longo, 2017). The 
first bidding round is expected to lead to installation of 400 megawatts of 
renewable electricity generation capacity.
 This pathway considers increasing the carbon tax (greater than C$30/ton) to 
level the playing field with fossil fuels production. In order to meet energy 
shortfalls, the pathway will explore the development of renewable energy, 
primarily solar power and wind power, and the use of geothermal energy 
produced from over 400,000 wells in Alberta.
 Government- initiated programmes can help with the transition to renewable 
energy by providing funding and subsidies. Particular support will be provided to 
the 48 First Nations communities in Alberta: C$35 million has been invested to 
support local renewable energy projects, encourage energy efficiency, and 
provide training for jobs in the low- carbon economy. Additionally, renewable 
energy development can be supported by recycling revenues from the carbon 
tax amounting to C$5.4 billion over a three- year period. Revenues from the 
carbon tax can be directed to those most adversely impacted by higher energy 
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prices. Around 27%, or C$1.5 billion, will be directed as rebates to lower- and 
middle- income Albertans to offset the carbon tax.
 The future of this pathway is anticipated to provide more meaningful 
employment, particularly for those transitioning out of the oil sector and for 
young graduates in their early twenties entering into the labour market. There is 
also significant potential for renewable resources. Alberta can be seen as a 
technological innovator for energy systems by tapping into the abandoned gas 
wells currently viewed as a liability for geothermal energy. There is also 
potential for decentralised wind and solar power systems, primarily where 
resources are more abundant in the more populated southern regions. Solar 
systems can be installed in homes, while wind farms can be located on the 
outskirts of the city (but not too far from the electricity demand). In essence, 
this future considers that natural resources, including metals and fossil fuels, are 
used in a sustainable enough manner to allow a thriving human population 
capable of maintaining an equilibrium with the environment. In the words of 
Karl- Henrik Robert in his book The Natural Step Story: Seeding a Quiet 
Revolution (Robert, 2002):
In the sustainable society, flows of matter are balanced or, at least, not 
systematically unbalanced. Natural cycles surround society and define the 
limits within which we have to live. The sustainable society lives partly on 
flows from nature’s production and partly on smaller flows of metals and 
minerals from the Earth’s crust. Plants build up enough renewable resources 
to satisfy their consumption by animals and humans.… Since (in the 
sustainable society) the rate of this flow does not exceed the rate of 
regeneration of resources, it can be regarded as an ‘interest rate’ from nature 
rather than as a systematic toll from its ‘capital’.
Some aspects of this future are already being implemented under the Alberta 
government and the Climate Leadership Plan. However, some elements remain 
at a conceptual level. The Energy Futures Lab lacks specific action plans that 
are made available to the general public. Instead, it is currently being 
implemented by leveraging the connections and influence of its fellows to help 
educate professionals in roles capable of catalysing change in the energy sector. 
However, despite being co- developed by a diverse group of people, this approach 
may lack a perspective on the communities most impacted by energy 
development activities, for which these changes could bring the most benefits or 
disadvantages. This could imply a significant challenge for implementation of 
this vision. Other barriers could be the significant change of local policies to 
stimulate the development of renewable energy transformations at both 
individual and industry levels. Alberta, as of April 2018, approved a bill looking 
into a Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programme that allows property 
owners to install renewable energy capabilities in their facilities financed by 
property taxes, providing financial incentives for renewables development. 
However, it will be up to the municipalities to decide if they want to take part 
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in this programme, hindering opportunities for interested individuals if their 
municipality opts to not participate in the programme. Another initiative 
taking place is the request of the Alberta Electric Systems Operator (AESO) to 
incorporate 30% renewable generation into the grid by 2030. The first call was 
a success in achieving an electricity cost offer of 3.7 cents per kilowatt, the 
lowest renewable electricity pricing in Canada to date, and it is expected to 
become operational by 2019 (Government of Alberta, 2018a, 2018b).
The best of all worlds
From consultation, conversations, and discussions, the desire of most Albertans 
is to have the best of all pathways. The people of Alberta, across all sectors, 
seem to want a growing energy business based on fossil resources like the oil 
sands while decreasing the environmental impact of the sector in the territory. 
Some may argue this contrasting and idealistic vision might be impossible to 
materialise. However, if stakeholders are convinced this is a way forward, then 
the main challenge remaining is developing a process to communicate different 
worldviews to co- develop the mechanisms that could make such a vision come 
true. Such understanding of each other’s realities is vital to achieve consensus. 
Today, the lack of consensus represents the biggest barrier to build a feasible 
lower- carbon pathway for the Alberta oil sands.
 Public perception collected from interviews, surveys, and media indicate 
Canadians are committed – in principle – to climate change action. This 
commitment may take different forms nationally or regionally. In 2014, 65% of 
Canadians surveyed claimed to be familiar with the discussion around the use of 
fossil fuels and their impact on climate change, and 62% agreed that protecting 
the environment was more important than the price of energy, indicating a 
preference for government measures to implement taxes on the main polluters 
(Nanos Research, 2014) seen in the prairies region where Alberta is located. In 
the same year, another survey revealed that approximately 43% of the 
population was completely or partially in favour of oil sands projects in Alberta, 
mainly due to their economic and employment benefits. However, a growing 
35% indicated that their impression of the oil sands projects has worsened over 
the past five years.
 In 2015, a survey performed by a major broadcasting company (CTV) 
indicated that 72% of Canadians believed that the science of climate change is 
irrefutable. In addition, 63% of Canadians were willing to pay more for certain 
products in order to help the country meet its environmental commitments, 
despite the fact that 66% (45.5% in the Alberta region) acknowledged they 
were aware that meeting the new target may involve a significant job loss in the 
Canadian oil industry (CTV and Nanos Research, 2015). Considering the 
public’s opinion, the government carried out a national consultation to define a 
provincial operating budget for 2016, receiving significant feedback regarding 
the use of green technologies and the growth of the green energy sector. This 
feedback helped the government to outline a comprehensive strategy for the 
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sector. In 2016, a survey revealed the views of the Canadian public on climate 
change initiatives. In this survey, more than three out of four Canadians 
supported a national plan that guaranteed meeting international targets for 
emissions reduction, supported independent action from the federal government 
to meet the targets, and had a positive perspective on establishing a minimum 
carbon pricing scheme across Canada (Nanos Research, 2016).
 Based on stakeholder consultations carried out in Alberta (see the Research 
process and methods box earlier in this chapter for details), a dominant view 
emerged that was favoured by a range of Alberta stakeholders. Stakeholders 
would favour a future that converged the development of the oil sands sector 
with the growth of energy supply from renewable resources (Figure 4.2). Such a 
vision was observed across all the stakeholders consulted. Stakeholders from 
industry, government, environmental groups, communities, and Indigenous 
communities all considered a future where oil sands continued being one of the 
economic drivers of the province. The graduate population from local universities 
are now seeking more meaningful employment morally aligned with their own 
values where they can contribute to the greater good of society. More Albertans 
are becoming aware of both the benefits, as well as the negative impacts, of the 
oil sands. While there is an agreement that a gradual transition is needed, there 
is greater hope placed on cleaner technologies that support a more sustainable 
and equitable future. Such a middle- ground position indicates that Albertans 
hope for a solution able to keep the best of all worlds: maintain an economic 
benefit from a growing oil and gas sector while assuring the protection of the 
ecological integrity of the territory. This preference, although idealistic, resonates 
with elements present on the ‘mix and round it all up’ future, which supports a 
clean energy mix incorporated into the current energy supply.
 Indeed, ideals for the hopes of Albertans as a whole, the development of the 
oil and gas sector, and even the development of the renewable energy sector 
will continue to have negative impacts on the environment unless new 
technologies are introduced that are capable of changing current practices 
towards unknown, low- carbon economic activities. Moreover, communities 
where these activities occur will not be where most of the population 
concentrates. Instead they are likely to be located near remote communities, 
with high probabilities of conflicting with Indigenous values and traditional 
practices. Still, with the implementation of a cleaner energy mix, local 
communities will pay the price to maintain a more sustainable – better publicly 
perceived – Alberta: the sacrifice of their surrounding ecosystems and wellbeing 
due to the deployment of energy generation facilities strange to the local 
ecosystem. Considering these aspects, we asked Albertans to identify the biggest 
risks they foresaw for this ideal future (Figure 4.3).
 All the risks identified by stakeholders could be grouped in six main risks 
classified by their effect on the pathway, either as a barrier (implementation 
risk) or as a negative impact (consequential risk). The implementation risks 
include: (i) social rejection, where public opposition may affect the realisation 
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especially the weak integration of federal and provincial legislation negatively 
affecting implementation of the described pathway. There are more 
consequential risks identified in four broad categories. First, negative 
environmental impacts – such as the pathway may still cause damage to local 
ecosystems due to resource extraction, land- use change, air and water pollution, 
the creation of physical barriers, and noise pollution. Second, negative health 
impacts, particularly industrial pollution, which may affect the health of local 
communities if this pathway were to be pursued. Third, negative impacts on 
local communities, such as effects on the traditional ways of living of Indigenous 
communities. And fourth, negative economic impacts, especially a potential 
drop in profits leading to job losses and contraction of the economy. The 
dynamic between the risks and uncertainties found shows the complex context 
given for the development of lower- carbon pathways for the Alberta oil sands. 
In addition, the interconnectivity between all factors suggest that policy 
development should be done evaluating the sector as a system, and not focusing 
efforts on isolated approaches that could negatively impact the effectiveness of 
the much- needed policies (Figure 4.4).
 Surveyed stakeholders in Alberta are aware of the challenges faced by 
interested parties – government, industry, and Indigenous communities – when 
trying to find common ground. Even under ideal conditions – a future where oil 
and gas become sustainable – Albertans identify conflicts inherent to the 
interests of the defined institutions. For industry, economic losses play a role, 
Figure 4.3 Preliminary risk assessment developed by surveyed stakeholders.
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while for the government social rejection and political instability were identified 
as the main risks. Moreover, when asked to reflect about the issues from the 
local community perspective, participants did not have problems identifying the 
issue of continuing damage to ecosystems, leading to health impacts and 
disruption of the traditional Indigenous ways of living. These risks reflect some 
of those claimed by Indigenous communities since the arrival of Europeans to 
the Americas. So, we might wonder, is this just a matter of a lack of efficient 
strategies, or does this reality reveal a deeper conflict? Is the absence of a 
willingness to step out of its own defensive zone and address this issue from the 
initial intention to find a common ground the core element of a dysfunctional 
conversation?
 Such questions do not consider the approach of the Indigenous communities 
since historically they have been forced to comply with unfair conditions and to 
adapt to European cultural principles that conflict with their own worldviews. 
We argue that this question seeks the reflection of those educated under 
Western values that lack understanding of the holistic existence of the human 
as part of the ecosystem. As a consequence, finding the proper language to use 
in the different contexts could be a key practice to minimise risks and 
uncertainties in climate change action and mitigation. This could help ensure 
that plans are able to adapt to local realities and have a greater chance of 
successfully protecting vulnerable ecosystems. Maybe this is the real ‘best of all 
worlds’: finding a way to co- develop, by means of Indigenous and Western 
worldviews, an inclusive plan capable of decreasing the impacts of climate 
change.
 For an oil sands worker, a climate action plan could be presented as a need to 
adapt the sector to changing markets and decrease liabilities in a changing 
investment landscape. On the other hand, for a member of an Indigenous 
community, climate change action and mitigation could be presented as the 
opportunity to save moose and fish, as well as to guarantee the permanence of 
healthy land available for traditional practices. Therefore, in order to develop a 
successful action plan, multiple roadmaps should be adapted to local realities. 
There is as yet no perfect route to achieving such changes, and maybe there never 
will be. However, a future that considers the local context and co- development of 
action plans could be a starting point, allowing for implementation of effective 
plans to transition towards a more sustainable and equitable future.
 When looking at the futures identified, all stakeholders claimed that 
participation of Indigenous stakeholders was encouraged, and that feedback 
was taken into consideration on the development of the futures ‘cap the hat’ 
and ‘mix and round it all up’. However, Indigenous values are not evidently 
reflected in the language, action plans, or main interpretation of such action 
plans. These futures were developed, and are expected to be measured and 
implemented, from a colonising perspective. In contrast, the future ‘hold your 
horses’ was developed starting from Indigenous values of land and ecosystems, 
and then seeking Western scientific principles to translate its benefits to 
current Western understanding. This future portrays a social–ecological 
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dynamic with actors – e.g. humans, community, animals, plants, water – on a 
level playing field. The definition of ecological integrity from a perspective of 
biotic indicators (moose, fisher, fish, edible berries’ habitats), demonstrate a 
local interpretation of environmental impact which stakeholders can relate 
to, are able to monitor, and can commit to protecting. As reported by 
Whitmarsh, Seyfang, and O’Neill (2011), community involvement is a key 
factor for the success of policies for climate change mitigation. Therefore, 
from the local context, the pathway ‘hold your horses’ is expected to be more 
successful in achieving its goals – if implemented – rather than the other 
futures that lack elements that local communities can be represented in and 
be relate to. This scenario could be extrapolated to the national plans for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Today, the international discourse 
is defined on GHG emissions, a concept that is not tangible or relatable to 
challenges present at the local reality of the communities.
Future outlook
In the quest for identifying lower- carbon pathways envisioned by the 
stakeholders in the Alberta oil sands sector, three main scenarios were 
identified: one following the official proposal from the provincial government, 
one based on Indigenous needs and priorities, and one based on a combined 
strategy created by the collaboration of several groups and aligned with federal 
strategy. Within these pathways, implementation and consequential barriers 
were captured from stakeholders as potential risks should this future materialise. 
These barriers mostly concentrated around economic losses, environmental 
degradation, social imbalance, and health impacts. Whether these risks were 
noticeable depended on the point of view of each stakeholder. However, a 
bigger risk is linked to the lack of consensus among stakeholders and the 
absence of a pathway capable of unifying and representing all viewpoints.
 From the futures captured, the Indigenous communities most directly impacted 
by the oils sands development, i.e. where the sector develops in traditional land in 
the vicinity of their communities, were the least represented among all. Although 
efforts to consult and include Indigenous communities has been made for all 
narratives, true inclusion or representation is not evident in their actions plans. 
This means that any action or policy towards reducing emissions in the oil sands 
sector will have considerable impact on the welfare of the neighbouring 
Indigenous communities, who are left with no voice as to their fate. Such realities 
call for urgent action in incorporating Indigenous/local communities in the 
process of co- developing policies effective to meet the commitments of Canada in 
the Paris Agreement. As a way forward, a consensus- building framework could 
serve as an important tool to maintain the interest and commitment of the 
participants. One example is the Consensus Building Engagement Process 
(CBEP), focused on step- by-step consensus building through the consultation and 
inclusion of all affected stakeholders (Lieu et al., 2018). The framework could 
consider Indigenous needs, priorities, and knowledge and by build consensus in 
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the planning and execution of the project/initiative. Understanding local values 
and allowing local communities to have an active role in the development process 
could generate benefits in the area of effectiveness, social support, and innovative 
ways to promote climate action.
 The study of the multiple pathways shared by stakeholders in the Alberta oil 
sands highlights the need for developing effective climate action capable of 
incorporating and representing local interests and concerns. Although efforts has 
been made in the past to improve representation of several sectors, evenly levelled 
participation through incorporation and consensus could be more effective that 
simple inclusion. A process to consider local communities as equal participants in 
the co- development process of policy could be more effective than those changes 
implemented so far, which have attracted plenty of criticisms for their lack of 
community representation. There is no formula for this approach since such 
action would require acknowledging varying cultures and worldviews. However, if 
policies are developed and/or implemented with this notion, the gap between 
climate policy and real on- the-ground impact could be reduced.
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Pathways towards a low- carbon 
electricity system – nuclear expansion 
versus nuclear phase out
Rocío Alvarez- Tinoco, Michele Stua, and 
Gordon MacKerron
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, fossil fuel has registered a sharp decrease in its role in 
overall electricity generation in the UK, falling from more than 250 TWh (tera-
watt hours) supplied in 2005 to less than 150 TWh in 2015. With nuclear power 
holding its earlier share, renewables were the main source of substitution for 
fossil- based generation. Identifying the drivers for this shift in UK electricity 
supply represents the first step to understand the strategies, policies, and actions 
characterising the UK electricity generation system.
 While prices and energy security concerns have maintained a strong influ-
ence on the UK electricity system, one more recent driver has been significant 
in determining major changes in the UK electric generation mix. The commit-
ment in the UK Climate Change Act 2008 (HM Government, 2008) to 
achieve 80% emission reductions by 2050 has significantly raised attention to 
the potential for low- carbon electricity. An ageing electricity infrastructure, 
requiring significant renewal in the next decades, represents an opportunity to 
accelerate the UK’s low- carbon electricity transition. Consequently, UK climate 
strategies, policies, and actions are likely to become the key drivers for the 
evolutionary dynamics of the UK electricity mix over the next decades.
 Two opposing decarbonisation pathways are particularly relevant for the UK 
electricity system. One relies on an increase in new nuclear power and the other 
involves phasing out nuclear with increased reliance on renewable energy.
 Comparison of the electricity mix over the past 35 years with the changes in 
the UK electricity generation mix between 2015 and 2016 (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) 
offers insights into the UK’s decarbonisation process as a driver in transforming 
domestic electricity generation.
 Apart from the significant shift from traditional fossil fuels to renewable 
resources, this comparison illustrates the dynamics within the British fossil- fuel 
sector. The dramatic decrease in the share of coal by more than 50% in just one 
year was not compensated by a rise in the low- carbon share, but by natural gas. 
While gas is a fossil fuel, it is often considered a ‘transition’ resource in a long- term 
Figure 5.1 The dynamics of UK electricity supply, 1980–2015.
Source: DUKES, 2017, p. 113.
Figure 5.2 Share of electricity generation in the UK by resource, 2015–2016.
Source: DUKES, 2017, p. 117.
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decarbonisation strategy due to its relatively low climate impact compared with 
coal and oil, as well as its relatively low price. However, if these dynamics are 
maintained in the short to medium term, major changes will be needed to meet 
long- term targets. Natural gas is incompatible with a successful decarbonisation 
process, although it is imaginable that gas with carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
could help decarbonise the electricity system. We have excluded it from this 
research. This is for two reasons: it is not clear that CCS will become commercially 
available; and none of the stakeholders at our consultation meetings raised CCS as 
an important low- carbon option. In addition, large- scale continued use of gas raises 
uncertainties for long- term energy security. With the UK government also aiming 
for a complete phase out of coal by 2025, new nuclear and renewable resources 
become central for genuine decarbonisation in the UK electricity system. Reduc-
tions in energy demand would also help facilitate this decarbonisation process by 
reducing the amount of new generating investment required. However, considera-
tion of energy demand reduction is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Nuclear power policy
Nuclear power is a low- carbon electricity technology, able to contribute to elec-
tricity supply on a potentially large scale. However, nuclear power involves mul-
tiple risks such as safety (including cyber- security), radioactive waste 
management, and potential nuclear weapons proliferation. Its economic sustain-
ability is uncertain and there is also potential for negative social impacts. In 
addition, UK nuclear development is characterised by a high degree of inter-
national interdependency, with firms and public bodies from multiple countries 
involved in the deployment of new nuclear power stations and with 
EURATOM (the European Agency for Nuclear Power) playing a central role in 
these interdependency dynamics.
 Major changes in UK energy policy since 2003 have included a revival of 
political support for new nuclear power. From the 2008 Climate Change Act 
onwards, there has been steady policy support for new nuclear power, both in 
terms of investment incentives and regulation. In 2015, the Conservative 
administration announced a ‘policy re- set’ for energy and electricity. This re- set 
was confirmed in the recently published Clean Growth Strategy (CGS), endors-
ing political commitment to new nuclear power (HM Government, 2017).
 At present, the UK has some 9 GW (gigawatts) of operational nuclear capa-
city, providing about 21% of all UK electricity demand (DUKES, 2017). All 
but one of these nuclear plants is expected to close before 2030, although no 
serious plans for closure yet exist. Moreover, unlike anywhere else in Europe, 
the UK government has ambitions for a significant future build- up of new 
nuclear capacity. In a 2013 publication (HM Government, 2013), the UK gov-
ernment suggested that new nuclear capacity might be somewhere between 
16 GW and 75 GW by 2050, with 16 GW being the minimum target. An 
increasing reliance on new nuclear is therefore currently planned in the UK as a 
major contributor to achieving ambitious decarbonisation commitments. It has 
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yet to be determined whether this will be entirely via larger conventional reactors 
or with a contribution from so- called small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). 
While this is a contested issue, some studies consider nuclear power a secure and 
effective investment for the UK electricity sector (Levi and Pollitt, 2015).
Renewable energy policy
The adoption of renewable resources within the UK’s electricity mix has signifi-
cantly increased over the last ten years, with their overall contribution to UK 
electricity generation more than tripling between 2008 and 2016 (Figure 5.1), 
reaching a total share of more than a quarter of the total domestic installed 
capacity (DUKES, 2017). With favourable natural conditions, strategic invest-
ments in research and technological innovation, and public financial incen-
tives, UK renewable electricity generation has been increasingly relying on 
offshore wind energy, gaining European and international leadership in the 
sector (Toke, 2011; Higgins and Foley, 2014; Kern et al., 2014). With offshore 
wind gaining more attention, renewable resources that received significant 
public support in earlier years (onshore wind and solar) are now facing cuts in 
public support, while others such as biomass and tidal have problems. For 
instance, Drax Power Station is controversial for replacing coal with large 
amounts of imported biomass, and tidal stream technologies are still in develop-
ment and more research is needed to find optimal locations and reduce costs.
 Wind and solar PV clearly possess substantial potential for contributing 
further to the decarbonisation process (Raugei and Leccisi, 2016). Coupled with 
strong political support from both major political parties and most of civil 
society, wind and more recently solar have attracted substantial private invest-
ments, assisted by rapid technological innovation and a corresponding reduc-
tion in costs. Onshore wind dominated during the period up to around 2010, 
with offshore wind now the most promising renewable option for the decarboni-
sation of the UK electricity system, while solar PV has also grown substantially 
since 2010. Recent official documents clearly emphasise significant political 
support for expanding offshore wind in the short, medium and long term (HM 
Government, 2017).
 Our research method is described in the Research process and methods box. 
Note that while both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed, we 
report here only on the qualitative part of the research.
Research process and methods
The mixed method approach used in this research involved qualitative and quant-
itative methods to identify and assess risks and uncertainties in low- carbon mitiga-
tion pathways for the UK electricity system. We used qualitative methods 
including interviews, surveys, and face- to-face stakeholder engagement to: identify 
the possible transition pathways for the UK electricity system; identify and assess 
United Kingdom  71
the risks and uncertainties associated with these identified futures; and develop 
scenarios. These scenarios were translated to inform the socio- economic model 
E3ME to test iteratively the techno- economic feasibility of the mitigation path-
ways on the national level. The qualitative work relied on the co- operation of 95 
experts and stakeholders from 33 different organisations, which included govern-
ment, private organisations, universities, and NGOs (see Table 5.1).
 This relatively large group included strong participation from academic particip-
ants, who were easier to reach and more able to participate than other stakeholder 
groups. Nevertheless, there was sufficient diversity among the other stakeholders 
consulted, including five representatives of private firms (including EDF Energy, cur-
rently constructing the nuclear plant at Hinkley Point), three environmental NGOs, 
and five representatives of government and public agencies.
 The engagement process consisted of several stages, starting with a focus group 
and face- to-case interviews, followed by three stakeholder and expert consultation 
workshops. The intensive one- on-one interviews with energy sector experts and 
an expert focus group helped to identify the main drivers of uncertainties in the 
nuclear sector. It also scoped out categories of the main perceived risks associated 
Table 5.1 Summary of stakeholder activities and participants by type of organisation
Stakeholders’ engagement activities
 
Type of organisation and participants





Focus group: nuclear power 
(Brighton, 1 July 2016)
 – –  4 –  4
Interviews (London, October–
November 2016)
 1 2  3 –  6
First stakeholders’ consultation 
workshop: nuclear sector map 
and scenarios propositions 
(London, 21 October 2016)
 4 1  6 1 12
Second stakeholders’ 
consultation workshop: 
assessing risks and 
uncertainties for nuclear 
expansion (Falmer, 
27 March 2017)




pathways and UK nuclear 
power (London, 
22 September 2017)
 7 1  8 – 16
Survey online (‘no new 
nuclear’) (July–September 
2017)
 4 1  6 1 12
Subtotal 23 9 60 3 95
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with the new nuclear power scenario on the one hand and the renewable electri-
city scenario on the other.
 The first stakeholders’ consultation workshop aimed at co- designing a system 
map of the UK nuclear sector following the Technology Innovation System struc-
ture (i.e. actors/stakeholders, networks, and institutions) using a specific tool 
created for this purpose (Nikas et al., 2017). This identified the main interactions 
among the system elements (Cox et al., 2016) and then elicited the preferences 
and opinions of the stakeholders for the UK’s future electricity system mix for 
2030 and 2050, bearing in mind the UK commitment to an 80% emission reduc-
tion. From this first stakeholders’ consultation emerged multiple future electricity 
mixes, in which nuclear power has a share. However, stakeholders agreed on the 
broad shape of two scenarios, which are the subject of this chapter. Based on the 
literature and stakeholder engagement, we developed a list of potential risks and 
uncertainties associated with the two pathways (Hanger et al., 2016).
 In the second stakeholders’ consultation workshop, we assessed the identified 
risks for nuclear power expansion along different dimensions, such as likelihood 
and severity of impact. For the no new nuclear mitigation pathway, we assessed 
the identified risks by using an online survey.
 Finally, the third stakeholders’ consultation workshop was used to discuss the 
economic feasibility of the two scenarios and to build a complete and detailed nar-
rative of the corresponding mitigation pathways.
 Note that due to the need to guarantee stakeholder anonymity it has generally 
not been possible to attribute particular stakeholder views to specific categories of 
stakeholder.
Decarbonisation pathways
Based on the critical roles nuclear and renewables may have in the decarbonisa-
tion of UK electricity, we introduce two opposing decarbonisation pathways. The 
first is based on major nuclear expansion and the second is a regime with no new 
nuclear investment and dominated by renewable resources. These decarbonisation 
pathways are similar to those known as the ‘clockwork’ and ‘patchwork’ scenarios 
which have been proposed by the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) (2015).
 The ‘new nuclear’ pathway includes 40 GW of new nuclear capacity. This is 
highly salient because the UK government relies heavily on new nuclear power 
in its decarbonisation efforts. Stakeholders at our first workshop, including those 
with a strong commitment to nuclear power, considered that a level of 75 GW 
of new capacity by 2050 was not technologically and financially feasible (e.g. 
delays on building new facilities and the high cost of electricity generation). 
However, 40 GW of new nuclear capacity might realistically and credibly be 
achieved according to stakeholders, particularly considering that France had 
achieved an even higher rate of nuclear construction in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Despite the inherently controversial and politicised character of decisions on 
nuclear technology, public opposition to nuclear power (and questions of its 
legitimacy) have always been muted in the UK.
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 In the light of sustainable development considerations, the ‘no new nuclear’ 
pathway is also clearly salient to any debate about current and future electricity 
production, and a future without further nuclear capacity is clearly a real possib-
ility. Given radical decarbonisation objectives, such a pathway implies a major 
expansion in renewable capacity and over the past decade renewables have 
gained credibility, growing quickly and with ever- reducing costs. High nuclear 
costs may persuade the financial community that the technology does not 
deserve support and that there are alternatives in achieving decarbonisation in 
the absence of further nuclear power. Strong public support for solar PV and off-
shore wind marks the ‘no new nuclear’ pathway as highly legitimate, although 
there is some evidence of public disquiet about onshore wind.
The ‘new nuclear’ pathway
A ‘new nuclear’ pathway could be credible given the following circumstance. 
Politically, a nuclear expansion of 40 GW would require a strong and largely bi- 
partisan continuation of the support given to large- scale and centralised techno-
logy options in the 2015 policy re- set and the 2017 Clean Growth Strategy, 
including nuclear power, as part of a continuing commitment to stringent emis-
sion reductions by mid- century. This ongoing commitment to nuclear expan-
sion will be strengthened by the view that new nuclear power is vital to energy 
security, as well as a major contributor to decarbonisation. Geopolitical worries 
about the UK’s need to import higher volumes of gas and oil will support this 
security argument over the next few years.
 The ‘new nuclear’ pathway foresees a slowdown (and a possible halt) in the 
reduction of renewable energy costs. At the same time, another barrier to 
renewables expansion is the difficulty of providing system backup for the inter-
mittent renewable sources that dominate in the UK. The bulk, seasonal electri-
city storage that this requires continues to be expensive and impractical. Thus 
for radical decarbonisation, nuclear expansion would be the only proven option. 
Public opposition to technologies like onshore (and increasingly offshore) wind 
increases and limits further renewable energy growth. In addition, difficulties 
remain in implementing major demand- reduction schemes that would avoid 
some new capacity needs. As expansion in nuclear capacity gains momentum, 
the possibilities for renewables expansion is in any case constrained. Nuclear 
power performs well worldwide, both economically and in terms of safety.
 The nuclear industry overcomes some of the technological and cost problems 
currently besetting the European pressurised water reactor (EPR). Future reactor 
design becomes standardised on the best- performing current technologies, 
whether of the so- called Generation III+ or the not- yet-commercialised Gener-
ation IV, allowing a reduction in costs and subsidies. Global political instability 
encourages intensive nuclear technology development, both internationally and 
in the UK, as an apparently secure option, and SMRs could emerge (Depart-
ment for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 2017a; Locatelli et al., 
2017) as a more flexible option for part of the 40 GW capacity, though the 
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 feasibility of commercial SMRs is yet to be established. Global instability also 
reinforces the idea that a strong civil nuclear industry as helpful in maintaining 
the UK’s capacity to possess credible nuclear weapons (Johnstone and Stirling, 
2015).
 Political support appears to be maintained by recent government decisions 
and documents, such as the announcement of the follow- up to Hinkley Point C 
nuclear project (15 September 2016); the 2017 Clean Growth Strategy (HM 
Government, 2017); and the consultation for a new National Policy Statement 
(NPS) for future nuclear generation (2026–2035), announced by BEIS in early 
December 2017 (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 
2017b). Support for research and innovation appears strong, with BEIS’s Energy 
Innovation Programme planning to invest around £180 million in nuclear 
innovation (HM Government, 2017, p. 50). While a change in UK governing 
parties may affect such political support, traditional cross- party commitment to 
nuclear generation persists. Based upon the requirement for similar technologies 
and skills, interrelationships between civil and military use of nuclear techno-
logy further appear to suggest durable political support for nuclear generation.
 Yet while steady political support for nuclear research and innovation appears 
robust, other potential negative consequences may become significant barriers 
for the implementation of the described pathway. Based on our stakeholder con-
sultations, we identified those that appear to be the most significant among 
these risks (Third stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2017) with respect their 
causes/drivers, likelihood, magnitude, and possible effects (see Figure 5.3).
Risks associated with the ‘new nuclear’ pathway
Conflicting policies and regulations
The nuclear power sector is embedded in a wide- ranging, trans- sectoral institu-
tional framework, which brings significant complexity in the development and 
application of regulations for new nuclear. The UK nuclear sector is subject to 
significant national safety and security legislation and to (national and inter-
national) laws on the military use of nuclear. This interaction between different 
policies and regulations can affect nuclear as a source for domestic generation of 
electricity in several ways. First, the imposition of strict safety and security regu-
lations may lead to increases in the costs of production and maintenance of 
nuclear plants. Second, potential conflicts with international regulations may 
lead to long- term international disputes, which could significantly slow down 
the development of new plants (as these are traditionally developed through 
international co- operation systems). Brexit may further increase the risk of con-
flicts between the UK and international legislation on nuclear. Stakeholders 
considered conflicting policies and regulation, and in particular international 
legal clashes, as a significant risk both in terms of their likelihood and magni-
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High nuclear costs and limited profit margins
While it has low operational costs, nuclear electricity suffers from high and 
often very poorly estimated costs of construction (e.g. Harris et al., 2013). Stake-
holders emphasised cost escalation for nuclear reactors and delays in implemen-
tation among the main challenges for the sector. High costs for nuclear- based 
electricity require substantial incentives and subsidies. Such costs may impact 
low- income consumers, potentially exacerbating energy poverty (Focus group: 
nuclear power, 2016). Most stakeholders, irrespective of their preferences, 
regarded this as a high risk, while its impacts are defined as medium- to-marginal 
if adequately counteracted by ad- hoc public investments. The cost issue has 
become more acute with financial problems besetting private firms like EDF, 
Areva, and Toshiba (Thomas, 2017; Vaughan, 2017). However, negotiation 
between investors and the UK government over a long- term fixed price for elec-
tricity well above current wholesale prices could counteract such risks. The 
CGS addresses the need to reduce costs of nuclear power while maintaining 
safety by investing in innovation. SMRs, with lower capital requirements, may 
represent an alternative long- term option to mitigate investment risk, although 
as yet commercially unproven. SMR development in the UK would require an 
adequate regulatory framework and siting might prove problematic as SMRs are 
likely to be most cost- effective if sited near urban areas. Overall, the risk of lack 
of investment because of high costs is registered as having high likelihood 
among stakeholders, depending on the evolution of timings and costs for new 
nuclear power plants, as well as on ongoing uncertainties in electricity prices. In 
the opinion of stakeholders, the magnitude of the effects of this risk is less 
certain. Their impact may be limited given the overall political support for new 
nuclear (see the earlier discussion about the ongoing policy support for the 
sector).
Nuclear accidents/social disruption and activism
Despite being two separate risks, nuclear accidents and social disruption/activ-
ism can be often correlated, as underlined by a majority of our stakeholders. 
Hence we discuss them as complementary sub- risks of a single category. Man-
aging social acceptability of nuclear expansion per se received very little empha-
sis among the stakeholders, who underlined that social acceptance of nuclear in 
the UK is widely diffused, with studies supporting such a perspective (Jay et al., 
2014). Yet stakeholders clearly stressed that nuclear accidents elsewhere in the 
world can strongly affect public perception about nuclear expansion, signifi-
cantly increasing social opposition. Past experience has shown that even distant 
accidents have radically shifted countries’ positions towards nuclear. This hap-
pened for example in Germany, where early nuclear shutdowns were a con-
sequence of the Japanese Fukushima accident (Kepplinger and Lemke, 2016). 
While the chances of major nuclear accidents and related consequences are 
regarded as small in general terms, the majority of stakeholders perceive the 
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magnitude of their possible effects on the UK nuclear power as extremely high. 
Similar accidents can in fact become key triggers in radically increasing activ-
ism and social disruption, posing significant threats to the entire UK nuclear 
sector, especially in any case of geographically close and high- impact accidents 
(Wheatley, Sovacool et al. 2016).
Radioactive waste legacy and intergenerational injustice
There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the back- end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle (decommissioning and waste management), especially the failure to date 
to establish a UK geological repository for high- level wastes. Considering the 
ethical issues, poor waste management governance, and the scale and longevity 
of radioactive waste, there is a widespread stakeholder view that the risk has not 
been fully taken into account in UK nuclear expansion decisions (Second stake-
holders’ consultation workshop, 2017). A specific issue is the peripheralisation/
marginalisation of communities surrounding nuclear facilities and waste sites. 
These communities may be prone to manipulation of public opinion by the 
nuclear industry to develop an apparent social acceptance (Sovacool, 2011, 
p. 211). The risk of continued failure to develop adequate and democratic waste 
governance is considered a risk whose magnitude and effects are hard to define 
precisely. No timely mitigation strategy was advanced by stakeholders.
Lack of technology and specialised skills
Stakeholders have considered this among the most likely and potentially 
harmful risks to the success of new nuclear power in the UK. While this may 
seem surprising given the UK’s long experience in nuclear technology, the UK 
is contemplating the commercialisation of at least four overseas nuclear tech-
nologies as part of its expansion plan (the EPR, AP1000, ABWR, and Hualong) 
and possibly more (e.g. SMRs). The greater part of the relevant knowledge 
about these technologies resides outside the UK, so this significant expansion of 
novel nuclear technologies and related systems requires development of many 
new skills for the implementation of such an ambitious and diverse nuclear 
pathway. The needs for significant technology transfer processes and agreements 
can be seen as limits for a domestic implementation of the sector. In addition, 
Brexit, which may lead to a slowdown in technological relationships with tradi-
tional UK nuclear partners such as France, may further increase both the likeli-
hood and magnitude of such risk. Finally, the lack of people with specialised 
skills in nuclear regulation is considered as a particular risk for the sector by the 
stakeholders. Lack of capacity among regulators could lead to a significant mis-
alignment between the ambitions for the UK nuclear sector and the means to 
fulfil them (First stakeholders’ consultation workshop, 2016).
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The ‘no new nuclear’ pathway
In this narrative, much depends on reasons for the failure of the current policy 
of major nuclear expansion. In a ‘no new nuclear’ pathway, raising finance for 
new nuclear power projects becomes impossible. It took EDF several years to 
assemble the £25 billion financing cost for Hinkley Point C and the successful 
construction of this first new project is far from certain, especially given the fra-
gility of the finances of EDF and problems in quality control in the manufac-
turing of critical components in France. In this narrative, the government is 
unwilling to allow future nuclear projects to risk costing consumers the equi-
valent of the £30 billion excess costs that Hinkley involves (National Audit 
Office, 2017). At the same time the world market for new nuclear stations fails 
to pick up, putting further pressure on nuclear vendors, several of whom 
(Toshiba/Westinghouse and EDF/Areva) are already facing some major finan-
cial problems.
 The recent cost reductions in renewable technologies would continue and 
make renewables highly competitive in market conditions. The offshore wind 
sector, offering opportunities for a significant number of large- scale sites, 
develops strongly and offers increasingly competitive costs. Solar PV is also 
widely deployed, both in the form of solar farms and in building design. Cur-
rently uneconomic renewables, such as tidal power, gradually become more cost-
 competitive and local biomass use becomes more popular. Problems of both 
seasonal and short- term bulk electricity storage are overcome at reasonable 
prices, allowing renewables to achieve a large majority share of electricity gen-
eration despite the fact that they are not dispatchable. More comprehensive 
interconnections with other countries would help. However, energy security 
might constitute a high risk and uncertainty unless such storage systems can be 
developed and work with high reliability. While the development of CCS is 
imaginable in this pathway (as also the case for the ‘new nuclear’ pathway), this 
is not considered here as the commercial development and deployment of CCS 
is far from certain.
 Such a renewables- only expansion pathway in the UK electricity system 
involves a significant change of direction and risks (see Figure 5.4). This means 
that a ‘no new nuclear’ pathway would be accompanied by a major new priority 
for demand- reducing measures, allowing an 80% or more emission reduction 
commitment to be met with a lower total installed capacity. Some renewables 
in the UK enjoy policy support similar to that surrounding new nuclear. Both 
traditional and recent policies in the UK seem to secure robust short- and 
medium- term support for at least some forms of renewable energy. Scope for 
reductions in energy demand across all consumption sectors, especially in house-
holds, is also recognised and supported by policy, hence further facilitating the 
deployment of renewables. Wind energy, and particularly offshore wind tech-
nologies, can count on strong support from British policymakers, identifying it 
as a key strategic technology for the country. For instance, the 2017 Clean 
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wind, with more than £500 million for contracts with generating firms (in the 
form of auctions) and additionally £150 million to be invested in offshore techno-
logical innovation. In this pathway, there would also be strong support for solar 
PV, as well as further R&D and potentially deployment of other currently non- 
commercial renewables, especially tidal power and possibly wave energy. The 
current policy of discouraging and even disallowing onshore wind would be 
reversed. Overall, doubts about the effective level of interest in renewables by 
current UK policymakers (Gillard and Lock, 2017, p. 646) would be reversed.
Risks associated with the ‘no new nuclear’ pathway
Conflicts between sub- national actions and national frameworks 
regarding renewables
Conflicting conditions between sub- national initiatives and the UK national 
framework for renewables have systematically characterised the sector’s 
dynamics. For instance, Scotland has adopted a wide array of interconnected 
policies favouring renewables deployment to a much greater extent than 
England and Wales, facilitated by the devolution (ceding) of some political 
authority to Scotland (McEwen and Bomberg, 2014). However, Scotland is 
facing limits to the full implementation of its renewables potential because of 
conflicts between Scottish and UK regulatory frameworks (Cowell et al., 2017). 
A typical example of such conflict is provided by tidal energy. Seen as an 
exploitable resource in Scotland (Neill et al., 2017), tidal attracts very little 
attention from policymakers and institutional investors in England (Lamy and 
Azevedo, 2018). As a consequence, tidal power keeps on, overall, being margin-
alised, including in Scotland. This is because, constrained by the unfavourable 
regime surrounding tidal at UK level, Scotland has had to limit strategies to 
small- scale piloting experiments.
 Community- led initiatives have also suffered similar limits over the years. 
UK renewables development has benefited from many small- scale community- 
led initiatives. However, diverging interests, objectives, and scope have shown 
the limits of a synergistic implementation of community- led initiatives and 
national electricity systems, regulations, and policies, and recent UK govern-
ment policy has withdrawn previous support for community energy projects. 
While generally providing social, economic, and environmental benefits at the 
local level (Bracken, Bulkeley, and Maynard, 2014), community- led initiatives 
have a limited effect on a larger, national scale. As a consequence, community- 
led initiatives tend to be neglected by national policymakers and institutional 
investors (Saintier, 2017) and government subsidies and tax incentives for com-
munity energy projects were withdrawn in 2015 (Community Energy England, 
2018). Stakeholders defined this set of risks as already affecting the implementa-
tion of renewables. Efforts to integrate local, regional, and national frameworks, 
as well as increasing policymaker awareness of community- led initiatives, were 
suggested as the main solutions for mitigating the risk.
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Limits in accessing private finance
Access to private finance for renewables in the UK is determined by a multiplic-
ity of factors, leading to relatively high degrees of risk and uneven expectations. 
More specifically, renewables’ access to private finance is affected by: (a) costs of 
the adopted technologies; (b) the general volatility of market prices for electri-
city; (c) variations in prices of other resources (i.e. fossil fuels and nuclear); and 
(d) uneven and/or unexpected changes in carbon markets. Technology costs are 
in many ways the main driver in determining private financial support for 
renewables, with technologically mature resources such as wind and solar more 
favourably supported than niche ones. More generally, increasing interest from 
private institutional investors in renewables in the UK, driven by the rapid pace 
of cost reductions, makes the likelihood of a lack of private finance appear relat-
ively limited (Winch and Wynn 2017, pp. 22–23). Nevertheless, the majority 
of stakeholders underlined how the presence of many types of risk concerning 
private finance means that the overall risk cannot be regarded as unlikely. In 
addition, substantial reductions in private finance would lead, in the opinion of 
several stakeholders, to significant damage for the technologies/resources 
affected. Stakeholders unanimously identified better co- ordination between 
national policies and private finance as the best way to mitigate the risk.
Environmental impact of renewable infrastructures and social opposition to 
some renewable technologies
As already suggested for the ‘new nuclear’ pathway, two complementary risks 
are analysed here under a single perspective. As addressed by those stake-
holders who raised these two risks, these are often interlinked. While nuclear 
is generally perceived as more threatening to nature and environmental pres-
ervation, questions have also been raised on the possible environmental 
impacts of renewable technologies, with special regard to those that imply 
large- scale development of new infrastructure in previously untouched natural 
areas. Apart from unwelcome visual impacts, wind deployment using ever- 
larger blades has raised concerns for the possible effects on migratory birds 
(Hattam, Hooper, and Papathanasopoulou, 2017; Hooper, Beaumont, and 
Hattam, 2017). Stakeholders suggested that, despite British public opinion 
being generally favourable to renewable technologies (Allen and Chatterton, 
2013), these risks have contributed to the rise of social opposition to some 
renewable technologies. In addition to environment- related social opposition, 
some stakeholders suggested that increases in electricity tariffs due to the need 
for financial support for new clean technologies could lead to opposition. 
Further objection to visually intrusive renewable solutions is likely, such as 
with large- scale solar farms and onshore wind power plants (and already, for 
example in mid- Wales, new onshore wind developments are politically virtu-
ally impossible). Stakeholders defined this set of risks as likely to happen and 
in part already happening. At the same time the small size and localised 
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nature of social opposition to renewables makes this a limited risk in terms of 
its overall effects on the renewables sector.
Technological gaps and lack of innovation
UK leadership in offshore wind technologies is becoming more visible 
(Colmenar- Santos et al., 2016). However, at the same time the UK lacks exper-
tise and technological ownership with respect to most other renewables. As a 
consequence, such renewables’ implementation continues to rely on technology 
imports, leaving a possible energy security issue. While stakeholders agreed in 
affirming that an adequate policy to favour deployment of the technologies and 
skills may contribute to reduce the likelihood of this risk, they also affirmed 
how, in the case of inaction, the effects may be significant. Several stakeholders 
affirmed that inaction would lead to a significant loss of competitiveness for the 
UK in the renewables sector, affecting UK prospects in terms of sector- based 
economic growth. The issue of ensuring that there is cost- effective bulk storage 
for intermittent renewables at high levels of system penetration remains a 
serious risk, even though several different strategies (including demand 
response) are available (Grünewald et al., 2011). Better interconnectors would 
help but they are themselves dependent on a surplus availability of power in 
other countries. As in the case of ‘new nuclear’, stakeholders identified the lack 
of skills of sector regulators as a key risk for renewables implementation.
Uncertainties associated with the two pathways
While risks are defined in relatively specific ways as potential threats to decar-
bonisation pathways, uncertainties are more general but potentially relevant 
unknowns, the effects of which could either be positive or negative. Four main 
types of uncertainty emerge, three of them typically affecting decarbonisation 
pathways anywhere in the world and one specifically affecting the UK. We 
identified two traditional drivers (carbon market price volatility and technolo-
gical innovation) and two recent drivers (the Paris Agreement on climate 
change and Brexit), all four affecting both pathways. Except for the Paris Agree-
ment, generally seen by stakeholders as a driver for reducing uncertainty, the 
other drivers were seen as sources of significant uncertainty for UK electricity 
generation. This section describes how each of these drivers leads to uncertainty 
for both the ‘new nuclear’ and the ‘no new nuclear’ pathways.
 With a long history of uneven fluctuations, electricity prices represent a 
significant source of uncertainty for investors and other stakeholders engaged in 
the implementation of both new nuclear and renewable electricity. Price fluctu-
ations, or expectations of fluctuations, affect long- term investments in the 
sector. Yet rapid variations in electricity prices linked to shifts in competing 
resource prices (i.e. for fossil fuels) may lead to significant uncertainty in the 
medium and short term. Public intervention and long- term contracts with fixed 
electricity prices can compensate for such uncertainties but require significant 
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state engagement and action. Stakeholders involved in the assessment almost 
unanimously agreed that this is a major driver of uncertainty, in particular for 
the nuclear sector.
 Rapid advances in energy- related technological innovation may lead to signi-
ficant changes in the electricity framework, in the UK as well as in the rest of 
the world. The breakthrough in new, economically, socially, and environ-
mentally competitive technologies may represent a key element in determining 
changes within the electricity mix and may lead to the replacement of obsolete 
incumbent technologies. While possibly appearing as a risk, uneven technolo-
gical innovation has been included as a driver of uncertainty due to its unpre-
dictability. While it is possible that new technologies breakthrough in both new 
nuclear and non- nuclear sectors, it is impossible to forecast these changes. For 
instance, nuclear fusion represents a long- lasting chimera for nuclear and elec-
tricity generally, though its effective realisation could lead to a radical change 
in the electricity mix worldwide. Technology commitments at national level 
serve to mitigate the uncertainties concerning technological innovation. When 
analysing the CGS sections on investment in low- carbon research and innova-
tion (HM Government, 2017, pp. 100–101), it can be seen that the UK is 
significantly committed to stimulating technological innovation. In detail, the 
CGS promises significant investments for relevant research and innovation 
(more than £900 million to 2021), devoting more than 50% of these invest-
ments to nuclear power while limiting investment in renewables research to just 
20% of the total.
 The December 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change contains highly 
ambitious goals in terms of mitigation of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and 
therefore has potentially significant impacts for the energy sectors for all signa-
tory countries. However, the agreement still lacks full design of its regulatory 
framework, leaving significant uncertainty margins that affect electricity stake-
holders in the UK and elsewhere. Stakeholder opinions in our research suggest 
that the Paris Agreement may act as a driver in reducing uncertainty for both 
the ‘new nuclear’ and ‘no new nuclear’ pathways, thanks to its quantified 
pledges to be delivered at national and international levels. The great majority 
of stakeholders suggested that, because both pathways have low- carbon ambi-
tions, the Paris Agreement could reduce uncertainties and ultimately favour the 
implementation of either pathway. A limited number of stakeholders judged the 
Paris Agreement as possibly neutral in driving the selected pathways, while no 
stakeholder identified the agreement as a driver of additional uncertainty.
 The referendum binding the UK to leaving the European Union (Brexit) was 
widely recognised as a significant driver of uncertainty for the implementation 
of both the ‘new nuclear’ and ‘no new nuclear’ pathways. Stakeholders stressed 
that the UK exit from EURATOM creates the biggest Brexit- related uncertain-
ties for UK new nuclear. Uncertainty about possible limits for partnerships with 
European firms has also been recognised as potentially threatening for the 
nuclear sector. On the other hand, some stakeholders have suggested possible 
bureaucratic burden reductions and easing of public funding as positive Brexit 
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effects for nuclear power. Brexit was also recognised by the great majority of 
stakeholders as a major driver of uncertainty for renewable electricity produc-
tion in the UK. Brexit- related uncertainties are most importantly related to 
investment, doubts about the robustness of the UK’s mitigation commitments, 
exit from the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), and more difficult 
relationships with European partners.
Conclusions
The choice of focusing on nuclear power for the UK case study was based on the 
strong commitment of the UK government to new nuclear as a major com-
ponent of its climate mitigation strategy, when no other EU member state has 
made commitments greater than marginal further nuclear construction. If the 
UK government is successful in pursuing this strategy there could, however, be 
significant implications for mitigation policies in many other countries. The two 
pathways investigated – involving, respectively, a very high rate of nuclear con-
struction and an abandonment of nuclear power – were deliberately framed as 
possible ‘extremes’ in relation to the future of mitigation in the UK, though 
both have credible storylines.
 Our results have limitations, partly because our stakeholder sample was 
skewed towards academics with relatively limited consultation of other stake-
holders. The need for strict stakeholder anonymity (especially stressed by indus-
try participants) also means that we cannot report attributions of particular 
stakeholder views to stakeholder categories. Nevertheless, it is striking that in 
relation to assessment of several of the risks considered, there was a high degree 
of consensus about the existence and seriousness of risks across stakeholders 
with widely differing interests and views. A good example is the related risks of 
high cost and problematic financing that could affect both a high nuclear and a 
no nuclear pathway – a serious risk expressed by a large majority of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders also often showed substantial agreement on the most effective 
actions that could mitigate several of the risks. These included greater public- 
sector commitment to technology and skill development and the need to avoid 
conflict between different spheres of policy and regulation at sub- national, 
national, and international levels.
 Both pathways were shown to have significant risks attached, often 
common to both pathways. However, it was clear that stakeholder views sug-
gested that the 40 GW nuclear pathway had particularly difficult risks attached 
to it, involving large and controversial state and consumer funding. Recent 
developments, including very high nuclear costs, slow progress in nuclear con-
struction, and regulatory problems associated with Brexit tend to give external 
confirmation of the severity of risks to a high nuclear future. However, UK 
government sees the need to support new nuclear as an option in case no 
better and credible technological alternatives emerge (e.g. low- cost tidal and 
biomass and full development and deployment of CCS) to reduce risk and 
uncertainty for energy security if heat, transportation, and industry would be 
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electrified. Moreover, the combination of renewable generation with substan-
tial energy demand reductions will require more policy attention. While this 
suggests that more weight may need to be placed on renewables in the UK’s 
low- carbon future, there remain significant risks here as well. The most serious 
among them is the development of cheap enough bulk seasonal storage to 
overcome intermittency problems and the high costs that may still attach to 
developing many more GW of renewable capacity.
 Our final conclusion is therefore that both a mainly new nuclear and a 
mainly renewable pathway need significant work to overcome a range of 
important risks. Research here needs to engage with a wider range of stake-
holders and concentrate on ways in which public support and legitimacy can be 
secured for mitigation strategies that will probably involve significant future 
public or consumer subsidy.
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Promoting renewable energy and the 
risk of energy poverty in Chile
Luis E. Gonzales Carrasco and Rodrigo Cerda1
Introduction
In the last six years, one of the most important global issues has been the chal-
lenge of climate change and its economic impacts. One of the main determi-
nants of the acceleration of climate change is emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2018), during the 
three- year period 2014–2016, global emissions levelled off at around 32.1 
million tons of CO2. Of this total, 42% came from electric generation, 23% 
from transportation (mostly land transport at 17%), 19% from manufacturing 
and construction, with the rest attributed to other sectors. This deceleration in 
worldwide emissions growth is mainly due to the substitution of fossil fuels for 
renewable energies.
 Among the renewable energy technologies, solar energy has made one of the 
biggest market impacts in recent years. In Latin America, for 2016, there is 
installed solar capacity of 2828 MW, equivalent to 4% of the installed capacity 
of the United States, 2% of China, and 1.5% of Europe. According to the Inter-
national Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA, n.d.), Chile is leading the region 
in its exploitation of solar potential, with 56.7% of Latin America’s installed 
capacity during 2011–2016. Building on this positive trend, and due to the con-
tinued international pressure to mitigate the emissions of GHGs, a carbon tax 
was implemented to complement the increase in clean energy with an incentive 
to reduce emissions elsewhere. Nevertheless, this push towards substituting fossil 
fuels with renewable energy also implies an expected rise in electricity prices in 
the medium term. The extent depends on the electricity mix but may negatively 
impact the cost of energy for households, disproportionally affecting the poor 
because of their low income disposal to cover additional cost in their electric 
bills after the implementation of the tax.
 In particular, as an emerging economy Chile faces the challenge of continu-
ing its development path while at the same time maintaining economic growth, 
social welfare, and environmental action. Poverty in Chile has declined signifi-
cantly since the early 1990s. This is measured in two ways: first, using the 
 traditional income measure, and second, by the new methodology of multi-
dimensional poverty (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017). In traditional 
92  Luis E. Gonzales Carrasco and Rodrigo Cerda
measurement, the poverty line is basically determined by the cost of a food 
basket. The new methodology of multidimensional poverty includes other 
factors that relate to vulnerability, such as access to education, health, work and 
social security, housing and networks, and social cohesion.
 In either approach, access to energy and its costs seem to be absent. There 
are several reasons why it is important to include them as a relevant factor. The 
first is that climate change will produce (and is already producing) impacts of 
various kinds, including increases in average temperatures, droughts, and 
extreme weather events (IPCC, 2014). These phenomena are associated with 
increases in demand for energy to keep our homes and workplaces at an ade-
quate temperature. In this way, it is expected that energy demand will grow to 
cope with climate change. A second reason is that to mitigate climate change it 
is necessary to substitute fossil- fuel-intensive technologies for those with lower 
emissions of GHGs. To achieve this, policies are being used that may raise 
energy prices; for example, if a carbon dioxide tax is imposed it particularly 
affects the electricity sector. This second reason suggests an increase in for 
households of expenditure on energy, therefore energy expenditure can become 
a significant part of the family budget, especially for those most vulnerable. This 
would imply that any increases in prices could place pressure on family budgets, 
adversely influencing the socio- economic wellbeing of those affected. Thus, in 
line with this book’s risk framing, energy poverty is a consequential risk result-
ing from Chile’s ongoing low- carbon transition.
 The variations in climatic regions and resource potential also need to be con-
sidered in household energy consumption. In Chile, there are three thermal 
zones. The first zone is a ‘hot’ zone in the north which mainly comprises the 
Atacama Desert and Valleys, where solar power development is mainly concen-
trated with temperatures reaching up to 40°C degrees. The second thermal zone 
is in central Chile with a ‘temperate climate’ between 8–35°C degrees. The 
main metropolitan areas are situated in this thermal zone; they are the wealthi-
est part of the country and make up around 60% of Chile’s population. The 
third zone is in the Patagonia region in the southern Andean Mountains where 
there is high potential for hydro power. This area is sparsely inhabited and 
income levels are lower.
 Overall, electricity prices in Chile high because the electricity mix is 
imported, including natural gas. There is potential for hydro power but with 
reservations due to climate change, and coal is not popular due to social pres-
sure which inhibits further development.
 In this climatic and socio- economic context, this chapter analyses a low- 
carbon pathway as manifested around the key idea of incentivising renewable 
energy through a carbon tax, as introduced in the electricity- generation sector 
in Chile in January 2017. The particular focus is on the potential energy poverty 
risk in the absence of a compensation policy, with the aim of deconstructing 
this potential negative consequence by measuring energy poverty – also known 
in the literature as ‘fuel poverty’ – and the degree of energy vulnerability of 
Chilean households; more concretely, this is done by determining how many 
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households could fall into energy poverty and which specific households would 
be affected if energy prices were to increase. This tax, by increasing the prices of 
the electricity sector, indeed decreases poor households’ budgets. Thus, focused 
compensation measures for those most negatively impacted by rising electricity 
prices could ensure some distributive justice and mitigate this risk. Such com-
pensation measures have limited fiscal costs, which makes them quite attractive. 
Additionally, non- quantifiable risks associated with a low- carbon energy trans-
ition are based on expert perception only and stakeholder perspectives are con-
sidered to make a robust analysis in this chapter.
The current Chilean low- carbon pathway
The geographic characteristics of Chile make the country one of the most 
potential markets for renewable energy expansions. Specifically, the leadership 
of Chile in solar investments is observed through the significant and fast growth 
of installed capacity from 2012 to 2017. According to the International Renew-
able Energy Agency (IRENA, n.d.), in 2012 Chile had 2 MW of solar photo-
voltaic (PV) installed, and by 2017 was leading in Latin America with 
2110 MW of solar PV installed. This ‘solar revolution’ means an average rate of 
302% growth by year. Comparing with the rest of the region, Chile has 58.6% 
of the installed capacity in 2017.
 Four main drivers explain this expansion. First, the observed average growth 
of the per capita electricity demand of around 4% in the last 46 years. Second, 
the natural potential of Chile concentrated in the Atacama Desert in the north 
of Chile, the driest desert in the world with an estimated solar potential for 
electricity generation of nearly 1000 GW or five times the present peak load of 
all South America. (Jiménez-Estevez et al., 2015). The third driver is the 
absence and cost of possible substitutes like the natural gas that in the past 
achieved US$15 per thousand cubic feet. In the case of coal there is an official 
agreement for decarbonisation, signed by the industry and the government, that 
prevents new investment in this fuel in the future (Generadores de Chile, 
2018), plus carbon pricing through the implementation of carbon tax. The 
fourth driver is that the success of this industry was based without fiscal transfers 
or subsidies. An example of this is the tender for the sale of electric power in 
2016, where the company Solarparck Corp Tecnologica was awarded 120 MW 
of solar energy at US$29.10 MW per hour, practically half the cost of a coal- 
fired plant in Chile.
 To take advantage of these four drivers, actions are needed to: (1) create a 
more sustainable electricity sector by 2025 to facilitate the entrance of new 
competitors; (2) interconnect the two main electricity systems, the Central 
Interconnected System (Sistema Interconectado Central, SIC) and the North-
ern Interconnected System (Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande, SING); 
and (3) promote energy efficiency and clean technologies.
 The implementation of these actions requires, however, significant private 
investment in the sector, which is expected to trigger economic growth. 
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Recently, the government invited tenders to provide 12.430 GWh per year, 
starting in 2021, in the SIC and SING systems. This call constituted an 
important step forward in the implementation of the energy agenda. A total of 
84 companies participated in the tender process and the electricity supply was 
awarded to companies that offered to sell electric power to the market at 
US$47.6 per MWh. This price is much lower than those currently set in the 
market. Importantly, two- thirds of the investment will be in solar and wind gen-
eration (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2016).
 In addition to the Chilean economic efforts carried out in the last 40 years, 
the country has been engaged in efforts to mitigate the negative effects of 
climate change. One of the important efforts was the approval of a law to 
provide incentives promoting non- conventional energy sources (NCES). The 
law states that by 2025, 20% of total energy would correspond to NCES (Ley 
No 20257, 2008).
 The current public policy agenda on energy stipulates that 45% of the 
increase in electricity supply in the 2014 to 2025 period should come from 
NCES. Chile is also including new policy instruments to mitigate GHG emis-
sions. In the 2014 tax reform, the government introduced a tax on CO2 emis-
sions and local air pollutants (SOx, NOx, and particulate matter) from fixed 
specific sources. The tax on CO2 emissions was set at US$5 per ton. In addition, 
a car tax was imposed based on NOx car emissions. Nevertheless, an expected 
correction to this tax is required.
 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2018), in 2012 the 
average global CO2 emissions per capita were 4.5 tons per year, with Chile having 
a similar figure. Those numbers are much lower than the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co- operation and Development (OECD) average of 97.2 tons per person. 
In the Latin America region, Chile accounted for 4.7% of total emissions.
 Chile, as a member of the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), has committed to reducing GHG emissions by 30% by 2030 
(Gobierno de Chile, 2015). The mitigation efforts should occur in different 
sectors that produce GHGs, focusing on: energy, industry, mining, and other 
sectors using fossil fuels; processes in the industrial sector; use of land; and waste. 
To achieve the reduction in GHGs by 2030, Chile committed to reducing its 
GHGs emissions by 35% to 45% vis- à-vis its 2007 levels, provided it is possible 
to keep the pace of economic growth and obtain international grants to finance 
the additional required measures to attain the objective. In the land manage-
ment sector, Chile committed to the restoration of 100,000 hectares of forestry, 
which corresponds to the reduction of 600,000 tons of GHG emissions per year.
 To tackle this challenge of a low- carbon pathway, policy measures have been 
taken and implemented. One of the most representative for the market was the 
carbon pricing signal. After a broader discussion in academia, congress, and civil 
society, Chile decided to implement a carbon dioxide tax starting at $5/ton of 
carbon dioxide equivalent as its carbon pricing strategy. This measure was 
approved in 2014 and implemented recently in 2017, collecting its revenues at 
the moment less than quinquennia.
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 At this point, and with the best information, simulations of possible scen-
arios of both different levels of carbon tax rates and electricity generation mixes 
have been conducted by different projects like the Mitigation Action Plans and 
Scenarios for Chile (MAPS Chile, 2014) where macroeconomic impacts are 
observed with the interaction of electric generation models that represents the 
expansion plans in the electricity sector and provide the resulting prices of tech-
nologies mixes for industry and households.
 Using this context of Chile’s low- carbon emission pathway and the aggregate 
information of macroeconomic and energy simulations, four scenarios were 
developed where energy poverty could emerge as a consequential risk resulting 
from the promotion of renewable energy by means of a carbon dioxide tax.
Four scenarios to understand energy poverty
To understand possible negative consequences – in this case energy poverty – of 
continuing this pathway, scenarios help address uncertainties about the future 
role of renewables in the Chilean energy sector. Across these scenarios any low- 
carbon pathway needs to support a continuous growth rate appropriate for an 
emerging country, where the rate of economic growth in capita terms is around 
3.5% (Benavente, Gonzales, and Díaz, 2014). This pathway includes the object-
ives of an electricity generation matrix with a low presence of coal and other 
fossil- fuel sources, plus the incorporation of renewable technologies like solar 
and wind. At the same time, this pathway shall reduce negative externalities 
produced by pollution from activities such as mining and manufacturing. Thus 
in the near future Chile sees itself as a developed economy that bases its produc-
tion on environmentally friendly technologies, generating opportunities for 
them to be included in the electric generation mix of its population in 
many ways.
 The first scenario consists of moderate solar development. The main assump-
tions for this first exercise are moderate growing investment in solar projects 
and, as a possible substitution, a moderate increase in liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) prices. In addition, this scenario does not incorporate the development 
of big hydroelectric projects in the south of the country.
 The following three scenarios are modifications of part of the assumptions of 
the first scenario, trying to identify the effect of a particular policy.
 The second scenario considers a decrease in the cost of investment in solar 
projects, with the rest of the scenario’s assumptions remaining as the baseline. 
This assumption is consistent with evidence in the last report of renewable costs 
by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). This report states 
that the falling costs of solar and onshore wind are significant. Solar PV techno-
logy experienced learning rates of 18% to 22%, with solar panel prices falling by 
around 80% since 2010. At the same time, onshore wind shows learning rates of 
15%, with costs falling by around 38% since 2009. Taking into account that 
Chile is a small and open economy, we assume that these prices will be reflected 
in the local economy as in the global economy.
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 The third scenario consists of testing the possible expansion of hydroelectric 
projects in the south of Chile. Because of its geographic location, Chile has a 
significant hydroelectric potential. In 2015, the most recent survey from the 
University of Chile (Jiménez-Estevez et al., 2015) established that the total 
potential is 7.704 MW distributed across 142 generation plants, with about one- 
third of them in the south of the country. This was calculated by considering 
operational plants, plants under construction, and provisional plants.
 The fourth scenario modifies the last assumption on LNG prices. This scen-
ario is justified because of the dynamic experienced in the industry over the last 
ten years. This dynamic is characterised by the expansion in US gas production. 
In the following years, it expects an annual production growth of 1.6%, satisfy-
ing the demand of emerging countries like China, which represents 40% of the 
total demand. The USA is expected to fulfil more than one- third of the extra 
production in the following five years, making a considerable impact in the 
natural gas market.
 These four scenarios are represented by a baseline that will vary according 
the level of carbon tax simulated in each scenario. The carbon tax varies from 
$5 to $50; for simplicity we will report variations of each baseline scenario for 
$5, $20 and $40 per ton.
Research process and methods
To diagnose the bigger picture of the Chilean energy sector and the resulting multi- 
level challenges, we conducted open- ended interviews with the main stakeholders 
in the three main industries: the electric sector, mining, and manufacturing.
 We used Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS) scenarios for esti-
mating energy poverty under different future characteristics of the energy sector 
(MAPS Chile, 2014). These scenarios were built through several rounds of con-
sultation with a mixed group of more than 300 experts from seven sectors: 
(1) generating and refining transformation; (2) mining and other industries;  
(3) transport; (4) commercial, residential, and public energy consumption;  
(5) land use and agriculture; (6) forestry; and (7) waste.
 At the same time, the quantitative assessment process was conducted in two 
phases. The first was about building the baseline, imagining Chile in a business- as-
usual scenario and forecasting the economy over 20 years from 2006. The second 
phase was characterised by the identification of possible measures that could be 
introduced in the following years in the sectors of Chile’s economy. For our pro-
poses, the electricity sector was defined as one of the most dynamic sectors in the 
adoption of new technologies for electric generation, for example liquefied natural 
gas, solar, and wind. Experts brought not only technical arguments for considera-
tion in the scenario, but also normative arguments for their justification. This 
phase was the most significant for considering our estimates at the time for the 
energy poverty scenarios.
 With the possible scenarios identified, we used a minimum cost model repre-
senting the electricity generation market in order to obtain the equilibrium price 
of that electric generation market for each scenario. With that equilibrium price 
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established, we used a macroeconomic model that has a minimal minor repres-
entation of the energy sector as part of the inputs of the production function of 
the economy (together with capital investment and employment) – in other words 
the total added value. When introducing those equilibrium prices we estimate the 
output where feedback leads the demand side in the electric model. As outcomes 
of the interaction between both models, we can see the consumption and invest-
ment of a representative household, the deviation of output during the price 
increase, and the GHG emissions associated with each scenario in the electric 
model.
Energy poverty as a consequence of the carbon dioxide tax
The current Chilean carbon dioxide tax will give raise to fuel poverty under all 
scenarios conceived by experts (Figure 6.1). Around 15.7% of households in 
Chile are in energy poverty in the baseline scenario without the change in 
prices. Under the four mitigation scenarios this number could increase to 
16.19% of the population, controlling for the change in the mix of electricity 
generation and the different levels of carbon tax simulated.
 At the same time an estimated monetary compensation amount for those 
households could provide each vulnerable household with the amount of money 
that satisfies their utility function and maintains their level of wellbeing at the 
level they experienced before the introduction of each mitigation scenario.
 Public spending of between US$9.3 and US$15.5 million is required to alle-
viate the impact of the mitigation scenarios.
 Thus energy poverty can be considered a consequential risk resulting from 
Chile’s low- carbon pathway as manifested in this case as carbon pricing in the 
form of a tax to increase renewable energy in the electricity sector. This risk is 
observed in two dimensions: (1) the quantitative dimension, resulting from the 
exercise presented above, using simulations and calculating the monetary com-
pensation required to restore at least at the same level of utility vulnerable 
households after the carbon tax; and (2) the qualitative dimension where neg-
ative impacts in the wellbeing of households further than monetary ones are 
observed and could affect the comfort of people that in extreme could provoke 
death.
 For the quantitative dimension, it is important to consider that the rich dis-
cussion with stakeholders allowed us to work with realistic scenarios of techno-
logy penetration and to draw a possible evolution of the carbon tax rate in the 
midterm. One of the main points to consider was how future increases to the 
actual rate of carbon tax were to cope with the negative externality and the rate 
of emissions that Chile will face in the following years.
 Certainly, and like the definition of risk in the literature has done, the 
energy- poverty negative consequential risk depends on the context of 
the assumptions made in each scenario. A good example of this dependency is 


































































































































































































































































































































Chile is a net importer of natural gas prices determined in the global market, 
this will definitely improve or deteriorate the consequences in energy poverty.
 Nevertheless, there are some policy options in the context of the estimations 
that depend on the willingness of policymakers to incentivise the penetration of 
other technologies, like big hydropower in the south, resulting in a minor 
impact in the monetary loss for households.
 In the qualitative dimension, according to the suggested energy poverty indi-
cators, a definition of poverty in terms of energy satisfaction, or the ability to 
maintain a comfortable indoor temperature, is associated with the last percep-
tions of each individual in the previous season, according of the panel of stake-
holders at Red de la Pobreza. For example, a measure suggested by the 
stakeholders are questions such as, ‘How cold for you was the last winter?” or 
“How hot was the last summer?” The huge variance in possible answers will 
relate to the observed average temperature and is expected to be both high and 
not easily comparable.
 However, stakeholders consider that these kinds of definitions must be col-
lected in some way in order to introduce them into the design of the policy, 
mainly because of its negative impact on health and in extreme as a cause of 
death.
 Additionally, different climatic regions in Chile will require different adjust-
ments in indoor temperature. In the southern region, biomass (direct combus-
tion) is traditionally used as heating in the winter. The biomass is readily 
available and low cost compared with the cleaner heating sources including 
solar power and hydropower. However, hydropower is not yet fully developed in 
the south and there are divided views on the development of hydro due to 
climate change and irregular rainfalls. The potential switch to cleaner energy 
would increase the cost of heating in these homes but may impact different fam-
ilies in different regions in Chile.
 Beyond the two dimensions explained before, one means to reduce the con-
sequential risk would be to recycle revenues from the carbon tax to support the 
families that are at risk of energy poverty. However, this must be carried out 
carefully as there are different energy poverty indicators that consider different 
parameters. For instance, some energy poverty indicators stipulate households 
are in energy poverty if they spend more than 10% if their income on fuel, but 
these indicators do not consider household make- up and their energy needs, nor 
energy infrastructure. Other indicators such as the minimum income standard 
(MIS) based indicator, will categorise a household as at risk of energy poverty if, 
after covering its housing requirements, its residual income cannot meet the 
household’s energy costs and other living costs as well as maintain a decent 
living standard. Another indicator, the low- income–high- cost (LIHC) indi-
cator, considers households to be in energy poverty if they have energy costs 
that are above the median level. 
 Different indicators will tell a different story related to the negative outcome 
of a certain electricity mix and the impact on energy poverty. The first two indi-
cators could show a high risk of energy poverty for the poorest in the country, 
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while LIHC could show that the middle class has a higher risk of fuel poverty. 
The variations are due to the different costs associated with different energy 
fuels. For instance, households spend less on low- cost biomass in southern 
regions versus higher costs of solar power in other regions (see Gonzales, 2018). 
Currently in Chile, there are no considerations to assess fuel poverty within the 
different thermal zones and different household income levels. More studies are 
needed in order to explore the impact of renewable electricity on energy poverty 
as the climate continues to change and more households will need to adjust to 
the changes. The burden of the costs will need to be carefully considered and 
the risks of energy poverty mitigated before rolling out policies.
 In summary, successful implementation of a low- carbon pathway will place 
pressure on household budgets, as energy costs will rise. Any of the possible 
scenarios would change both actual and desired spending decisions on energy 
and other essential items in individual households – what we call their ‘prefer-
ences’. Many household preferences cannot be directly observed, but we con-
sider that an economic compensation, set by observed expenditure on energy 
products, is the best proxy for the hidden preferences of these households. This 
measure will not fit all the preferences of every household but it will at least 
cover a significant proportion of them.
Other uncertainties and risks
The policy complexity at the intersection of economics, energy, and environ-
ment may give rise to uncertainties, and under these some identifiable risks 
related to the promotion of renewable energy in Chile which go beyond the 
consequential risk posed by energy poverty. They have not been quantified but 
are the result of stakeholder engagement processes including focus groups.
 We understand the uncertainty as a lack of information about possible results 
or stages after policy implementation. In this case the uncertainty, identified by 
the stakeholders’ discussion around scenarios of mitigation for a low- emissions 
economy, is nested in the behaviour of citizens in cultural and social demands 
towards the promotion of renewable energy.
 This unpredictable behaviour of the citizens regarding the promotion of 
renewable energy is contrasted by actual positive positions to renewal technolo-
gies in regions far away from solar or wind farms, and contrasted by the opposi-
tion observed in some regions of the country where they host these farms. A 
good example of this contradictory behaviour is the opposition to wind farms in 
the south of Chile, specifically in Chiloe. This kind of manifestation opens the 
door for doubt about the performance of the renewal sector in the future. While 
there is an increasing willingness to adopt new and clean technologies, other 
kinds of considerations, like the beauty and quality of landscapes, also play an 
important role in the subjective valuations of society.
 At the same time, a cultural change also brings uncertainty around the feas-
ibility of the promotion of the renewable energy as an instrument of alleviating 
negative externalities in climate change policy. A good example of this is the 
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treatment of biomass or wood in the south of Chile. Not only monetary con-
cerns are considered for the appositions of the eradication of this kind of source 
of energy, but also all the traditional and cultural conceptions of wood in the 
living standard of the region play a major role in the introduction of new clean 
technologies.
 The uncertainties identified above bring us to a subset of implementation 
risk, that is the expansion of electricity access across Chile as a heating and 
cooking option. Currently in Chile the coverage of electricity access is 99.6%. 
The remaining ~0.4% is spread around the country. From this data we can 
appreciate that the largest portion of the 0.4% without electricity connection is 
concentrated in one of the poorest regions of the country, the Araucanía region. 
Furthermore, trying to characterise this region, we can learn from Encuenta 
Nacional de Energia (Ministerio de Energía de Chile, 2016) that the Araucanía 
region uses 70% biomass- wood for heating and less than 5% electricity for this 
propose.
 One of the implementations risks in this context is related to the monetary 
expected change for citizens. There is no official market for biomass- wood in 
Chile and prices are lower than the estimated prices of electricity if this option 
is considered as an option for heating. Also, it is important to consider the cost 
of these alternatives in the building and operational phases, and to consider that 
one of the natural constraints of the energy matrix in Chile is the dependency 
on fuel imports (IEA, 2018).
 Another risk is observed at the time of subjective considerations related to 
renewable energy and energy poverty. According to an expert’s panel named 
Red de Pobreza Energetica, more significant than the monetary dimension of 
the consequential risk of energy poverty, they observed that energy poverty 
could have three negative impacts in the lives of citizens through these dimen-
sions (Urquiza et al., 2017).
 The first impact observed is the socio- cultural dimension. According to the 
discussion of this group reported in Amigo et al. (2018), the importance of abso-
lute and relative energy necessities is differentiated by the diversity of regions of 
Chile demanding this feature in the policy design.
 The second impact is determined by the first one and is related to the quality 
of energy access in regions. Factors like equipment, housing conditions, and the 
intermittency of the service are part of this impact. In this regard, preliminary 
observation of expert judgement of the group estimated that the impact would 
be observed in the monetary budget of the household.
 The third impact is with respect to accessibility and equity. The most signi-
ficant challenge in this regard is the conditions of towns at the borders of the 
country where energy sources are not available and where the provision distri-
bution is costly. This third dimension is closely related with the consequential 
risk analysed in the previous sections by quantitative methods.
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Conclusions
Chile is facing new and complex demands as a result of its economic progress. 
One of those demands is moving to a low- carbon economy while keeping eco-
nomic growth on the same path. For this purpose, the government actively pro-
motes renewable energy to reduce GHG emissions, relying on the significant 
potential of renewable energy in Chile. In order to support the diffusion of the 
respective technologies with market instruments, the government of Chile 
recently introduced a carbon tax.
 This tax, however, will create an unintended collateral problem – a conse-
quential risk – affecting disproportionally the most vulnerable portions of the 
population. In a scenario where levels of penetration of solar technologies for 
the electric generation interacts in four different mixes of energy, 15.7% of 
Chilean households are in energy poverty. Without economic compensation 
and with a variation of carbon tax from $5–40/ton of CO2, it would lead to a 
16.2% increase in the proportion of households in energy poverty. If the gov-
ernment decided to compensate the most vulnerable in the population, the cost 
would be between US$9.3 and US$15.5 million for a programme that left 
households at at least the same level of wellbeing and comfort as before the tax.
 Apart from the risk of increasing energy poverty, we identify an uncertainty 
of the behaviour of citizens towards renewable energy promotion. This emerges 
after a rich exchange of ideas with stakeholders at the point of building the 
scenarios. Moreover, we identify implementation risks that at the moment are 
not quantifiable because of the lack of detailed information at household level, 
these being the monetary cost of substituting biomass- wood by electricity if this 
is considered an option for heating at household level, and the multidimensional 
risk in the mix of quantitative and qualitative perceptions of the stakeholders 
can be seen (see Figure 6.2).2
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7 The Netherlands
Expanding solar PV – risks and 
uncertainties associated with 
small- and large- scale options
Krisztina de Bruyn- Szendrei, Wytze van der Gaast, 
and Eise Spijker1
Introduction
According to recent projections (ECN, 2017), the Netherlands will not be able 
to comply with its commitment under the 2008 Energy and Climate Package to 
realise a 14% share for renewable energy consumption by 2020. Currently, only 
about 6% of energy is generated from renewable sources, which is expected to 
increase to, at most, 13% by 2020 (European Commission, 2017). In compari-
son, in several other EU member states – such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Croatia, Latvia, Romania, and Sweden – the 
2020 targets have already been achieved. Other member states have not yet 
done so but are on track. Next to the Netherlands, France and Luxemburg are 
other member states that have not yet complied, nor are on track for realising 
2020 renewable energy targets (European Commission, 2017).
 In response to the slow progress, a policy package was prepared by the Nether-
lands Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2016 with additional measures for reaching 
the 14% target by 2020 (Kamp, 2016). While technically the options in the 
package seem feasible, there are a range of barriers affecting their successful imple-
mentation, such as costs, spatial planning, and public acceptance issues.
 To date, biomass (63% in 2016) and wind energy (24% in 2016) have been 
responsible for the bulk of renewable energy production in the Netherlands 
(CBS, 2017). Solar energy constitutes 5.4% of renewable energy in the country, 
which is not a surprise given the relatively low solar radiation in this region of 
Europe. Nevertheless, due to the ongoing debate on the sustainability of 
(imported) biomass and the increasing difficulties related to expanding onshore 
wind power in the Netherlands (RVO, 2017), expanding solar energy on 
rooftops as well as on land and water has increasingly become an indispensable 
option for complying with renewable energy commitments for 2020 and 
beyond.
 Solar energy can provide different energy services, such as for electricity, 
heating, cooling, and transportation. Each of these services face challenges and 
therefore risks, such as space needed for solar parks, extra costs to be borne 
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when purchasing and operating the panels, and social aspects related to energy 
switch and acceptance of the technology. This chapter focuses on the possible 
consequences of expanding electricity production through solar energy. This has 
several common aspects and potential risks with other renewable energy sources 
but faces additional risks related to grid balancing.
 Despite their current small share of solar- based power production in the 
Netherlands, ground- mounted parks could potentially become at least as 
important as rooftop PV (DNV GL, 2016). Therefore, in this chapter, both 
technology options for solar PV are considered for a pathway towards expansion 
of electricity production in the Netherlands through rooftop solar panels and 
large- scale solar parks. Possible consequences (risks) of this pathway for society 
and the economy are elaborated, as well as potential barriers that could prevent 
successful scaling up of the technology options in the country.
The Dutch pathway towards solar PV
In October 2017, the newly elected Netherlands coalition government 
announced a national climate and energy accord with the goal of reducing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 49% by 2030 (below 1990 levels) (VVD, 
CDA, D66, ChristenUnie, 2017). This goal corresponds with an emission 
reduction of 56 Mton CO2, on top of reductions through existing and planned 
policies for mitigation in the Netherlands. Eighteen Mton of that reduction will 
be obtained through the accelerated phase out of coal plants, which means that 
alternative electricity sources need to be utilised, including solar PV.
 With a view to the recent policy context in the Netherlands, this chapter 
analyses potential consequences and implementation barriers related to a 
desired future with large- scale application of solar PV for reaching Dutch and 
European energy and climate goals, as well as a trajectory with actions to realise 
that (a pathway). As part of the pathway, we consider two options: (1) the 
upscaling of rooftop solar panel use in the built environment with a focus on 
households, small businesses, schools, etc.; and (2) large- scale applications of 
solar PV, such as through ground- mounted solar parks of high output.
 The starting point for the pathway is that, presently, the installed solar- 
power capacity of the Netherlands is 2.7 GWp (CBS, 2018), 94% of which is 
based on rooftop solar panels on dwellings and buildings; the remainder is based 
on ground- mounted solar parks (176 MWp) (Zon op Kaart, 2018). According to 
the National Solar Power Action Plan for 2016 (DNV GL, 2016), 4 GWp of 
installed capacity could be achieved by 2020 (about 12 PJ of generated solar 
power, assuming 850 load hours). Technically, however, the potential is much 
bigger. Nowadays, only about 450,000 dwellings in the Netherlands are 
equipped with solar PV rooftop panels, while potentially around four million 
roofs are suitable for that (which is around half of the total number of dwellings 
in the Netherlands). Should this technical potential be utilised, in addition to 
the roofs of industrial and utility buildings, solar PV capacity could grow to 
70 GWp in 2075 (DNV GL, 2016). Fully utilising the technical potential of 
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large- scale solar parks could double this capacity. Large- scale projects have thus 
far been scarce in the Netherlands, which has been largely due to the fact that 
revenues have long been insufficient to cover the costs. Moreover, in a densely 
populated country such as the Netherlands, space is limited so that opportunity 
costs are relatively high (see also elsewhere in this chapter when discussing spe-
cific risks). For these reasons, according to the chair of Holland Solar (a solar 
PV sector organisation) in an interview, stakeholders such as municipalities, 
railway infrastructure management, and the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Water Management have long taken a re- active position, while they have only 
recently become pro- active (Cobouw, 2018).
 Since 2017, the option of large- scale solar parks has become eligible for 
exploitation support under the Dutch sustainable energy subsidy scheme 
(SDE+).2 Projects granted this subsidy become financially viable, which takes 
away an important financial barrier to large- scale solar expansion. In 2017, over 
half of the SDE+ budget of €6 billion was allocated to solar parks (Van den 
Eerenbeemt, 2018). With the adoption of large- scale ground- mounted projects, 
the expansion of solar PV could go faster than rooftop solar PV due to eco-
nomies of scale.
 Next to technical and economic potential (supported by incentive schemes), 
the scale and pace of solar PV expansion also depends on a range of other 
factors. These include: the policy mix for creating an enabling environment for 
solar PV; opportunity costs when land that is used for solar parks can no longer 
be used for other (e.g. agricultural) purposes; inefficiencies in the market value 
chain; and whether energy, legal, financial, and technical services are suffi-
ciently capable of supporting scaling up solar PV.
 The scope for Dutch energy and climate policies is set by EU directives such 
as the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Performance of Buildings Direc-
tive, and the Electricity Market Directive. Examples of policy instruments 
derived from these, with direct relevance for solar PV, are: net metering, 
enabling households and small businesses3 to feed surplus solar electricity into 
the grid; the SDE+ subsidy scheme; energy investment tax exemptions, enabling 
an investor in clean energy technology to deduct investment costs from income 
before taxes; and the postal code regulation, enabling consumers to invest in 
nearby solar parks and receive tax rebates.
 In particular, the net- metering instrument has turned out to be a strong stim-
ulus for rooftop solar PV investments by households and small businesses. 
Households that produce solar- based electricity are exempted from energy 
charges and are paid by the grid operator when they deliver surplus electricity to 
the grid. With these financial benefits, return on investment for solar PV easily 
surpassed interest rates on bank accounts. As explained above, the SDE+ 
opening for large- scale solar PV has generated a strong growth in planned solar 
parks. Since the eligibility of solar parks under SDE+, the number of completed 
parks has grown from 2 MWp in 2014, to 15 MWp in 2015, 43 MWp in 2016 and 
114 MWp in 2017. Many more projects are in preparation: as of May 2018, 
94.5% of all planned solar parks (including those that have been approved for 
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the SDE+) are still in the process of preparation, such as arranging permission 
and other planning (Zon op Kaart, 2018).
 Further promotion of the pathway takes place via (governmental) institu-
tions that develop visions for energy and climate, have responsibility for 
(spatial) planning, and formulate policy packages around these. Municipalities, 
for instance, usually issue the permits for parks, for which they need to decide 
whether a solar park is in accordance with local spatial plans. The ministries are 
responsible for the national energy and climate policy development, including 
incentive schemes such as subsidies and tax exemptions, and are thereby sup-
ported by government agencies such as the Netherlands Enterprise Agency 
(RVO). The market system for expansion of solar PV in the Netherlands is 
shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 The market system map for solar PV expansion in the Netherlands.
Note
The block arrows in the map show connections between institutions and stakeholders that have a 
positive effect on scaling up solar PV. The broken line arrows reflect potential market barriers, such 
as public resistance to large-scale solar projects or grid balancing issues due to households’ guaran-
teed delivery of domestically produced solar-based electricity to the grid.
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Risk elicitation
While the pathway promotes expansion of solar PV, there are multiple factors 
that can positively or negatively influence its implementation. These are likely to 
differ between small and larger- scale applications. When taking a decision on pur-
suing a pathway, it is important to understand both the potential consequences of 
the pathway and the implementation barriers in terms of how easily, and against 
what costs, these can be cleared. Therefore, key questions answered in this chapter 
are: what are the possible consequences of, and implementation barriers to, 
rooftop or ground- mounted solar PV systems? How are these reflected by risk pro-
files of the pathway? And how can these risks be mitigated?4
Research process and methods
To identify the implementation and consequential risks of solar PV acceleration in 
the Netherlands, a literature review was conducted which has been supported by a 
series of semi- structured qualitative interviews during 2016 and 2017 with 19 rel-
evant public and private stakeholders in different relevant sectors and professions. 
The initial list of the expert stakeholders was put together based on the prior know-
ledge of team members (purposive sampling). The list was later expanded by adding 
more expert stakeholders based on inputs from early interview subjects (snowball 
sampling). Nineteen experts have been interviewed, who were selected from seven 
stakeholder groups: public body (n = 5), businesses (n = 3), academia (n = 3), energy 
think tanks (n = 3), grid/network operators (n = 2), an energy co- operative (n = 1), 
and an environmental non- governmental organisation (n = 1). The interviewees’ 
expertise spans from technical design and installing of solar PVs to economic, 
behavioural, and spatial aspects of low- emission transitions. Stakeholders were asked 
about their views on the transition pathways and policy instruments, implementa-
tion barriers, consequential risks, and recommended changes to address these risks.
 The interviewed stakeholders have different interests regarding solar PV imple-
mentation. For instance, while a policymaker at the national level may strive for 
achieving renewable energy and climate goals, a local policymaker needs to 
accommodate relevant measures in local or regional spatial planning. Network 
operators have a key interest in maintaining grid stability with accompanying 
resources. Research institutes have a broad interest in understanding problems 
related to pursuing energy and climate goals and formulating solutions that serve 
all parties involved in the energy transition. Environmental NGOs interviewed 
expressed mainly concerns about how low- emission energy and climate options 
could be hampered by policy, economic, and social obstacles. On the commercial 
side, interviewed business stakeholders explained their experiences with setting up 
solar parks and the opportunities and limitations to that. Their experience resulted 
in often practical issues, such whether and how to clean panels in a solar park, 
responsibility for connecting to the grid, what professionals are usually asked in 
order to construct a park, etc. We also included in our stakeholder assessment rep-
resentatives of an energy co- operative who, from a more ideological perspective, 
strive for locally generated clean energy.
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Large- scale deployment of rooftop solar PV and ground- mounted solar parks is 
likely to have different types of impact, leading to different types of risk. Sim-
ilarly, as both technology options in the pathway have different implementation 
characteristics (rooftops versus ground- mounted investments), their implemen-
tation risks are likely to be different too. In this section, key consequential and 
implementation risks are highlighted (see Figure 7.2 for a summary), as well as 
ways to mitigate these. As explained in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Figure 7.2, 
both risk categories are intertwined with each other. For instance, should stake-
holders be aware of a potential negative impact of a pathway, such as employ-
ment losses, and consider this a consequential risk, then this could also result in 
a reduced public acceptance, which in its turn would lead to an implementation 
risk (in Figure 7.2 this is referred to as ‘consequential risk as cognitive barrier’). 
Where applicable, such cognitive barriers are also addressed.
 While applying the same type of technology, the small and large- scale 
pathway options are very different in terms of project size (e.g. small- scale 
rooftop PV panels versus large- scale ground- mounted solar parks), grid stability 
measures, ownership, costs, etc. Implementation risks are therefore separately 
discussed for both options.
Implementation risks related to expanding rooftop solar PV in 
the Netherlands
Technical aspects
For several reasons, not all residential dwellings and industrial buildings are suit-
able for placing solar panels on their rooftops. Ideally, a roof is sufficiently strong 
to carry the weight of the solar panels, has a favourable orientation towards the 
sun, while the waterproof layer on the roof tiles is suitable for placing solar 
panels. Lack of these conditions can lead to implementation problems which 
entail the risk that the desired scale of solar PV for meeting Dutch renewable 
energy targets is not met. Moreover, even if these conditions are met, owners of 
the dwelling or building may still find the investment risky or unattractive 
because, for example, they find panels unattractive, cannot cover the costs, or 
are concerned about the payback time. These risks are further explained below 
based on inputs from stakeholders.
 Industrial buildings generally have flat rooftops and are generally constructed 
to support one metre of snow. Such constructions may not be strong enough to 
carry a layer of solar panels and additional investments to strengthen the roof 
may be required. Traditionally, most rooftop solar panels are installed on 
rooftops with a southward orientation for better utilisation of solar radiation, as 
these have the most attractive business cases. However, the business cases for 
east- or westward- oriented buildings have recently improved due to technical 
improvements with enhanced efficiency and the net- metering policy. Yet the 
latter category seems to be more sensitive to a change in this policy: one of 
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the payback time of southward- oriented panels would increase from five to 
seven years, while the payback time of east- or westward- oriented panels 
increases from nine to 15 years.
Social aspects
From the perspective of social acceptance of rooftop solar panels, the survey 
conducted among Dutch stakeholders has shown that public perception of 
rooftop solar PV is generally positive. An important enabling factor to that has 
been the policy instrument of net metering,5 which provides a good business 
case for owner- occupiers who have both a sufficiently large rooftop area and the 
financial ability to invest in solar PV. A considerable proportion of Dutch 
households, however, do not reap the benefits from this policy as they consider 
the payback time to be too long or simply do not have the funds necessary for 
the initial investment. Partly this relates to the argument that the rationality of 
people is hampered by not having full information as well as cognitive limita-
tions, while time for decision making is limited (the concept of bounded ration-
ality as explained in Chapter 2).
 For example, while a comparison between interest revenues from savings 
accounts and revenues from solar PV investments may currently lead to a 
favourable picture for the latter, households may still find it more comfortable 
(a lower perceived risk) to keep their money in a savings account. This is partly 
due to the underlying uncertainties, such as ‘unknown’ developments of known 
risks of household investments in solar PV. In the case of investment in solar 
PV panels, this could lead to postponed or cancelled investments.
Policy- related uncertainty
Finally, uncertainty for scaling up rooftop solar panels, which could result in an 
implementation risk, lies in the current absence of a policy to make newly built 
residential dwellings more suitable for solar PV panels. According to the con-
sulted stakeholders, it would be essential to provide incentives or regulation so 
that architects and building companies, as well as future home owners, can 
better integrate solar panels on rooftops and/or situate houses in such a way that 
it is most effective for solar PV. Currently, the energy performance code (EPC) 
for buildings offers insufficient incentives for this, so newly built houses may still 
lack suitable conditions for solar PV, and instead stimulates doing the minimum 
of installing only two panels. (These are also referred to as ‘shame or excuse 
panels’, according to the interviewed solar PV experts.) For existing houses this 
is even more complicated because a building certificate (an energy label from A 
= ‘highest’ to G = ‘lowest’) is only required if a dwelling is sold.
 With stricter EPCs, installing solar PVs would be a relatively cheap way to 
meet the new standards. Adopting solar PVs on rooftops could therefore become 
mandatory in building standards and guide architects when designing new 
houses.
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Implementation risks related to ground- mounted parks for solar PV
Public resistance
Ground- mounted solar parks will, similarly to onshore wind turbines, have an 
impact on landscapes as they require a significant piece of land and are often 
clearly visible from long distances. In the Netherlands, spatial plans developed 
by provinces and municipalities determine for what purposes land can be used. 
This could give rise to social conflicts if a solar park is eligible for a certain area 
according to the spatial planning but is not preferred for this area by the local 
population.
 Information evenings held for ground- mounted solar projects in the develop-
ment phase showed that the main concern of the local population is where the 
park is going to be located and how this relates to the location of people’s 
houses. There is a preference for placing solar parks outside cities where they are 
less clearly visible. This contradicts with, for instance, the regional regulations 
in the Province of Fryslân where, according to spatial planning, ground- 
mounted solar parks can only be installed near cities/villages and not in open 
land (Gemeente Súdwest-Fryslân, 2015). The spatial departments of provinces 
often oppose having solar parks in the countryside because, during the past 30 
years, their primary task has been to protect the rural landscape. These contra-
dictions between traditional spatial planning and people’s preferences regarding 
location of ground- mounted solar parks could considerably delay the deploy-
ment of solar parks due to lack of acceptance (or even resistance) among the 
local population.
 Therefore, an important lesson from the stakeholder consultation for this 
study is that it is important to engage the local population as soon as possible in 
decision making on a ground- mounted solar park. This is important as a solar 
park can, as explained above, affect the population in multiple ways, such as 
visual pollution due to the significant change in the landscape, opportunity 
costs as the land can no longer be used for other purposes for a long period of 
time, and associated issues such as reduced job opportunities. Recently, in the 
Netherlands, there have been cases where ground- mounted solar parks were 
cancelled due to local resistance and in these cases the population, as an 
important stakeholder, had only late in the process been consulted. Consulted 
stakeholders for this study have therefore identified social resistance as a key 
obstacle to scaling up solar PV through ground- mounted parks.
 According to interviewed commercial parties, a way to lower public resist-
ance against solar parks can be found in improvements in the design and 
(spatial) planning structure. Currently, most project cases focus on cost optimi-
sation as that is the key criterion for obtaining subsidies through the SDE+, so 
that project developers have an incentive to choose relatively low- cost mater-
ials even if this has a less attractive design. Moreover, as explained previously, 
solar parks in the Netherlands fit best in areas close to population centres as 
using more remote, rural areas would require modification of spatial planning. 
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Therefore, consulted stakeholders recommend that the design of the panels be 
considered as a factor when taking a decision on providing subsidies, and that 
spatial plans are modified so that solar parks are also eligible for rural areas.
 An example of a concept where social acceptance is more naturally con-
sidered in the project planning is that of energy co- operatives, which are gener-
ally formed by locals who are familiar with regional issues and preferences. Trust 
in energy co- operatives is therefore higher than in government bodies because 
they offer the opportunity for locals to be part of the decision making on prefer-
ence for energy source, to have a voice, to be critical, and to raise questions 
regarding their spatial environment.
 Further to risks related to implementation of both solar PV options and how 
these may block or slow down expansion of solar PV in the Netherlands, this 
section focuses on potentially negative impacts of the options (consequential 
risks) for economic sectors and areas of society. Contrary to the former section, 
where implementation risks are discussed separately for scaling up rooftop solar 
PV and ground- mounted solar parks, the potential consequential risks that 
follow are discussed mostly simultaneously for both options as the risks are 
largely similar. Where differences in consequential risks exist, these are expli-
citly mentioned.
Consequential risks of expanding rooftop solar PV and solar parks in 
the Netherlands
Impact on the electricity grid
Presently, the Dutch electricity grid is designed to handle peak demand but, 
with an increased share of distributed renewable energy such as solar PV, the 
current peak handling capacity will become insufficient or at least come under 
pressure. Distribution grids are sized around average demands of 1 kW per dwell-
ing and become insufficient if (instead) dwellings are feeding 4–8 kW (peak) 
into the grid (DSO, 2017). Technically, modifying the grid is not a complex 
task but there will be costs involved, which are covered by the distribution grid 
operator. As these costs do not directly accrue to solar PV panel owners, they 
are usually not considered by households when deciding on whether or not to 
invest in rooftop panels.
 Grid operators are not involved in small- scale rooftop solar PV projects and 
therefore do not have influence on where and how many panels are installed. If 
all suitable homes (around four million, as discussed earlier) were equipped with 
solar panels, about 16 GW of solar power could be generated per year. Operators 
interviewed in our stakeholder consultation indicated that the grid could cope 
with this amount of solar power with only small adjustments but, in order to avoid 
grid- balancing issues, large neighbourhood batteries may be needed to store gener-
ated electricity that cannot be used momentarily due to insufficient demand.
 From the households’ point of view, net metering is an attractive instrument, 
but from a grid- balancing perspective it is more complex and not the preferred 
The Netherlands  115
way to stimulate solar installations. The price of solar energy varies throughout 
the day, while in the system of net metering the price is fixed. There is no 
incentive to use electricity at times when it would be best for the electricity 
grid. Ideally, solar electricity is used when available (during sunny hours). 
During these hours, electricity prices would go down because of increased solar 
electricity supply. Dynamic electricity pricing could facilitate a smarter way of 
using electricity so that peaks in supply are met with increased demand and 
balancing issues are mitigated or avoided. Next to technical investments, this 
will also require modification of the legal framework that governs the electricity 
market.
 In contrast to individual rooftop solar PV projects, grid operators are gener-
ally involved in the development of large- scale solar projects as they need to 
arrange the necessary infrastructure (connections, cables, etc.). Network oper-
ators are obliged to connect the park to the grid when they are called upon to 
do so. Grid operators interviewed expressed concern that if the recent accelera-
tion in project applications (such as under the SDE+) continues with a high 
rate of project approval, then in the short term large grid reinforcement, as well 
as smart grid development, will be necessary. A very recent example concerning 
the limited grid capacity came from the south- east of Groningen, where the 
DSO and TSO warned that in the short term they will not be able to connect 
new solar parks due to the risk of ‘electricity congestion’ in the local grid (Van 
de Veen, 2018).
 One way to reduce the costs of grid reinforcement, as suggested during the 
stakeholder consultation for this study, is by placing solar parks in ‘grid- friendly 
zones’. Two- thirds of the grid connection costs related to a new solar park could 
be avoided by placing solar panels in areas where combinations with existing 
connections can be established, such as large- scale rooftop projects, or next to 
wind parks, industrial areas, and railways (because this infrastructure can also be 
used). According to such a ‘smart design’ strategy, projects make use of already- 
existing infrastructure. Innovations like this are, however, hampered as grid 
operators are generally not considered market entities but are obliged to follow 
regulations without influence on spatial planning decisions.
 An efficient solution, suggested by consulted stakeholders, could be to 
include a section in the SDE+ subsidy scheme saying that projects that are 
planned for a grid- friendly zone (following smart design) will receive a preferen-
tial treatment and receive more support per kWh. Currently, the SDE+ is 
designed in such a way that cheaper projects are granted first and generally with 
a lower tariff per kWh. This disregards the cost for the grid operator.
Impact on traditional electricity producing sectors
Expanding the use of renewable energy at the expense of traditional, fossil- fuel-
based energy plants may have a negative impact on the business cases of fossil- 
fuelled power plants. Coal and gas power plants will most likely be used as 
flexible power production capacity to accommodate the peaks in daily energy 
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demand. ‘Traditional’ energy companies can furthermore support the low- 
emission energy transition by shifting to more renewable- energy production 
themselves, thereby benefiting from their existing customer base and experience 
with large- scale projects.
Impact of net metering on the fiscal balance of the Dutch treasury
As explained previously in this chapter, rooftop solar PV panel investments by 
households are supported via the policy instrument of net metering. Ground- 
mounted solar parks have become eligible for exploitation support through the 
SDE+ subsidy scheme. While net metering has an impact on the government’s 
fiscal budget through reduced tax income, subsidy scheme support for solar PV 
will lead to higher governmental expenditure.
 Due to net metering, the Dutch treasury misses potential tax revenues 
because households and businesses with solar PV panels on their rooftop are 
exempted from paying energy tax, value- added tax (VAT), and sustainable 
energy contribution (ODE) on the self- generated electricity they consume. For 
this study, a simplified model exercise has been carried out to calculate this 
effect, assuming an accelerated phase out of coal plants by the year 2030.6 It has 
been concluded that, should the net- metering mechanism remain unchanged, 
the treasury might lose out by around €500 million in 2023, rising to almost 
€1.2 billion by 2030.
 However, for a more complete picture, for this study the net financial impact 
of net metering on the Dutch treasury has been estimated. After all, economic 
activities related to installing solar panels also lead to tax incomes. Assuming 
that an average household generates about 3000 kWh of solar electricity per 
year and is exempted from energy tax, VAT, and ODE, the government’s 
annual tax income amounts to around €1,200 per year (compared to a situation 
where the household consumed electricity from the grid and paid taxes on this). 
The calculations show that tax losses for the treasury indeed outweigh the gains 
in tax income from installation companies (see Figure 7.3).
 According to interviewed stakeholders, net metering has been a powerful 
incentive for households to invest in rooftop solar panels. Additionally, as some 
indicated, the persistently low interest rate has been a stimulus as this made 










Figure 7.3  Balance of the Dutch treasury for the case of a household with 3000 kWh 
solar electricity generation.
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important condition for the latter has been the trust of households in the con-
tinuation of the net- metering policy instrument. Uncertainty about precisely 
that has recently arisen due to communication by the government about a 
planned evaluation of the instrument and possible changes based on that. 
Already this news has created a hesitance to invest in rooftop panels.
 With respect to the impact on the government’s fiscal budget of subsidising 
large- scale, ground- mounted solar parks, a similar modelling exercise was under-
taken for the Netherlands, assuming different scenarios for phasing out coal- 
based electricity and scaling up solar PV. In a scenario of an accelerated 
phase- out of coal, the expenditures related to the SDE+ subsidy in support of 
solar parks would amount to almost €5 billion per year by 2030; in a business- as-
usual scenario, based on recent policies in the Netherlands, these expenditures 
would amount to around €1 billion per year by 2030.
Impact on employment
Both pathway technology options are expected to generate jobs because a work-
force is needed for the design, installation, and maintenance of the panels. Pres-
ently, however, there is little to no expertise with the design and construction of 
large- scale solar PV projects in the Netherlands, so often foreign experts are con-
tracted to oversee the process. In addition, a stakeholder engaged in developing 
large- scale solar parks in the Netherlands indicated that construction of the parks 
is often carried out by specialised teams with foreign employees who travel from 
project to project in Europe. Local employees are mainly contracted for their know-
ledge of local rules and regulation (electrical, legal, etc.). After the projects are 
operational, however, only a minimal workforce is needed for operation and main-
tenance as solar parks usually do not require much cleaning and maintenance.
Discussion of risks and uncertainties related to the solar PV 
pathway
Part of the case study analysis is to assess how the solar PV low- carbon trans-
ition pathway performs in terms of its contribution to meeting the Dutch renew-
able energy targets and realising other socio- economic benefits. As explained, 
both technology options are needed for reaching the Dutch renewable energy 
target of 14% in 2020 (and beyond) and the 2030 climate target set by the gov-
ernment coalition, whereby large- scale solar projects particularly contribute to 
accelerating renewable energy expansion, mainly because of economies of scale 
in planning, financing, and construction. Considering overall cost efficiency of 
public spending and fiscal effects, it is still unclear which pathway is most cost- 
effective. With ground- mounted solar parks, potential production is relatively 
high but the subsidy- related expenses are also considerably higher than the 
reduced tax revenues when supporting rooftop solar PV.
 While for the success of the pathway all risk aspects discussed in this chapter 
will have to be addressed, from the stakeholder consultation it is clear that 
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spatial planning will be among the most important factors for success. For small- 
scale rooftop applications of solar PV, the challenge is to ensure that newly built 
dwellings have a better orientation towards the sun. For larger- scale projects, 
especially ground- mounted solar parks, spatial planning needs to consider 
alternative uses of areas so that opportunity costs remain low. They should also 
consider whether an area is acceptable for residents, especially when projects are 
adjacent to their villages and towns and therefore clearly visible by the local 
population. From the stakeholder interviews, a clear recommendation is to 
involve local stakeholders in the decision- making process for ground- mounted 
parks as early as possible. This helps to make people ‘co- owner’ of the project 
and enable them to propose modifications to the project plan. Recent examples 
of solar- park plans in the northern region of the Netherlands have shown that, 
if project developers do not take into account public opinion and consider 
different design options, public opinion might quickly change and prevent the 
implementation of large- scale projects in the long term. This is supported by 
findings by Nikas et al. (2018) which indicate that ‘soft measures’ focusing, for 
instance, on behavioural change and public acceptance can lead to more sus-
tainable low- emission pathways than measures focusing on mainly providing 
financial incentives.
 The findings from the stakeholder consultation moreover suggest that several 
of the risks discussed in this chapter are augmented by uncertainties about 
policy development and spatial planning, and a lacking larger picture of the 
overarching climate and energy perspectives of scaling up solar PV. As a result, 
optimal investment decisions as perceived by individual stakeholders may not 
be optimal from macro- level economic, social, energy, and climate perspectives. 
This calls for a ‘grand design’ solution or a strategy to ‘fix’ the grid- balancing, 
finance, and spatial planning issues. Part of the grand design could be a prioriti-
sation of risks to be tackled first, which would not be driven purely by efficiency 
of resource allocation but also by cost- effective use of solar PV for realising the 
Dutch contribution to European energy and climate goals.
Conclusions
The Netherlands lags behind its European commitments for renewable 
energy production by 2020. Despite the adoption of a new package with 
measures to intensify renewable energy capacity investment, according to a 
review by ECN (ECN, 2017) and a recent European Commission report on 
member states’ compliance with the Renewable Energy Directive (European 
Commission, 2017), the country is expected to fall short of the 14% renew-
able energy target by 2020. Biomass is currently the main source of renew-
able energy in the Netherlands and wind energy deployment has recently 
accelerated. However, for compliance with 2020 and future targets, solar 
energy opportunities will also need to be utilised. For that, solar- based energy 
will have to catch up strongly as, for example, solar PV was only responsible 
for less than 1% of Dutch electricity production in 2017 (about 14% of the 
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gross production of the electricity was generated from renewable sources, to 
which solar energy contributed 13%).
 In order to understand uncertainties around scaling up solar energy in the 
Netherlands and how these could transform into risks, this chapter has focused 
on expanding electricity production through solar (PV). We did this by assess-
ing the pathway of upscaling small- scale solar panel use in the built environ-
ment (e.g. on rooftops of households, small businesses, and schools) and 
large- scale applications of solar panels on land and infrastructure (e.g. larger- 
scale rooftop projects and ground- mounted solar parks).
 Essentially, for reaching the 14% renewable energy target as well as targets 
beyond 2020, the Netherlands needs both solar PV options. At the same time, 
it is realised that scaling up solar PV can have negative impacts on society and 
the economy, which could be considered as consequential risks. Moreover, due 
to the existence of several implementation barriers there is a risk that a pathway 
cannot be implemented or will be implemented at a later stage or on a smaller 
scale. Both types of risks could block expanding solar PV in the Netherlands at 
the scale desired for complying with EU energy and climate commitments. For 
instance, replacing conventional energy sources with solar PV applications may 
have negative impacts on grid stability or could negatively affect the govern-
ment’s fiscal budget. Examples of implementation risks are that solar parks may 
not fit into existing spatial plans, may face social resistance, and that only a 
small fraction of dwellings and buildings are suitable for panels.
Notes
1 JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, the Netherlands. We acknowledge the 
support by Gert- Jan Kok during the preparation of the manuscript.
2 The SDE+ subsidy scheme, called Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie (or ‘support 
to sustainable energy production’; the ‘+’ refers to the revision of the scheme in 2011), 
is based on a feed- in tariff which guarantees that renewable energy producers receive 
an electricity price that is sufficient for covering investment and exploitation costs 
with a fair profit margin for the entire subsidy period. For each round, the feed- in 
tariffs are determined by the government for each renewable energy technology, for a 
fixed amount of full load hours and adjusted to market developments. The SDE+ 
budget is allocated according to a merit order.
3 With a small- scale energy connection of 3 × 80 Amp.
4 Risk elicitation of expanding solar PV in other member states can be found in Lüthi 
and Wüstenhagen (2012), Dusonchet and Telaretti (2015), and Del Rio and Mir- 
Artigues (2012).
5 This policy provides a financially attractive incentive for households and small busi-
nesses that produce solar power, use part of it, and feed the rest back to the electricity 
grid (net metering is then the difference between what is taken from and given to the 
grid).
6 The modelling exercise was done with help of the Business Strategy Assessment Model 
(BSAM). It is an agent- based model that is used in the TRANSrisk project for case 
study analysis.
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8 Spain
On a rollercoaster of regulatory change 
– risks and uncertainties associated 
with renewable energy transitions
Alevgul H. Sorman, Cristina Pizarro- Irizar, 
Xaquín García-Muros, Mikel González-Eguino,  
and Iñaki Arto
Introduction
Spain, in alignment with the European Union’s (EU) climate policy, aims at 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 80–95% below 1990 levels by 
2050 (European Commission, 2011). In the Paris Agreement era, the EU’s 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) sets the binding target 
of an at least 40% domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 
1990 (European Commission, 2015). Additionally, the 2030 Energy Strategy for 
the EU (European Commission, 2014) includes a target of at least a 27% share 
of renewable energy (RE) consumption – binding at the EU level – and at least 
27% energy savings – non- binding – compared with the business- as-usual scen-
ario. These targets are to be fulfilled jointly with all member states, yet there are 
currently no binding targets for individual member states for the post- 2020 
period.
 Since the end of 2017, Spain has picked up its commitment to complying 
with the objectives set out in the Paris Agreement and within the framework of 
the European Union, and has begun an elaboration of the Climate Change and 
Energy Transition Law (Under the Article 26.2 of Law 50/1997) of the 
government.
 Although currently Spain is well off in meeting EU targets, changes in its 
regulatory system over the years have caused disturbances in the roll out and 
ambition of renewable energy sources (RESs). These sources cover wind power, 
solar power from photovoltaics (solar PV), concentrated solar power (CSP), 
small- scale hydropower technologies (<50 MW), waste, waste treatment, and 
geothermal power.
 Renewables, especially in the electricity sector (RES- E), during the greatest 
renewable expansion period in Spain (from 2004 until 2013), were supported by a 
combined system of feed- in tariffs (FIT) and feed- in premiums (FIP) which was 
established in the Renewable Energy Act and applied to all RES and cogeneration 
(BOE, 2004). In this period, RES- E grew from a 9% of gross generation in 2004 
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up to 26% in 2015 (REE, 2004–2015). However, one of the most important polit-
ical concerns at that time was the tariff deficit: the gap between the cost of electri-
city generation and what consumers pay. Theoretically, electricity revenues 
should cover for costs, set by the regulator (Paz Espinosa, 2013) yet this deficit, 
increasing from €0.25 billion in the year 2000 to €26 billion in 2013, had become 
so big that it was triggering a financial black hole in the economy (CNE/CNMC, 
2007–2013). The tariff deficit in Spain, gradually mounting since the 2000s, came 
from generous subsidies to renewables under the special regime to support to 
renewable and co- generation potentially linked to over- ambitious infrastructure 
planning, but also from growing costs in extra peninsular islands, as well as 
network costs (Johannesson Linden et al., 2014). Solving the deficit issue through 
increasing consumer prices was difficult as electricity prices in Spain were already 
high (Paz Espinosa, 2013). In turn, subsequent regulatory changes in the hope of 
closing the tariff deficit have burdened the renewable energy sector due to retro-
active subsidy cuts leading to great uncertainties, emerging risk factors, and 
numerous examples of energy injustices that will be scrutinised throughout the 
chapter.
 Thus Spain, once a founding example of the roll out of renewables, followed 
an overall retreat due to retroactive regulatory and economic conditions, 
leaving concerns and uncertainties about future pathways within the Spanish 
renewable energy panorama. In fact, before the phasing out of the FIT–FIP 
system, Spain had ranked third in total renewable power capacity per capita 
(excluding hydro) by the end of 2012 (REN21, 2013) on the global scale, but by 
the end of 2016 it had recoiled to the fifth/sixth place (REN21, 2017).
 In this chapter we explore energy transition strategies, particularly with respect 
to regulatory changes affecting solar energy rollout in Spain. Stakeholder insights 
based on past experiences are presented as ‘lessons learned’ focusing on perceived 
risks including potential cases of energy injustices. This knowledge needs to feed 
back into the creation of new low- carbon pathways, which we present as potential 
policy mixes identified per sector (transport, building, and industry).
A rollercoaster ride: a review of regulatory changes in Spain
Renewable energy (RE) in Spain has been regulated since 1980, when Law 
82/1980 (BOE, 1980) on energy conservation was enacted, which claimed an 
increase in energy efficiency and a reduction in energy dependence. It happened 
as a consequence of the second international oil crisis and represented the start 
of the development of RES in the country. Since then, RE promotion has been 
a national policy priority and legislation has been in constant change. In 1985, 
the government firmly pledged its commitment to RE with the Royal Decree 
916/1985 (BOE, 1985) supporting small- hydraulic energy, the only RES exist-
ing at that time.
 After entry into the European Union, Law 54/1997 (BOE, 1997) liberalised 
the electricity sector in Spain and established a plan for the promotion of RES 
for achieving the goal of 12% of gross inland consumption of energy from 
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renewable sources by 2010 (IDAE, 2005). After this law, the Special Regime 
(SR) and the corresponding FIT scheme were first established. The SR included 
renewable energy (wind, solar PV, solar thermal, small- scale hydropower, and 
biomass/wastes) and co- generation generators, with a maximum of 50 MW 
power.
 Later, Royal Decree 436/2004 (BOE, 2004), known as the Spanish Renew-
able Energy Act, was set up to fit into the existing general framework supporting 
the electricity from RES/RES- E). Generators could decide to sell their electri-
city to a distributor and receive a fixed tariff (FIT) or sell it on the free market 
and receive a premium tariff (FIP) on top of the market price. The main differ-
ence between FIT and FIP is that the incentive level under the FIT system is 
fixed, whereas under the FIP scheme renewable generators get a guaranteed 
premium, which is lower than the FIT, plus the price of the pool. This decree 
provided incentives for new RES installed capacity and was subsequently 
renewed in the Royal Decree 661/2007 (BOE, 2007a), where new tariffs and 
premiums for RES- E generators, as well as a cap and a floor for renewable remu-
neration, were established.
 The combined system of FIT and FIP led to a strong increase of investment 
in electricity production from renewable energy so that most technologies 
highly exceeded government targets for the period 2005–2010 (IDAE, 2005). In 
an attempt to reduce regulatory costs, incentives were adjusted in 2010 (BOE, 
2010), including cuts to the FIT of solar thermal electricity and wind genera-
tion, and a cap on the number of hours eligible for support for PV installations.
 In a context of overcapacity and weak demand, the regulatory changes intro-
duced in 2010 were not deemed sufficient to reduce regulatory costs, and there-
fore in 2012 a new regulation (BOE, 2012) was passed for the temporary 
suppression of FIT and FIP for new installations. These measures left new RES- E 
without financial support but existing obligations remained.
 The last cutbacks to the FIT–FIP system were passed in 2013 (BOE, 2013a, 
2013b) and affected all RES units, including those that were already function-
ing. The FIT and FIP were reduced for both new and existing generation plants. 
This reform aimed at stabilising financial fluctuations in the RES system that 
had contributed to the accumulated €26-billion tariff deficit by 2013 (~2% of 
Spanish GDP). From 2014 onwards (BOE, 2014a, 2014b) renewable energy pro-
ducers receive the market price and, if needed, a subsidy to guarantee a fixed 
rate of return on investment (the yield of the ten- year Spanish treasury bond 
plus 300 basis points), which is subject to review every six years.
 The new scheme consists of the regular electricity market price supplemented by 
a capacity payment and a generation- based premium which are calculated on the 
basis of technology- and project- specific parameters. This new framework includes 
several remuneration adjustment mechanisms which could yield additional risks 
compared to the former system, based on a pre- established long- term tariff.
 Another relevant issue affecting the future of RE in Spain is related to the 
role of RE in distributed generation. In this sense, Royal Decree 900/2015 
(BOE, 2015) legislates electricity generation for self- consumption. It applies to 
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any RES generating electricity for self- consumption and being connected to the 
national grid, which will be subjected to access and consumption fee charges. 
The Spanish government claims that this regulation has been designed in order 
to ensure the technical and economic sustainability of the national grid. 
However, public opinion labelled the initiative as a ‘sun tax’ since consumers 
with their own PV systems are to be taxed for the electricity they generate and 
consume if they are connected to the grid. This regulation in essence has not 
considered the external benefits that these consumers generate to the electricity 
system while also complying with meeting the renewables and climate object-
ives. Moreover, failure to comply with the law or non- registration as a self- 
consumer are subjected to a financial penalty between just over €6 million and 
€60 million, deterring small actors (IEA, 2015).
 The Spanish legal framework had direct implications for the evolution of 
renewable energy’s installed capacity and electricity generation. As a result of 
national regulation, when the FIT–FIP- oriented SR was in force, capacity grew 
from 17 GW in 2004 to almost 40 GW in 2013, and electricity generation 
increased from 47 TWh in 2004 to 111 TWh in 2013. However, the last energy 
reform (including the subsequent cutbacks in the incentive scheme from 2012 
onwards) led to no new renewable energy capacity in 2014 and 2015, and a drop 
in the electricity generated by the SR. By technology, wind and solar accounted 
for 74% of total SR capacity in 2015 (57% wind, 12% solar PV, and 6% solar 
thermal) and 62% of electricity generation (49% wind, 8% solar PV, and 5% 
solar thermal).
 The costs of public retribution to RES and co- generation in Spain rose 
steeply from 2008 to 2013 (Figure 8.1). This coincided with the period of 
maximum investment in renewable energy capacity and dropped after the sup-
pression of the FIT–FIP scheme.
 The regulatory framework for RE in the transport sector sets a biofuel quota 
of 4.1% of the total amount sold from 2013 onwards (BOE, 2013c: Article 41). 
This target represents a reduction from the original 6.5%, thus endangering the 
achievement of the 10% goal by 2020 (risk) but at the same time incurs some 
additional benefits (e.g. reduces the biofuels competing for food production or 
avoids investment in alternative energy sources which do not generate high 
returns on the energy invested, having low energy return on investment (EROI) 
(Cleveland et al., 2016).
 Regarding the heating and cooling sector, European directives have not been 
properly transposed into the Spanish legal framework, thereby limiting the 
incentives to low- carbon sources for heating and cooling (H&C). The only pol-
icies aimed at RES- H&C include the building sector, where the Regulation for 
Thermal Installations in Buildings encourages the use of RES (biomass, geother-
mal, and solar) with energy efficiency purposes, but with no concrete targets 
(BOE, 2007b; updated in BOE, 2013a).
 Finally, concerning the energy efficiency target, the Spanish government for-
warded the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) 2014–2020 to the 
European Commission. This strategic plan contains targets in line with the 
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objective of improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 (MINETUR, 2014) 
with the adoption of an energy efficiency scheme, financial and fiscal measures, 
as well as energy efficiency standards and voluntary agreements.
Figure 8.1  Timeline of regulatory changes and incentive schemes’ variation for RES and 
co-generation in Spain.
Research process and methods
In line with the debate in Spain, especially relevant now with a deliberative 
process on the design of the Law of Climate Change and Energy Transition, the 
authors have carried out a combination of: (i) a comprehensive review of past and 
existing regulations on renewable energy in Spain; and (ii) an elaborate expert 
stakeholder engagement process. The stakeholder engagement process in itself has 
been conducted initially through: (1) an in- depth interview process; and there-
after (2) a far- reaching survey to provide insights for the renewable energy trans-
ition, as detailed later. The narrative told in this chapter is the result from all 
these efforts. Previous policy analyses and regulatory changes are compiled to 
deduce risks and negative consequences which are then used for inferring several 
implementation risks. These are resumed under occurring energy (in)justices in 
order to serve as lessons learned in the design of the new Climate Change and 
Energy Transition Law of Spain.
1 In- depth interviews with expert stakeholders
Out of an initial outreach to 24 expert stakeholders in the field, 16 experts 
were interviewed, either in person or via Skype, lasting approximately 45–60 
minutes. Out of the 16 interviewees, the authors had a sample distribution 
across sectors of 30% energy generators, 13% government/administration, 13% 
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NGO representatives, and 44% academic representatives. Of the 16 interviewees, 
four were females (25%).
 The semi- structured interviews were conducted in two blocks, the first block 
addressing controlled questions on the diagnostic of the energy panorama in 
Spain, regarding decarbonisation and the promotion of renewables in Spain in the 
past and current times. Thereafter, stakeholders’ narratives on their visions for the 
future (2020–2030–2050) were asked based on the energy mix, instruments and 
infrastructures, criteria, actors, and limitations, along with positive and negative 
consequences.
2 Survey
Based on the answers compiled from the 16 responses and over 15 hours of inter-
views, the authors put together a 23-question survey, four of which are covered 
within the scope of this chapter detailing questions on policy mixes for future 
transition pathways. The 15-minutes overall survey reached 206 respondents. The 
four questions tackled here provide insights on policy mixes for future transition 
pathways that stakeholders identified as crucial elements to be considered. More 
specifically, these questions grasp the diversity of perceptions regarding the 
importance and probability of certain policy measures in the transportation, build-
ing, and industrial sector. The ‘importance’ question as posed (answering from a 
dropdown menu of ‘low’/‘medium’/‘high’/‘not applicable’ options) revealed how 
stakeholders weighed each policy mix in terms of its relevance for its value, mag-
nitude, and influence, whereas the probability criteria (once again from a selection 
of ‘low’/‘medium’/‘high’/‘not applicable’) assessed the possibility that this policy 
was likely to happen.
 The extent of responses, reaching 206 stakeholders, resulted in a split with 
63% replies coming from men and 37% from women. In terms of response rates, 
there was also an inclined academic bias (40% of responses) in the sampling of 
sectors of activity, with energy suppliers and the private sector constituting 27%, 
NGOs 8%, administration 16%, and others 9% of the sample.
 The mixture of these methods has a two- fold objective: initially, to draw 
lessons from the past in order to build sustainable pathways for a low- carbon future 
in Spain, based on risks perceived and emerging justice concerns; and thereafter 
to incorporate a multitude of different ontologies and stakeholders, integrating the 
vision of regulators, academics, NGOs, and members of the private sector.
Reframing regulatory changes as uncertainties, risks, and 
justice concerns
From the roller coaster trajectory of past and existing regulation on renewable 
energy in Spain lessons emerge: negative consequences resulting from policy 
choices in the rollout of renewable energies and implementations risks of low- 
carbon policy pathways that need to be considered for future prospects for the 
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Consequential risks and the energy transition panorama
As a result of the political panorama and regulatory shifts, several consequential 
risks have been observed grounded on the archival research on regulatory 
changes and stakeholders’ interviews.
 Foremost, it has been underlined that gender representation has been a 
reoccurring debate in Spain, especially relevant within the energy sector 
which has the lowest percentage of women with executive positions (Pena, 
2016). This has come about in terms of negative consequences including a 
gender- plural vision in decision- making mechanisms in building low- carbon 
energy transition pathways. The gender under- representation of our stake-
holder interviews and survey results, within the scope of this research, have 
also indicated a representation of the snapshot of reality. The peak of the 
debate, and hence an imminent consequential risk of a future decarbonisation 
pathway, has also been observed in the 14-strong all- male panel of experts 
that have been selected in the design of the Climate Change and Energy 
Transition Law of Spain.
 Regarding regulatory changes, stakeholder interviews have helped to identify 
numerous major consequential risks. The Royal Decree of 2013 implemented by 
the state foresaw retroactive cuts of RES subsidies in terms of protective meas-
ures so as not to increase the aforementioned tariff deficit. These cuts accounted 
for 8.4 GW or 37% of the cumulative investment, around €1.7 billion in sub-
sidies for the sector (Rincón, 2016). The renewable energy sector, being stripped 
of all subsidies, faced a major consequence of the Spanish state breaking its 
promise to maintain incentives for 20 years.
 Royal Decree 900/2015 (BOE, 2015a) resulted in the taxation of self- 
consumption for PV installations. Under this decree, Type 1 modality of pro-
sumers indicates that if solar panel installations of less than 100 kW generate 
excess electricity, then that excess amount has to be donated to the grid and no 
remuneration is given. PV prosumers exceeding 100 kW (Type 2), regardless of 
whether they are using the grid or not at that moment of time, are subject to 
two types of taxes. The changes in the regulatory system oblige a self- 
consumption PV owner to pay a charge for the whole power (in terms of kW 
capacity) installed (the power contracted through the electricity company plus 
the power from the personal PV installation) as well as a (second) ‘sun tax’ for 
the electricity generated for self- consumption from the personal PV installation 
(applied to installations larger than 10 kW) (Tsagas, 2015).
 Evidently, this regulatory change, rather than encouraging the participation 
of small actors and consumers that would promote decentralisation as a means 
of achieving energy and climate action led by community- owned, renewable 
energy systems, has resulted in the contrary (Angel, 2016), penalising self- 
consumption and generation tremendously. Not only does this portray an unfea-
sible (both economically and socially) option for households, but it may also 
result in consequential risks for businesses: industries are hindered in PV instal-
lation, affecting the overall competitiveness of an RES transition within the 
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industry, with the lack of incentives to finance the promotion of renewables, 
leading to competitiveness losses.
 Along similar lines, the increase of the price of electricity to end users has 
especially been affecting the more vulnerable households and industries. RES 
support is currently an important component of the regulated cost of electricity. 
Thus, due to the need to finance relevant RES subsidies by means of an electri-
city price surcharge and the lack of competitiveness in the electricity sector, 
electricity prices in Spain have increased significantly. Despite being connected 
to mainland Europe, interconnection is limited. In fact, Spain is commonly 
known as an ‘energy island’ and therefore one of the European plans for the 
2030 roadmap is to increase interconnections in this sense. Spaniards currently 
pay the third- highest electricity tariffs in Europe, after Cyprus and Malta – 
island countries highly dependent on imported oil products for electricity gener-
ation. As such, regressive effects of regulations are most often impacting those 
who are least able to afford it, who are forced to bear the costs while benefiting 
from relatively few advantages. The poorest households are even more affected 
by higher electricity prices since they expend a greater proportion of their 
income on electricity. Spending on electricity as a proportion of disposable 
income in the poorest households is around 5%, whereas in the richest house-
holds it is around 1% (Garcia- Muros, Böhringer, and Gonzalez- Eguino, 2017). 
These regressive impacts can reduce the political feasibility of new measures to 
promote renewable energy sources. Public acceptability is essential for effective 
mitigation policies to be adopted, and equity and fairness play an important role 
in how such measures are regarded by public opinion (Bristow et al., 2010).
 Despite the social bonus mechanism (BOE, 2009) – presenting a 25% dis-
count on the total electricity bill for eligible households – for protecting vulner-
able consumers with low incomes, it has been observed that energy poverty in 
Spain increased from 3.6% before the economic crisis in 2007 to 9.88% in 2013 
(nominal values) after the average electricity bill grew by 76% and natural gas 
bills by 35% (Economics for Energy, 2015).
Implementation risks and the roll out of renewables
Stakeholders have portrayed an evident level of pessimism due to cutbacks in 
the renewables roll out due to regulatory changes, especially from 2013 onwards. 
Uncertainty lingers along with the highly volatile agenda of political parties, 
oftentimes changing based on election cycles. Moreover, additional compensa-
tion adjustment mechanisms along the timeline add overall uncertainty and 
instability to investments in the system, potentially aggravating additional risk 
factors in the future.
 One of the biggest and foremost characteristics within the Spanish electricity 
sector is that over 75% of electricity generation and over 85% of sales (Unesa, 
2013) are controlled by five major companies (Iberdrola, Gas Natural Fenosa, 
Endesa, Viesgo, and EDP), meaning that the electricity market presents a 
typical structure of an oligopoly. In this type of market structure the risk of lack 
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of competition increases, along with the risks of lack of independence of regu-
latory bodies due to the so- called ‘regulatory capture’ process. Such a practice 
undermines the interests of consumers and also creates the implementation risk 
of policies aimed at promoting public interest, such as those related to a boost 
for a renewable energy transition.
 Moreover, other factors aggregating to implementation risks arise from 
different parties in the government having different positions about the role of 
renewables and how they should be promoted and financed. The regulatory 
rollercoaster ride, as aforementioned, results in RES developments being legally 
and institutionally hindered and results in regulatory barriers continuously 
changing throughout the years (Capellán-Perez, Campos- Celador, and Terés-
Zubiaga, 2016).
Bridging risks to justice concerns: the energy justice framework
These illustrated risk factors can be brought together neatly within the field of 
energy justice, which calls for ‘a global energy system that fairly disseminates both 
the benefits and costs of energy services and one that has representative and 
impartial energy decision- making’ (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Such an 
approach is translated to the operationalisation of energy justice theory across four 
primary axes: recognition, procedural, distributional, and restorative components.
 It is accepted that recognition justice embraces the multitude of actors, 
voices, and positions, while procedural justice assumes inclusive, transparent 
decision- making mechanisms as well as dissolved power structures embedded in 
energy governance (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015). Distributional justice implies 
responsibility across nodes of production and modes of consumption (Walker, 
2012) and assumes fair distribution among producers and consumers, while 
restorative justice highlights the need for repairing the harm done to people 
(and/or society/nature) and assisting in pinpointing where prevention needs to 
occur (Heffron and McCauley, 2017).
 Energy injustices play out through technological, social, political, institu-
tional, or spatial ways (Bridge et al., 2013; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015; 
McCauley, 2018). Thus, with emerging consequential risk factors in the RES 
sector and recent policy changes in Spain, it is seen that energy injustices have 
been emerging along the four components, some of which are highlighted in the 
following paragraphs. These are to serve as illustrative examples for providing a 
series of ‘lessons learned’ from cases, for deriving alternative narratives for 
change, and for ensuring energy justice application in policy and practice in the 
future.
 Initially, the oligopolistic structure of the electricity system in Spain can be 
presented as a concern in terms of procedural injustices in relation to the Euro-
pean Commission Directive 2009/72/EC, regarding the functioning of the 
internal market of electricity. The directive, aimed at ensuring an equal level 
playing field in generation, has been contested in Spain by failing to ensure 
effective separation between the companies involved in the generation, 
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 distribution, and sale of electricity. The same market has also contributed to the 
creation of a tariff deficit resulting from the difference between the income of 
the electricity system and its regulatory costs. The tariff deficit reached €26 
billion in 2013 (CNE/CNMC, 2007–2013), burdening both the RES sector and 
end users. Thus, the energy policymaking processes have been criticised for 
being developed unfairly by powerful actors while excluding the voices of those 
potentially or actually affected (Clayton, 2000).
 This can illustratively be seen in Spain, in this sense a unique case being the 
only country where self- consumers are taxed for the electricity generated for 
their own on- site usage beyond a normal fee for electricity exported to the grid 
as in most counties. A Manifesto for the repeal of The Royal Decree 900/2015 has 
been developed contrary to these procedural injustices, arguing that self- 
production and consumption constitute a community right and that systems 
based on decentralised RES increase energy efficiency, create jobs, and boost the 
local economy (Afman et al., 2017).
 Second, the retroactive cuts of RES subsidies, as a response to the tariff 
deficit (the Royal Decree of 2013) that broke the Spanish state’s promise, is a 
foremost violation of recognition as the decree has not had any prior negotiation 
with stakeholders (including RES investors), as highlighted repetitively by the 
national wind association, AEE (McGovern, 2014).
 As a result, in June 2016 hundreds of cases were brought before the Supreme 
Court by investors who were against the legislative changes in an attempt for 
restorative claims, yet the court ruled against the investors. The legal battle in 
terms of retroactive cuts is not over yet. Now, many such investor companies 
have turned to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
with claims against Spain, with results still pending. Most recently, on 23 Feb-
ruary 2018, in a second international ruling against retroactive cuts, Spain was 
coerced to pay a Luxembourg- based investment firm €53 million in compensa-
tion (Weyndling, 2018).
 Another very important dimension to consider in the renewable roll out is 
the uneven allocation of risks and benefits of spatial factors and in terms of dis-
tributional questions. An extension and expansion of new geospatial require-
ments based on a shift to low- carbon alternatives (Bridge et al., 2013; 
Bouzarovski and Simcock, 2017; Scheidel and Sorman, 2012), whether for solar 
or wind, come about with distributional implications across both those regions 
producing this energy and those consuming it. A case in the southern Catalonia 
region has been well documented, where despite providing a surplus of electri-
city through wind production the region is still bound to the political and eco-
nomic periphery (Franquesa, 2018).
 Distributional implications also resulted through end users with dispropor-
tionate access to energy services and impacts on wellbeing in terms of energy 
poverty. Concerns about energy poverty have been on the rise with estimates 
indicating more than 1.5 million Spanish households in a situation of energy 
poverty, meaning that over five million people have serious difficulties in 
meeting basic energy needs such as electricity and gas (ACA, 2016; Raso, 
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2017). Such distributional injustices affect the wellbeing of those appearing to 
be most vulnerable, often mapped out into low- income households.
Future pathways and stakeholders’ ambitions
The regulatory ambiguity and arising concerns in terms of energy injustices open 
up new potential take- home messages in the design phase of the Climate 
Change and Energy Transition Law. The understandings emerging from embed-
ded risk factors and uncertainties have come about as lessons learned in the 
past, opening up the space to follow alternative policy mixes as identified by 
stakeholders, and laying the foundations of a future plausible low- carbon energy 
pathway for Spain.
 The key question that remains is whether Spain should carry out more ambi-
tious decarbonisation processes than those set by European directives. The 
results of our stakeholder survey composed of academics, administration, NGOs, 
energy providers and the private sector, and others have identified possible out-
comes in terms of the impending energy transition that awaits Spain.
 Several pathways towards the future exist. More conservative and cautious 
objectives are laid forth, on setting the 27% share of renewable energy (RE) 
consumption – binding at the EU level – as indicated by 9% of stakeholders 
participating to the survey. Yet a majority of stakeholders (53%) see the energy 
transition pathway and ambitious renewable objectives as a great opportunity 
for Spain. This provides an opportunity not only to pursue low- carbon altern-
atives but also to engage all important stakeholders in the field in the design of 
such ambitious policies. The middle grounds in terms of such an ambitious 
transition are supported by 38% of the engaged stakeholders, who believe that 
such a transition would be good for Spain as long as the additional costs that 
may arise in such a process are also considered and internalised.
 Narratives depicted by each individual stakeholder group regarding their 
ambitions in future pathway options remain diverse yet ambitious overall 
(Figure 8.3). While NGOs are on the frontlines of determined decarbonisation 
Figure 8.3 Pathways for Spanish energy transition as narrated by stakeholder groups.
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policies, more cautious outlooks are portrayed by energy providers and the 
private sector.
Policy mixes for sectoral transitions in Spain
With the attempt of identifying potential low- carbon transition pathways 
within each distinct sector, stakeholders have categorised policy proposals 
according to their importance – defined as their relevance for its value, magni-
tude, and influence – and probability – defined as the likelihood of this measure 
happening (Figure 8.4). Thus the authors have embraced a two- fold objective 
with such an approach: initially, defining entry points of sectoral intervention 
of policies where stakeholders believe there is an impact for change; and second, 
to measure the likelihood of carrying out such a policy, identifying whether 
there are barriers to its implementation and thus risks or prospects for such a 
policy being carried out. The multitude of criteria are to help grasp how 
different narratives have emerged as alternative policy proposals when tackling 
the renewable energy transition ambitions for Spain overall.
 Primarily, most policy mixes portray high stakes and a high likelihood of 
occurrence. Indeed, none were identified within the low probability and import-
ance quadrant. Although most are valued highly important, some are considered 
less likely to happen. A greater reuse of materials and processes within the 
industrial sector; and efficiency improvements in rehabilitation in buildings 
rank as of utmost importance, followed by policies on reduction and changes in 
Figure 8.4  Policy mixes by sector, positioned according to importance and probability of 
occurrence.
Note
Results are plotted with portability/likelihood along the horizontal, the importance/impact across 
the vertical, divided by colour for different sectoral policy mixes.
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mobility through public transport, railroad, and car sharing, though transport 
policies have resulted in highest prominence. Striking as it may seem, electrifi-
cation of vehicles and limitation of use and access of traditional vehicles in 
cities seem more likely to take place.
 In the industry, indicating policies for greater reuse of materials and processes 
within the sector rank with utmost impact, as recycling and upcycling are 
becoming integral actors in production chains. Such measures within the indus-
try push forth a triple objective in terms of energy efficiency, the zero- waste 
initiative, and a circular economy. Electrification of low- temperature industry 
(for example the textile sector and food processing) is seen as of medium 
importance but lesser possibility, while increases in the use of gas in high- 
temperature sectors ranked with least favourable potential due to prolonging 
fossil- fuel reliance, though more likely to happen.
 Transport has been identified as a key area of action by stakeholders as elec-
tric vehicles (EV) slowly infiltrate the car market, while incentivising measures 
on reduction and changes in mobility through public transport, railroads, and 
car sharing are classified as having a major impact. Penetration of EVs into 
policy arenas is seen as highly probable, and is supported by big car industries 
(e.g. Volvo) taking measures to either partially or completely switch to battery- 
powered engines, ending traditional internal combustion engine vehicles 
(Vaughan, 2017). Limitations to the use and access of traditional vehicles into 
cities are also seen as potential policies highly likely to be implemented. Several 
cities are starting to implement policies in this direction. For instance, Barce-
lona is a successful case: since the initial probation of the ‘superblocks’ policy 
(limiting the interior spaces of a 9 × 9 series of blocks to urban mobility, increas-
ing pacified spaces, and giving priority of pedestrians) as a part of its urban 
mobility plans, Barcelona has shown successful transition strategies (Ajunta-
ment de Barcelona, 2014). Madrid has also planned to ban the oldest and most 
polluting vehicles, prohibiting the use of gasoline cars registered before 2000 
and diesel- powered cars registered before 2006 (Plan A Madrid, 2017). In the 
survey, increasing taxes on transport fuels resulted emerged with a medium- high 
probability of occurrence but less important compared to other transport pol-
icies identified, despite the fact that the International Energy Agency (IEA) has 
pointed out that oil taxation in Spain is quite low; e.g. the tax component on 
the total diesel price is only 51%, whereas in the United Kingdom it is 67% and 
in Italy it is 62% (IEA, 2015).
 Improvements in energy efficiency and building restoration has ranked 
second in importance as currently there are no legislative developments sustain-
ing operations of urban rehabilitation, regeneration, and renewal, and legal obs-
tacles prevail preventing their implementation. Thus, legislative amendments 
making arrangements more flexible, opening up new mechanisms for funding, 
and encouraging public–private partnership are on the agenda of the Spanish 
Building Assessment Report (IEE), in addition to including a Certification of 
Energy Efficiency within the scheme. Policies regarding promoting self- 
generation and consumption rank of high importance, yet reveal medium 
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 probability of occurrence. A major reason behind this may be the regulatory 
changes de- incentivising and furthermore penalising RES with additional taxes 
(e.g.: the aforementioned ‘sun tax’). Though not as important, promoting the 
development and promotion of smart grids for control and monitoring of elec-
tricity consumption is more likely to happen. While the promotion of the elec-
trification of the heating and cooling (H&C) sector is perceived to be 
important, it features medium possibility of taking place according to 
stakeholders.
 Policies supported by technological advancements or change such as the 
smart grid, electric vehicles, or industrial improvements in production processes 
are more likely to happen, rather than policies with higher impact that require 
regulatory and behavioural changes.
 These policy mixes are to serve as an initial diagnostic where a great range of 
stakeholders believe it is necessary to act in an attempt to meet ambitious 
renewable energy transition targets.
Conclusions
In Spain, the tariff deficit increased over ten times within 13 years (from €0.25 
billion in the year 2000 to €26 billion in 2013). However, regulatory changes in 
the false hope of closing this tariff deficit have burdened the progress of renew-
ables in the energy sector. Regulatory frameworks, including the Royal Decree on 
self- consumption and retroactive subsidy cuts, have hindered RES production and 
development in Spain and also put future investments in jeopardy, leading to 
great uncertainties and risks. Moreover, the interplay of these factors has played 
out through numerous procedural, recognition, distributional, and restorative 
energy injustices that have been highlighted within the scope of this chapter. 
Such past developments, presented as ‘lessons learned’ aimed at renewable ener-
gies, should, for example, be considered in the future of policy design in other 
support schemes targeting energy efficiency improvement, development of high- 
efficient co- generation (CHP), or district heating (DH) municipal systems.
 The results of our stakeholder engagement and survey responses indicate that 
three potential pathways for an energy transition await in Spain. Less likely is to 
target more conservative policies aimed at reaching a 27% share of renewable 
energy (RE) consumption – binding at the EU level. Second is to set ambitious 
targets while assuming additional costs that may arise upon adopting such a low-
 carbon transition process. However, the majority of stakeholders indicate the 
energy transition pathway and ambitious renewable objectives as a great oppor-
tunity for Spain. The narratives of each stakeholder group, composed of aca-
demics, administration, NGOs, energy providers, the private sector, and others, 
have underlined the importance of aspiring for decarbonisation policies. An 
outlook towards particular policy instruments (covering the transport, building, 
and industrial sectors), based on their impact and probability of implementation 
in the hope of creating alternative spaces, have yielded potential pathways in 
enacting energy transition strategies in Spain.
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 Moreover, since June 2018, there have been changes on the horizon in 
Spain. A new Ministry for Ecological Transition, the first of its kind, has 
emerged and Spain now opts for more ambitious targets, and has started debat-
ing the future of fossil- fuel installations as well as potential discussions on the 
elimination of the ‘sun tax’. Many opportunities are present for designing a 
deliberative and progressive Climate Change and Energy Transition Law in the 
hope of alternative narratives and measures for change.
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9 Switzerland
Risks associated with implementing 
a national energy strategy
Oscar van Vliet
Introduction
In the wake of the disaster in Fukushima, the Swiss government decided in 
November 2011 that existing nuclear reactors would be used until no longer 
serviceable and then replaced by renewable sources. One plant has since been 
shut down and the other three, with a combined capacity of around 3 GW, are 
to be closed by 2034.
 Switzerland already has an almost carbon- free electricity supply because of its 
many hydropower plants. Hydropower and other sources currently supply some 
70% of Swiss electricity, which leaves around 30% of Swiss production to be 
shifted from nuclear to renewables. This turnaround is part of the latest Swiss 
Energy Strategy 2050 (ES2050). In addition to a climate target and a nuclear 
phase out, Switzerland intends to reduce its long- standing reliance on foreign 
fossil fuels, mostly oil for transportation and heating, as well as some natural gas.
 Due to the unique Swiss system of direct democracy, any future expansion of 
wind, solar, and hydropower requires that utilities, local and regional govern-
ments, NGOs, and companies in the renewable sector work together (see Swiss 
direct democracy box and Figure 9.1). Crucially, many of the utilities are publicly 
and domestically owned. As a result, large amounts of political discussion and 
academic research have been carried out for the Swiss renewables transition 
over the last five years, and the process of defining and implementing the 
ES2050 is still ongoing.
Swiss direct democracy
The Swiss decision- making system is unique in that Switzerland is a confederation 
with direct democracy. The confederation aspect – the country code CH stands 
for its Latin name of Confoederatio Helvetica – is reflected in a very devolved 
government. The municipalities and cantons (analogous to provinces, counties, or 
states in other countries) retain a great deal of autonomy. For example, public hol-
idays in Switzerland differ between cantons.
 This autonomy stretches into the electricity sector in two ways: first, the 
cantons have considerable discretion when implementing the federal energy law; 
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and second, most of the utilities operating in the Swiss market are majority- owned 
by municipalities and cantons.
 The direct democracy is exemplified in the Swiss system of Volksinitiativen 
(‘People’s Initiatives’). With a limited number of signatures (100,000 for a 
national initiative), any citizen can request a municipal, cantonal, or federal gov-
ernment to consider a specific action. If the government will not implement it out 
of hand, they can call a referendum on municipal, cantonal, or federal level to 
change policy. If a referendum passes, it becomes law in the same way as a con-
stitutional change – parliament and the executive have no legal way of overthrow-
ing the results.
 The political landscape in Switzerland is strongly influenced by the Volksinitia-
tiven as it is effectively impossible for any minority or collection of interest groups 
to directly impose their will on a majority of the populace. As a result, the entire 
political culture is strongly disposed towards compromise and consensus building. 
For example, the top executive decisions are made by a Federal Council of seven, 
who currently include members from four different parties, instead of having a 
single head of government.
 The current strategy of the Swiss federal government is officially documented 
in the Energieperspektiven 2050 report (EP2050),1 which essentially functions 
as a white paper (BfE, 2013). However, for all its length, the EP2050 report is 
vague on implementation: its main thrusts are efficiency, especially in buildings, 
e.g. replacing oil heating with more efficient heat pumps, further electrifying 
transportation, replacing Swiss nuclear power with Swiss domestic renewables, 
and a larger role for (existing) hydropower and rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) 
panels. This new renewable electricity capacity is to generate 20% of Swiss 
supply by 2035, or around 12 TWh. The federal government is opting for natural 
gas power plants and imports of foreign renewables as a stopgap measure in case 
domestic renewable capacity does not expand fast enough.
 The first phase of the Swiss ES2050 was passed into law by parliament in 
2016. The Swiss parliament added several changes in the process, including a 
support package for hydropower, which has been economically less viable due to 
current low wholesale electricity prices. The new energy law was opposed and 
immediately challenged by one of the larger parties in parliament (see Über-
parteiliches Komitee gegen das Energiegesetz, 2016) but the Swiss voted to keep 
the law in a referendum (Der Bundesrat, 2017). The Bundesamt für Energie 
(BfE – Ministry for Energy) is currently working on the next phase of the 
ES2050.
 If Switzerland is serious about replacing nuclear, it has four options available. 
The first is to use domestic renewables, mostly by expanding the number of solar 
panels and wind turbines. The second is to import renewables from foreign 
countries. These two seem the most likely and currently enjoy the support of a 
large majority of Swiss citizens in surveys (see following text). We will explore 
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 A possible third pathway is to use non- renewable natural gas. Gas is not 
currently used much for electricity in Switzerland (only for heating and 
chemical processes) but expanding its use is an option in the ES2050. The 
main risks for this pathway are that natural gas needs to be imported (e.g. 
from Russia) and the acceptability of increased air pollution. As we will see 
in the following sections, natural gas is neither preferred by the public, nor 
necessary for stability of supply. We therefore will not explore this pathway 
in depth.
 A possible fourth pathway would be based on rapid expansion of (deep)geo-
thermal power. However, earthquakes associated with geothermal tests near St 
Gallen and Basel seem to have soured the public mood against geothermal for 
the near future, and we will also not explore this pathway in depth.
 The ES2050 emphasises domestic renewables, using natural gas as a bridg-
ing fuel until sufficient renewable capacity becomes available. Switzerland 
therefore has to make a political decision on whether to keep emphasising 
domestic generation (though using imported fuels like natural gas and nuclear 
fuel) or to start relying on imported electricity year- round. This is not a binary 
choice as domestic and imported renewables are potentially complementary 
pathways.
Domestic renewables
The first pathway is to increase the capacity for renewables production at home. 
A large number of PV panels could fit on existing rooftops in built- up areas, 
owned by individuals and companies that also own the buildings. The new 
energy law includes a feed- in tariff to support expansion of renewables but the 
Swiss home solar industry is still in its infancy compared to Germany, with a 
total of 49,000 installations (1.4 GW) completed by 2015.
 The expansion of wind power in Switzerland has been even slower than PV 
because wind is not particularly strong and consistent in most of the country, 
and also because residents opposed to wind turbines have used spatial planning 
laws to block their construction. For example, the Kirchleerau–Kulmerau wind 
project was effectively blocked by a local referendum that ruled that no turbines 
may be built within 700 m of a residential building in that municipality. As a 
result, Switzerland had a total of 37 wind turbines in 2015.
 The Swiss can also build some additional hydropower but nearly all the best 
potential sites are already in use. Much of this pathway therefore centres on 
small- scale renewables: rooftop PV, wind projects with a handful of turbines, 
and small hydropower plants. In turn, this means that much of the expansion 
will be in the hands of private citizens, small and medium- sized businesses, and 
municipalities. Federal and cantonal authorities can support this development, 
in part through legislation that favours renewables and policies of the utilities 
they (jointly) own.
 The two main risks to the domestic renewables pathway are the intermit-
tency of solar PV and wind power in Switzerland – which does not have a lot of 
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sites with strong and sustained sunshine or winds – and public acceptance of the 
large number of PV panels and wind turbines necessary to make this work.
Foreign renewables
The second pathway is to import renewable electricity from abroad. This would 
require a build- up of renewable capacity outside Switzerland to feed into the 
Swiss grid. There are two general options: wind power, most likely from the west 
coast of Europe like the North Sea, or concentrating solar power (CSP), from 
sunny regions like southern Spain or North Africa. This would let the Swiss use 
the most abundant renewable resources in and near Europe without having to 
build in populated areas, making for cheaper electricity.
 Imports are feasible from a grid perspective: Switzerland already has the 
transmission lines and interconnections to move large volumes of electricity. 
These are currently used for three things: exporting excess electricity in 
summer, importing electricity in winter, and transporting electricity from 
north- west Europe to Italy. Both imports and exports are equivalent to 75% of 
gross national electricity production. Despite this trade, Switzerland sees itself 
as self- sufficient, with a net electricity export just under 2% of its total pro-
duction in 2015 (BfE, 2016). However, the problem for this pathway is that 
these power plants are very far from the cities and other demand centres that 
they are to supply. Building the infrastructure needed requires action from 
larger utilities and co- ordination between the European grid operators, i.e. the 
members of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO- E). Swiss utilities are already investing in foreign renew-
ables projects but this would need to be scaled up. Simultaneously, grid oper-
ators are in charge of constructing transmission lines to connect this new 
supply. This has not always gone smoothly; a major high- voltage line that was 
to connect wind farms in the Baltic with cities and factories in southern 
Germany has been opposed by residents and NGOs because of the landscape 
impacts and alleged health impacts it would have. Furthermore, it runs close 
to the eastern border and some have alleged it was planned to also carry Czech 
nuclear power, which seriously undermined the green narrative that supported 
this transmission line.
 The main risks to the foreign renewables pathway are the construction time 
and vulnerability of the transmission infrastructure – the latter more due to 
extreme weather than terrorism – and the acceptability to the Swiss public of 
foreign control over power supply. A further risk is in the acceptability of the 
power plants and transmissions lines for foreign benefit to the residents of other 
countries. Assuming we focus on the offshore wind and CSP plants in sparsely 
populated areas, which are anyway more productive, international transmissions 
lines face the largest risk of popular resistance.
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Research process and methods
Four research methods inform this narrative: energy system modelling, 
Q- methodology, a choice experiment, and a stakeholder workshop.
 The core of energy system modelling is to represent major supply- and-demand tech-
nologies in our energy system, and the flows between these, in one single model. The 
mix of these technologies is constrained by existing real- world circumstances and scen-
ario assumptions, and can be optimised within these constraints, e.g. for lowest total 
cost given high reliability and low CO2 emissions. We looked specifically at electricity 
and included various supply technologies, including run- of-river and dam hydropower, 
PV and CSP, wind turbines, gas turbine power plants, and pumped storage. Our model, 
using the Calliope framework (Pfenninger, 2017) represents sources in Switzerland and 
abroad. We use hourly data for intermittent sources like wind and solar from www.
renewables.ninja, a website with open renewable energy potential data (Pfenninger and 
Staffell, 2016; Staffell and Pfenninger, 2016) to find how intermittency limits the 
renewable electricity sources we can reliably use together, and how much we would 
have to use other sources as a backup to balance supply and demand.
 The core of Q- methodology is the development of a set of statements expressing 
potential stakeholders’ attitudes and beliefs about a particular issue, ensuring coverage 
and balance of the topic (Watts and Stenner, 2012). We started by interviewing a 
diverse range of stakeholders and systematically reviewing mass- media coverage. A 
sample of participants then ranked the statements according to whether they agree or 
disagree with their own perspectives. Using factor analysis, we identified patterns in 
the ranking and identified groups of participants who are likely to rank the various 
statements differently. In this way, we identified correlations and/or major differences 
between group perspectives. We could then match these perspectives to any shared 
institutional and/or demographic attributes of the groups’ members. Q- methodology 
is used to explore perspectives of a small group of individuals that should not be inter-
preted as representative of a larger populace without further research to confirm it. 
We used Q- methodology to unravel stakeholder perceptions in three Swiss villages.
 The core of a choice experiment is to make explicit what people base their decision 
on (Alriksson and Öberg, 2008). During the experiment we give respondents a set of 
different choice tasks, so- called ‘choice sets’. Within each choice set, respondents chose 
their preferred option from three alternatives, one of which was a status quo option. It 
is assumed that the individual utility of a choice depends (in part) on different observ-
able attributes that characterise the options within the choice sets. In our experimental 
design, we estimated part- worth utilities of the choice attributes by decomposing 
respondents’ answers as well as other variables. We could also group respondents based 
on the similarity of their preferences using principal component analysis.
 The core use for a stakeholder workshop is to make explicit the viewpoints of 
the different participants and facilitate an exchange of opinions and arguments 
between them. This may in turn create a shared vision but a more important goal 
is to build mutual trust and understanding for different viewpoints. Our workshop 
used a role- playing format, where we asked stakeholders to reason from the point 
of view of the voter groupings we found in our survey, to emphasise understanding 
other viewpoints and stimulate out- of-the- box thinking. We invited representa-
tives of different governments, NGOs, utilities, and consultancies.
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Risks and uncertainties
Risks to the Swiss renewables transition emerge at two levels. The first level is 
the new risks that replacing nuclear with renewables brings: intermittency, 
when no electricity can be produced as the sun is not shining, the wind is not 
blowing or rivers are frozen; failures in our electricity grid from extreme weather 
events such as from storms, icing, and landslides; and public opposition to new 
energy installations such as solar panels, wind turbines, and power lines.
 Any combination of intermittency and grid failure may lead to power losses 
and blackouts in a country that is used to an extremely reliable supply of electri-
city. The pathways that we examine trade off these two risks: wind turbines in 
Switzerland produce less than half of what they do in Denmark (see renewables.
ninja) but are close to the Swiss power grid; solar power from North Africa has 
very predictable output but needs long and vulnerable transmission lines that 
cross several countries.
 For solar farms we find inherent tension between using land for nature or 
agriculture and infrastructure. This applies especially in Switzerland as much of 
its mountainous terrain is ill suited to infrastructure and the rest of the country 
is fairly densely inhabited. Furthermore, the need for permits and grid connec-
tions makes solar farms unattractive to utilities at current bulk electricity prices. 
By contrast, rooftop PV and solar heaters only need to compete with residential 
electricity prices, which are higher due to inclusion of grid fees and taxes. 
Installing PV on non- building infrastructure, like avalanche protection barriers, 
is possible, but such projects are still experimental and expensive.
 The second level of risk is in the aggregate, or how the risks for the indi-
vidual projects and technologies affect the overall Swiss energy strategy. While 
individual renewable projects may supply intermittent power or get discon-
nected, combining many different sources and existing Swiss hydropower can 
lead to a stable supply. However, public support is more difficult at the project 
level than in aggregate: on the national level, this is just an abstract percentage 
of supply, while on the cantonal level it is a question of where the infrastructure 
will be located, and on the local level it is a binary choice of having the infra-
structure in your back yard or not. This is particularly fraught because local resi-
dents may experience fewer of the benefits and more of the drawbacks of a 
project that benefits the country as a whole.
Consequential risks (negative impacts)
Switzerland has one of the most reliable electricity supplies in the world right 
now, and its inhabitants see this as the right and proper natural state of things. 
Existing proposals implicitly or explicitly commit to operational security of 
supply, suggesting that the Swiss are unlikely to compromise on reliability for 
the sake of independence, climate, or a nuclear phase out. This stability can also 
not come at unlimited cost. We see two risks that would cause renewable elec-
tricity to lead to an unstable supply of electricity: intermittency and grid failure.
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 On intermittency, we find that Switzerland can phase out nuclear and switch 
to renewables without risk of intermittency as long as we do not rely solely on PV, 
even though there is sufficient space to put the panels (for more details, see Díaz 
Redondo, van Vliet, and Patt, 2017). This is because Swiss hydropower can com-
pensate for limited intermittency, but less so in winter when PV output is low and 
Swiss rivers get limited water. Relying only on PV will require some seasonal elec-
tricity storage, which is currently prohibitively expensive due to the staggering 
volume of electricity it would have to store for every winter. Wind power from the 
North Sea is especially suited to the Swiss electricity system as it is more stable 
than solar power and produces more electricity in winter.
 Furthermore, both North Sea wind and North African CSP are likely to be 
cheaper than using natural gas due to the rapid decline in installation cost for 
renewables electricity. As a measure of this, we use the levelized cost of electri-
city (LCOE) that is defined as the cost of the entire electricity supply system, 
including grid and backup plants to guarantee constant supply, divided by the 
kWh of electricity it supplies (in Swiss francs per kilowatt hour). For example, 
based on cost projections for wind and CSP from 2011 to 2016, replacing 
nuclear with a combination of wind and CSP would cause an LCOE ranging 
from about the same as using natural gas to almost twice as much. However, 
using commercial costs for wind and CSP contracted in 2017 results in an 
LCOE below these ranges. This showed that: (a) their model calculations were 
outdated by the time they were published; and (b) that renewables have reached 
‘grid parity’. The cost of generation is no longer a reason to avoid a switch to 
renewables.
 If Swiss utilities can invest in, buy a majority stake, or otherwise gain control 
over one or two dozen wind farms and/or CSP plants abroad, this system would 
insulate Swiss electricity supply from the intermittency of individual renewable 
power plants and the resulting fluctuations in prices on power markets. This 
would be a shift in policy for Swiss utilities: they already own stakes in power 
plants in foreign countries (overwhelmingly in EU member states) but the elec-
tricity is sold on local markets, not imported back to Switzerland.
 However, the second risk is that long power lines come with increased 
chance of outages due to extreme weather, which currently accounts for almost 
half of all grid outages. The magnitude of this risk depends on the grid: for a 
future with a large share of imports, sufficient redundancy in transmission cor-
ridors, high- quality equipment, and best practices in grid management can 
minimise the risk. Quantitative analysis and interviews with grid experts have 
shown that grids can almost always be built to withstand the harshest conditions 
in any given country. For example, the Finnish grid suffers more outages in the 
comparatively mild summer than in the harsh Nordic winter. Exchanging best 
practices would help transmission system operators (TSOs) prepare for changes 
in weather conditions brought on by climate change. This can be organised 
through existing organisations like ENTSO- E or Eurelectric. Furthermore, even 
if the transmission grid breaks down due to weather or for other reasons, Swit-
zerland has a large capacity for hydropower to provide some short- term buffer.
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 Our exploration of these two consequential risks shows that both can be 
mostly avoided and a fully renewable electricity supply for Switzerland can be 
realised at reasonable costs without an increased risk of supply interruptions. 
The only option that does not work is to rely on PV only. Without over-
whelming technical or economic constraints, this means the choice between 
pathways is essentially a matter of public preference. And here we find that it is 
not immediately clear that any of these supply options can be realised.
Implementation risks (barriers)
The implementation barriers we find for the Swiss ES2050 are of a social and 
political nature rather than, for example, lack of access to financing. For 
example, some legal bottlenecks need to be sorted out, such as cost- sharing or 
compensation for people who rent and wish to install PV on the roof of the 
building they live in. This particular problem of agency is especially acute in 
Switzerland as 80% of the population live in rented houses and apartments, and 
it requires a legal solution.
 However, the largest perceived barrier to renewables in Switzerland is public 
acceptance. The prevailing view is that the high attachment of the Swiss to 
their traditional landscape, and the large number of landscape and nature 
NGOs, make the construction of power lines, wind turbines, PV farms, and con-
spicuous rooftop PV in historic centres likely to attract opposition. Several 
research projects are underway to address this directly, and most of the projects 
in NFP70, a research programme about electricity supply options for Switzer-
land, include an ‘acceptance’ component in addition to the technical research 
at the heart of these projects.
 We could obviate acceptance issues in Switzerland in theory by outsourcing 
electricity supply to other (neighbouring) countries and the Swiss transmission 
grid could most likely handle the import load. However, this leads to two poten-
tial problems.
 First, citizens in these countries may be equally or even more unhappy to have 
energy infrastructure in their environment to supply someone else, though this 
might be offset by the business opportunity of selling the electricity. Moreover, if 
all of Europe follows in the footsteps of a renewable Switzerland, the required inter-
national interconnect capacity would need to grow by a factor of 6 to 12 (Rodríguez 
et al., 2014). Expansion of transmission lines would especially be needed in areas 
where renewable electricity is generated, which are usually peripheral areas.
 Second, this creates a reliance on other countries. The Swiss have a strong 
interest and desire for energy independence, often expressed as a desire for elec-
tric autarky (Trutnevyte, 2014). This has some dissonance with the fact that 
Switzerland currently imports 75% of its energy in the form of natural gas, oil, 
and uranium to fuel nuclear plants (BfE, 2016), and also with recent efforts by 
utilities to invest in renewable electricity generation abroad. Regardless of the 
current realities of energy use, independence is an aspiration that makes imports, 
renewable or fossil, less politically attractive.
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 Swiss citizens consistently prefer solar electricity and, to a lesser degree, wind 
(for more details, see Plum et al., n.d.). These should be built in existing indus-
trial and commercial areas, including ski resorts, rather than in areas of natural 
beauty. However, the Swiss do not agree on all aspects of their energy strategy. 
We find five distinct groups of voters: the largest two groups are ‘Moderates’ and 
a group that is specifically ‘Contra status quo’ to using nuclear power but other-
wise also moderate. Three groups have a very specific profile: ‘Pro renewables’, 
‘Pro Switzerland’, and ‘Pro landscape’. All groups except ‘Pro landscape’ (95% 
of respondents) prefer electricity from Switzerland, and all groups except ‘Pro 
Switzerland’ (84% of respondents) accept imports of renewable electricity, pref-
erably from plants operated by Swiss utilities. Unlike domestic or imported 
renewables, Swiss generally dislike natural gas and non- renewable imported 
electricity. Furthermore, our survey results show that the Swiss public find ‘the 
construction of high- voltage transmission lines abroad for supplying Switzerland 
with electricity problematic’ just as much as having power lines or wind turbines 
in their own living environment.
Local perspectives
Three local renewable energy projects in Switzerland illustrate the perspectives of 
different stakeholder groups on the process and negotiations involved in actually 
implementing a renewable energy project and show approaches to manage the 
risks involved: a small hydropower project in the canton of St Gallen (examined 
in Díaz Redondo, Adler, and Patt, 2017), solar PV on avalanche barriers in the 
canton of Graubünden (examined in Díaz Redondo and Van Vliet, 2018) and a 
solar farm project in the canton of Vaud (examined in Späth, 2018).
 The small hydropower project in Breschnerbach (canton St Gallen) was led 
by a local utility, consultants, and pro- hydropower members of local and can-
tonal governments. The main challenge noted by these proponents was that the 
decision- making process, including permitting, took a very long time to com-
plete. In the event, NGOs in favour of reducing energy demand were in conflict 
with local proponents who saw the hydropower plant as benefiting the local 
economy and community. After the utility received the concession in 2011, 
four years were spent negotiating a nature compensation scheme, with some 40 
stakeholders represented in the process, including national NGOs. One NGO 
complained to the cantonal court but this was rejected, and the construction 
permit was granted in 2016. The project was eventually seen as ‘win–win’. All 
perspectives showed consensus on the need for fair, inclusive, and democratic 
decision making, though the local proponents felt that participatory decision 
making limits infrastructure development.
 In St Antoniën (canton Graubünden), a project aimed to install solar PV on 
avalanche protection barriers. This would generate more electricity than PV in 
lowlands as the solar input is up to 50% higher in the mountains. Moreover, 
suitable foundations were already present, and foundations make up a significant 
share of the installation costs for most PV projects. However, building PV on 
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avalanche barriers in a remote village had never been done on a commercial 
scale. Everyone involved thought the project could contribute to the regional 
and local economy and benefit the environment. We found this to be the major 
driver for stakeholders to engage in the implementation process. Furthermore, 
the project was strongly driven by the idea that this could be a model for PV 
systems on avalanche defences. Most of the funding required for the project was 
crowd- sourced, with some contribution from the cantonal government. 
However, the federal government refused to fund the project as an innovation 
pilot and the municipal assembly ultimately voted against a loan to cover the 
funding shortfall. Residents, NGOs, and government officials suggested this was 
due to doubt over whether sales of electricity could cover investment costs, as 
well as their worries about estimates of technical difficulties, rising costs during 
the decision process, and unsuccessful fundraising activities. This seems to have 
increased doubts about and opposition to the project, and eventually led to an 
opposing vote in the municipal assembly. Some of the stakeholders who were 
opposed also felt that they did not receive the information they wanted from 
the proponents of the project, and that this created a lack of trust. Better com-
munication might have removed this risk. Furthermore, the decision of the 
federal government not to fund this rural PV project was seen as inconsistent 
with the national policy to promote rural development and renewable energy.
 In Payerne (canton Vaud), the local utility proposed a solar farm on a plot of 
agricultural land that had already been designated as an industrial area. This 
project was part of a greater plan to make the village largely self- sufficient in 
electricity. Local stakeholders and NGOs were involved in the planning process 
and, while one NGO formally opposed the project, it did not take the project to 
the courts. The project was completed in 2015 and produces around 40% of the 
electricity used in the village. Stakeholders generally agreed that large roof sur-
faces should be used first to install solar panels, but there was a gap between tra-
ditionalists who wanted to reserve farmland for agriculture and pragmatists who 
will use it for solar PV if that is more profitable. Others emphasised energy effi-
ciency, much like in Breschnerbach, and citizens’ role in decision making, much 
like in St Antoniën.
Broader implications
The potential for utility scale PV is likely quite limited in Switzerland, given 
the value put on rural landscapes and agriculture, but fortunately the available 
rooftop area for PV seems sufficient for Swiss purposes in several estimates (see 
Gutschner et al., 2002; Compagnon, 2004). Furthermore, permitting for any 
energy infrastructure is known to be a long process both inside and outside Swit-
zerland. One utility noted that they only invest in foreign renewables projects 
that have already obtained permits in order to reduce their exposure to 
acceptance risk.
 Utilities and renewable plant developers are particularly concerned about the 
current low price of electricity in Switzerland and the EU power market, as a 
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result of the ongoing expansion of renewables in Germany and elsewhere. The 
‘merit order effect’ reduces prices when renewable electricity is abundant (i.e. 
sunny weather and high winds across the EU) and drives up prices of balancing 
power when renewable electricity is scarce, making renewable electricity a 
victim of its own success (see Cludius et al., 2014). This has reduced enthusiasm 
for installing renewable electricity by utilities. Consumer- owned rooftop PV has 
not been affected as much, as domestic production reduces electricity bills that 
include taxes and grid fees (electricity cost is only half the total) and the Swiss 
feed- in tariff policy.
 Across the three projects, stakeholder perspectives suggested a risk to the 
overall Swiss ES2050: stakeholders feel disengaged with the ES2050 process 
because they disagree on the overarching framework, i.e. the pillars of the 
energy strategy. It seems that the federal, cantonal, and local stakeholders have 
different interpretations of the ES2050 and its major objectives of energy effi-
ciency, supply diversity, deployment of investments, and environmental protec-
tion. Each of these levels of government prioritises the ES2050 objectives 
differently, and all of them seem to think their approach is best for everyone. 
However, these authorities lack a forum to resolve these differences. Further-
more, these interpretations differ in turn from the preferences of the Swiss 
public. This is a risk to the general political process that carries the ES2050 
forward.
 This is separate from the ‘usual’ political risk where different interest groups 
want different things. This is also present in Switzerland, and some of the lobby 
groups have very close ties to political parties.
Comparing pathways
Unsurprisingly, we cannot have an energy system that is reliable, climate 
friendly, gives us independence, keeps the landscape intact, and phases out 
nuclear all at the same time. However, it is possible to replace the existing 
nuclear plants in Switzerland with a combination of domestic and imported 
renewables without infringing on reliability. The cost for this would be no 
higher than using natural gas, as suggested in the ES2050, or replacing the 
ageing Swiss nuclear plants. Good management by the TSOs that carry the 
imported power would minimise the risk of weather- induced grid failures. Both 
pathways, domestic renewables and the foreign renewables, are therefore pos-
sible in principle, though rooftop PV would have to be supplemented with Swiss 
wind power in strictly domestic pathways. Due to the low potential for wind 
power in Switzerland (i.e. wind blows slowly, infrequently, and/or erratically), 
this would also have highest cost. Natural gas is technically feasible but a non- 
starter in the opinion of the Swiss public.
 While both pathways are technically feasible and broadly socially acceptable, 
there are still issues with individual projects (see Table 9.1). As long as renew-
ables partially depend on subsidies to be competitive, financing remains difficult 
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nature compensation adds to the cost. Delays in permitting and constructing all 
of the necessary power plants and transmission lines are also very likely. This is 
not necessarily a problem to either pathway in the long run, as the Swiss nuclear 
plants are scheduled to remain in service for as long as they are deemed safe to 
operate. As the two youngest and largest plants (built in 1979 and 1984, with a 
combined capacity of 2.2 GW) have recently received extensive safety upgrades 
in the wake of Fukushima, we can expect their lifespan to be extended to 60 
years (World Nuclear Association, 2018). If these nuclear plants remain in 
service until 2039 and 2044, the Swiss have some 25 years to construct their 
replacements.
 Some uncertainties remain in the Swiss transition to renewable electricity, 
although they are not threatening: For example, the political winds may shift 
over the next 25 years to be more or less open to international co- operation. 
However, the structure of the Swiss Confederation’s executive makes dramatic 
shifts in policy – like in countries with two- party systems (e.g. the USA) – 
unlikely. Overall, we may expect Switzerland to remain rhetorically inde-
pendent and autarkic, but practically integrated in Europe. Likewise, the Swiss 
economy has been relatively stable, with a largest annual drop of 3.4% of GDP 
in the last financial crisis, despite being known for international banking. The 
effects of climate change are also uncertain but the effects on hydropower are 
expected to be small over most of this century (SGH and CHy, 2011). Finally, 
it is unclear how far the costs of PV and wind will decrease in the future, but 
grid parity has now effectively been achieved and any further drops can only be 
in favour of the wider adoption of renewable electricity sources.
Conclusions
Overall, the Swiss prefer domestic production of renewable electricity, but a 
majority share of imported renewable electricity will likely be cheaper overall 
and cause fewer issues with intermittency. However, the renewable imports 
pathway would face more problems with acceptance of new infrastructure, espe-
cially long- distance transmission lines. (See Figures 9.2 and 9.3.)
 The most recommended option would be to combine the domestic renewable 
pathway with the imported renewable pathway. The most favourable combina-
tion seems to be Swiss rooftop PV, offshore wind from the North Sea, and Swiss 
hydropower. Such a mix would also be acceptable to the Swiss public. This is 
especially important given the Swiss political system in which policies and pro-
jects can be challenged in local, cantonal, or national referenda.
 However, depending on the demand for renewables in EU countries, this 
may require expansion of transmission capacity in the Dutch, Belgian, Danish, 
and German grids. Both the needs for grid expansion, and ways that this could 
be done in a manner acceptable to residents around the new transmission lines, 
should be researched further.
 This narrative has two major implications for the Swiss energy strategy. First, 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ownership and operational control would be preferable to the Swiss people. 
Second, as long as there is no forum to resolve the diverging interpretations of 
ES2050 among local, cantonal, and national stakeholders, we can expect con-
flicts and delays.
 The risks we examined were of a political, technical, and economic nature. 
The political risks were mostly barriers to implementing one of the pathways, 
and the technical and economic risks were mostly about the consequences of 
these pathways. This follows a pattern we have observed in general in the liter-
ature about the Swiss energy transition.
 The most pressing risk seems to be delay or outright failure to obtain permits, 
and more generally how to plan and build energy infrastructure without provok-
ing opposition and legal challenges from nearby residents. This has been done 
successfully in Switzerland, for example for the Linth–Limmern pumped storage 
plant and its connection to the grid, where residents raised no objections. It 
would be worthwhile to investigate successful processes for energy infrastructure 
and determine how these can be mainstreamed.
Note
1 The EP2050 was written by Prognos AG, the consultancy firm that also wrote Ener-
giekonzept 2050, a similar document, for the German government.
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Risks and uncertainties in low- carbon 
pathways for the urban building sector
Lei Song, Jenny Lieu, and Ying Chen
Introduction
China has become both the world’s largest energy producer and consumer. It 
has a comprehensive energy supply system based on coal, electricity, oil, natural 
gas, and renewable energy, meeting the basic demands for socio- economic 
development. However, China’s energy production and consumption are also 
facing difficult decarbonisation challenges due to rapid economic development, 
abundant endowment of coal, population growth, and urban development.
 The country has experienced the fastest economic expansion of any major 
economy in the world and has taken 500 million of its population out of poverty. 
Today, China is the second largest economy in the world, with an overall GDP of 
¥67.67 trillion (US$11.06 trillion) in 2015 (NBS, 2016a). Economic growth is 
now slowing, falling to 6.9% in 2015 compared with the average rate of 9.7% from 
1979 to 2014. During the 13th Five- Year Plan (2016–2020) period, China’s 
potential average growth rate is expected to drop to 6.3%, indicating that China’s 
economy is transitioning from high to medium- high growth.
 This growth has been accompanied by increasing energy demand. Even 
though the energy supply and consumption structure has been improving in 
China, the long- term socio- economic development will continue to rely on 
coal, of which China has large resources, resulting in increasing carbon emis-
sions. Energy consumption in building, transport, and daily living sectors in par-
ticular will keep on increasing. As of 2014, transport and housing have become 
the largest growth areas for energy consumption in China (Wei and He, 2017).
 China’s population exceeded 1.38 billion in 2016. Urbanisation levels 
reached over 57% – around 3% higher than the global average (NBS, 2016a). 
Although the speed of urbanisation has slowed somewhat – down from nearly 
4% in 2010 to around 2.5% in 2016 – the urban population is expected to reach 
65% by 2020. Along with urban population growth, rising living standards in 
cities, locked- in energy infrastructure, and transport- related activities will con-
tribute significantly to increasing carbon emissions. Cities will therefore need to 
make major carbon emission reductions in the present and future.
 Increasing urban population and density have driven both the rapid develop-
ment of the building industry and rising energy consumption in China. In 2015, 
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the construction industry contributed 26.4% of China’s GDP, and building 
energy use accounted for 33% of the total energy use in China (Yuan et al., 
2017). Total carbon emissions from China’s building sector increased from 
984.69 million tons of CO2 in 2005 to 3,753.98 million tons of CO2 in 2014 
(Jiang and Li, 2017). Between 2001 and 2014, both primary energy consump-
tion and electricity consumption in China’s building sector increased more than 
two- fold (Li et al., 2017) Rapid urbanisation and economic development have 
driven the demand for higher quality living spaces, including improved indoor 
comfort, with a corresponding increase in energy consumption. Therefore, 
energy conservation in new buildings and increasing demand in the existing 
building stock have become two of the largest challenges for China’s energy 
conservation and emissions- reduction work (IEA and Tsinghua University, 
2015). Building energy- conservation plays an important role in ensuring that 
emissions peak before 2030, a commitment set by the Chinese government in 
China’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Guidance and support 
from government policies are crucial for achieving the energy conservation 
targets for the building sector (Yuan et al., 2017).
 The low- carbon transition pathway for the Chinese building sector is deter-
mined by national regulations and plans related to building energy conserva-
tion. This narrative addresses two key components of a green building 
low- carbon transition pathway: energy- efficiency efforts to reduce emissions, 
and green energy consumption in buildings with an emphasis on scaling up 
renewable energy. (‘Green buildings’ are commonly understood as the practice 
of creating resource- efficient and healthier approaches for building design, 
construction, renovation, operation, and maintenance (Fastenrath and Braun, 
2018).) Both pathways focus on urban residential buildings Although energy 
consumption in public and commercial buildings represents a dominant share 
in China’s building sector – almost three times greater than residential build-
ings in rural or urban areas – rapid urbanisation has boosted continuous devel-
opment and scaled up the construction industry, especially with regards to 
residential buildings. For new buildings in China, the construction areas of 
residential housing accounted for about 75% and for public buildings about 
25% (NBS, 2016b). Furthermore, residential buildings in urban areas are now 
the highest energy consumers. For instance, space and water heating in urban 
buildings in northern China is the largest energy consumer, representing 52% 
of total building energy consumption in the region. In addition, demand for 
space heating and cooling for southern households in urban areas has been 
increasing rapidly due to climate change and higher living space comfort 
(Tsinghua University, 2016).
 A low- carbon transition in residential buildings is more complicated than 
other building categories. This increased complexity is due to the wide range of 
housing types; differences in household demographics; varying climate con-
ditions across China that impact households’ ability to regulate indoor temper-
ature; and economic- social contexts such as the housing rental market, social 
customs, and culture. This chapter illustrates how these factors may shape a 
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 low- carbon transition pathway in the building sector, the barriers to implement-
ing the transition, and also the potential negative impacts resulting from the 
transition pathway.
Policies for a low- carbon transition in the building sector
China’s low- carbon transition in the building sector is defined by an enabling 
set of overarching plans, objectives, and programmes. China’s national medium 
and long- term technology development programme (2006–2020) proposes 
building energy- efficiency and green building as priority goals for a low- carbon 
transition in the building sector. Overarching commitments to the Paris Agree-
ment are highlighted in China’s NDCs, which also placed emphasis on enhanc-
ing green building in the whole life cycle of the building sector. Most recently, 
the National New- type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020) offered a lifestyle guide-
line that promotes ‘green production and consumption to be part of the main-
stream urban economic life’. The plan proposed to ‘greatly increase the 
proportion of energy- saving and water- saving products, recycled products and 
green buildings’ to achieve improved building energy conservation. China also 
issued a series of work plans that were closely related to building construction 
work, which sets a clearer vision for the pathway for low- carbon transition in 
the building sector from the supply side.
 For promoting energy efficiency in the building sector, both new green build-
ing and retrofitting programmes were established. The 13th Five- Year Plan for 
Building Energy Efficiency and Green Building Development, released by the 
China State Council and the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Develop-
ment (MOHURD) in 2017, set up exact targets for increasing the proportion of 
green building and energy- efficient buildings in existing buildings stocks. By 
2020, the energy efficiency level of new buildings in urban areas is planned to 
increase by 20% compared with 2015. The proportion of urban green building 
in new building developments is intended to be increased to 50%, while the 
proportion of green building materials used should exceed 40%. Over 500 
million square metres of existing residential buildings should receive energy- 
saving renovations. Furthermore, the Energy Development Strategy Action 
Plan (2014–2020), released by the China State Council in 2014, has strength-
ened the actions required to achieve the target for controlling energy consump-
tion and improving energy efficiency. This includes upgrading energy- efficiency 
design standards for residential buildings, accelerating the construction of green 
buildings and the renovation of existing buildings, setting up energy consump-
tion limits for public buildings, a green building rating and labelling system, pro-
moting energy appliances and green lighting, and reforming heat metering and 
transformation of existing buildings.
 Several policies have been implemented to increase the use of green energy 
in the building sector. The 13th Five- Year Plan for Energy Conservation and 
Emission Reduction Programme, released in 2017, sets targets specifically for 
ultra- low energy consumption and zero energy consumption, including the use 
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of distributed roof photovoltaic (PV) power generation systems, solar thermal, 
geothermal energy, and industrial waste heat to meet the demand of energy con-
sumption in building sector. By 2020, the installation area of solar water heater 
systems will reach 45 million square metres, and the solar thermal utilisation for 
heating will reach 800 million square metres, which has been proposed in the 
13th Five- year Plan for Renewable Energy Development issued in 2016. 
Additionally, there are regional plans that address energy demand in building. 
For instance, heating in the northern region of China represents 42.5% of 
Chinese final energy use in buildings during 2015 (IEA and Tsinghua Univer-
sity, 2015). Thus, the Clean Winter Heating Plan for Northern China 
(2017–2021), issued in 2017, required the northern regions (including Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong) to achieve a ‘coal to gas’ transition to 
provide half their power for heating from geothermal, biomass, solar, natural 
gas, electric, industrial waste, and centralised clean coal- fired heating by 2019. 
By 2021, the clean energy heating rate is expected to reach 70%.
 In addition to national policies, in China local governments play substantial 
roles in promoting low- carbon development. For instance, the Green Building 
Evaluation Standard (GB/T50378–2014) was enacted in 2014 by MOHURD 
(the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development) to evaluate the con-
servation of energy, water, and materials in whole building life cycles. Local 
governments also issued their own standards for green building evaluation, such 
as Shanghai Standard for Green Building Evaluation (DG/TJ08–2090–2012) 
and the Beijing standard (DB11/513–2015). The local building codes may be 
based on the local development requirement, but these would be stricter than 
nationwide codes. Green building strategies from national and local level may 
be divided into five different categories such as: green building codes, retrofit-
ting programmes, rating and labelling in green building, subsidy and preferential 
policies, and information campaigns to raise awareness.
 Nested in the above strategies, the green building transition pathway consists 
broadly of two components: energy efficiency and renewable energy. The tech-
nologies, policies, and actions needed to promote energy efficiency and renew-
able energy are equally important for the transition towards a green building 
sector. However, here there will be a stronger emphasis on energy efficiency in 
the pathway description.
The green building pathway
Green buildings broadly focus on resource savings – with respect to energy, water, 
land, and materials – in the whole life of the building. The adoption of ‘green’ 
architectural principles such as solar, passive or low- energy design, and ‘low- 
carbon’ building technologies and materials generally reduces energy consumption 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Pachauri et al., 2007; UNEP, 2011). Green 
building strategies may include different categories such as: certified green build-
ing labels, prefabricated buildings, new buildings with high energy efficiency, ret-
rofitting existing buildings to high energy efficiency standards, renovating existing 
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buildings with exterior windows or window shading, on- site renewable energy, 
green or vegetated roofs and walls, and building energy- saving management and 
services projects.
 Given the context of China’s low- carbon transition to green building in 
urban areas, the green building pathway consists of two main components: 
energy efficiency in the building sector, and renewable energy in the building 
sector and the electricity system. These have also been indicated in The Com-
prehensive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction in the 
13th Five- Year Plan Period. The component on energy efficiency of green build-
ing again contains two parts: new buildings and retrofitting existing buildings. 
Renewable energy in the building sector is not only about on- site renewable 
energy installations but also emphasises the promotion of renewable energy 
supply in the electricity system.
 The green building transition pathway can be viewed through the life cycle 
of the building including: building- process energy consumption, which consists 
of building planning, design, and construction, and a building’s energy con-
sumption, consisting of the operation and utilisation of the building (Chen and 
Luo, 2008). Energy consumption during the operational phase accounted for 
80% of total consumption during the life time of the building (Zhang, Kang, 
and Jin, 2018). Thus, a low- carbon transition that emphasises the operation 
phase of a building will be the primary emphasis in the pathway’s discussion.
Research process and methods
The present chapter is based on a qualitative research design that includes two 
methodical approaches: stakeholder analysis, involving mainly workshops and 
interviews, and policy document analysis.
 The data collection started with governmental documents, archives, and 
related literature reviews. This covered more than 50 documents issued by 
national governments and more than 19 regulations or programmes at the local 
level. These documents helped identify key factors, processes, actors, and the 
political framework of the building context. Based on that, a key set of questions 
was discussed with stakeholders in workshops and interviews, which developed a 
general understanding of transition pathway in building sector:
1 Is the current policy mix deemed adequate for achieving the desired green 
transition in the building sector? What additional policies are required to 
promote the transition pathway?
2 What are the barriers and challenges in the implementation of transitioning the 
building sector? What are the criteria from the stakeholders for estimating them?
3 What are the (positive or negative) impacts of green transitions on the 
social- technological structures?
Furthermore, the participatory research approach contributed to provide a 
 multiplicity of opinions and perceptions about the drivers, implementation risks, 
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consequential risks, and uncertainty under green building pathways in different 
climate zones.
 Three workshops and two focus group interviews were held in Beijing and 
Shanghai respectively. The participants in each focus group were invited from 
different stakeholder groups including local governments, architects, constructors, 
NGOs, experts on green building design, urban planning and low- carbon technol-
ogies, and researchers. The events counted a total of 189 participants, including 
132 governmental officials, 18 experts, six architects, six NGOs, four constructors, 
eight residents, and 21 researchers. The workshops helped to outline and specify 
the transition pathway, achieving a general understanding of the drivers for uptake 
by stakeholders and the barriers to a low- carbon transition. The interviews aimed 
to gain in- depth expert and practitioner knowledge. Most of the participants came 
from the local administration and experts in Beijing and Shanghai’s building 
sectors, which identified the risk categories (implementation and consequential 
risks, as well as uncertainty) and their potential impacts under the transition 
pathway for the building sector.
 Stakeholders for this research project were chosen as key informants in order 
to identify risks associated with low- carbon transitions in the building sector. 
Therefore, stakeholders were included who are involved in the building industries 
or engaged in the fields of policymaking, research, and consulting with respect to 
low- carbon development. These stakeholders are familiar with the low- carbon 
transition process in China. Policymakers play an important role in bringing about 
low- carbon transitions in China and consequently formed the largest stakeholder 
group. The opinions from the other stakeholder groups complemented the policy-
makers’ perspectives.
Energy efficiency in the building sector
Energy efficiency in new green buildings
The transition pathway for China’s building sector aligns with the goals set out 
in the 13th Five- Year Building Plan. By 2020, China envisions achieving a 20% 
improvement in energy efficiency for new buildings in urban areas compared to 
2015. In less than two years, the proportion of urban new buildings defined as 
‘green buildings’ shall be improved to 50% and the proportion of green building 
materials would exceed 40%. The green buildings targets shall mainly be 
achieved by upgrading the energy efficiency standards and certification system, 
which has been emphasised in the policies of 13th Five- Year Plan for Building 
Energy Efficiency and Green Building Development and the Energy Develop-
ment Strategy Action Plan (2014–2020).
 In the near future, new buildings will be constructed in line with energy effi-
ciency standards such as the Three Star System certification standard. This certifi-
cation system is expected to encourage technological innovation and improve the 
management of green buildings by means of two different certifications: design 
label and operation label. Design label is a pre- certification that can be granted to 
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allow the project to market itself as a green building. Operation label is final certi-
fication that is granted after controlling the energy performance of the building for 
one year (Geng et al., 2012). The Three Star System involves six indicators such 
as land saving and the outdoor environment, energy saving and energy utilisation, 
water saving and water resource utilisation, material saving and material resource 
utilisation, the indoor environment quality, and operating management. These 
indicators are intended to provide a strong signal for construction companies/
developers to consider the energy and resource saving potential of their current 
designs. Eventually all construction companies/developers will reach minimum 
energy and resource efficiency requirements and may even exceed the standards to 
improve their competitive edge in a market that is becoming increasingly con-
scious of environmental impact and energy savings.
 Furthermore, there is significant potential for the development of prefabri-
cated buildings and promotion of green building materials as innovative solu-
tions to meet the green building goal, which would increase ‘passive’ 
ultra- low-energy- use buildings. These measures have been strengthened in 
several policies such as the Action Plan for Urban Adaptation to Climate 
Change (issued by MOHURD in 2013), the Technical Guidelines for Passive 
Ultra- low Energy Use in Green Buildings (issued by MOHURD in 2015) and 
the 13th Five- Year Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Pro-
grammer (issued in 2017). Since the majority of prefabricated buildings are 
largely manufactured in controlled settings, the process reduces environmental 
impact during the construction phase and results in savings (compared to tradi-
tional construction methods) in water consumption of around 50%, mortar con-
sumption of 60%, wooden materials of 80%, and energy consumption of 20%. 
Although the cost of a prefabricated building is around ¥1000 per square metre 
higher than the cost of a normal building, they are still expected to account for 
15% of new buildings until 2020 (MOHURD, 2017) as set out in the 13th Five- 
Year Building Plan’s targets. Costs of prefabricated buildings in the short to 
medium term (2–5 years) are expected to decrease, through economies of scale 
and technological learning. In the future, the share of prefabricated buildings is 
expected to continue rising due to other advantages, such as reduced construc-
tion noise and dust in neighbourhoods and better- quality control of construc-
tion materials. These challenges are specifically linked to new builds, while the 
existing building stock faces a different set of challenges and should consider the 
needs of current occupants.
Retrofits of existing buildings
The low- carbon pathway for existing buildings is also based on the Energy Con-
servation and Emission Reduction Programme and the 13th Five- Year Plan for 
Building Energy Efficiency and Green Building Development. These pro-
grammes foresee that China will by 2020 complete the energy- efficient renova-
tion of over 500 million square metres of existing residential buildings and the 
energy- saving reconstruction of 100 million square metres of public buildings. 
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Retrofits of existing buildings in China are expected to increase by 5% per year 
by 2020 and could continue to increase in the future. If followed through, the 
proportion of energy- efficient buildings in the existing urban residential build-
ing stock will reach 60% by 2020. Economically developed areas such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Shenzhen have achieved 
breakthroughs in energy efficiency, and the proportion of energy- saving meas-
ures has exceeded 10% of local green building polices across China (Chen, 
2018).
 In practice, renovation projects for existing buildings involve three compon-
ents: the external structure, the internal equipment, and the renewable energy 
supply. With the exception of renewable energy use in existing buildings (which 
will be discussed in the next section on green energy), the external structure 
retrofits include external wall and roof insulation for improving thermal resist-
ance or heat storage capacity, and energy- efficient doors and windows with low- 
emissivity glass. For instance, the Action Plan for Urban Adaptation to Climate 
Change (released in 2013) proposed to accelerate the comprehensive transfor-
mation of aged residential buildings by improving the buildings’ air tightness 
and strengthening their performance in water collecting and heat insulation. 
Furthermore, the national plan also mentions raising the renovation standard of 
energy and water saving for existing buildings. Internal equipment retrofits can 
promote energy- saving products for HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air condi-
tioning), lighting, and operation controls such as Building Information Model-
ling (BIM) or energy monitoring systems (Li et al., 2017). Some related 
measures to renovate the existing buildings have been mentioned in the Energy 
Development Strategy Action Plan (2014–2020), such as promoting energy- 
efficient appliances and green lighting in existing buildings, and accelerating 
the transformation of existing buildings by the reform of heat metering and 
charging. Furthermore, energy efficiency improvements are expected to con-
tinue to increase as retrofits improve energy efficiency along with associated 
behavioural changes. Households will become increasingly aware of the eco-
nomic and environmental benefits of energy efficiency. There may also be 
positive reinforcement of energy- efficient behaviours based on the piloted Social 
Credit System, which can rate consumer behaviours based on data collected.
 There will also be continued technical support and financial incentives 
(including subsidies and green financial bonds) for retrofits of existing build-
ings that comply with increasingly stringent energy codes, especially in resi-
dential buildings in northern China and in public buildings nationwide (Yu, 
Evans, and Shi, 2015). The Regulation on Reward for Heat Supply Metering 
and Energy Conservation of Existing Residential Buildings in North Heating 
Areas (released in 2007) and the Regulation on Subsidy Funds for Energy- 
saving Renovation of Existing Residential Buildings in Hot Summer and Cold 
Winter Zone (in 2012) have stated that central finance allocate special funds 
or rewards to support energy saving in existing residential buildings in 
different climate zones, such as the northern and southern regions. More spe-
cifically, subsidies in Shanghai that were first provided in 2013 will continue 
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to support retrofits, renovations, and/or monitoring energy use in existing 
buildings over the next decade.
Green energy in the building sector and the electricity system
Green energy in thermal systems
The direction of this transition pathway highlights the potential for green 
energy sources – including CHP and large- scale boilers using natural gas and 
renewable energy – to reduce the need for grid- based energy supplies, which are 
still highly reliant on fossil fuels. Renewable energy can be used in various forms 
for thermal systems, such as capturing solar heat for space or water heating, 
using biomass for heating, and heat pumps that extract heat or cold from the 
ground (Casini, 2016). Additionally, buildings can be designed for natural 
ventilation.
 The 13th Five- Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development, issued by the 
National Development and Reform Commission in 2016, set up the target for 
all utilisation of renewable energy to reach 730 million tons of coal equivalent 
(TCE), and all renewable energy power generation capacity reaching 680 GW, 
by 2020. Among that, the heat collection area of solar thermal utilisation will 
reach 800 million square metres. By 2020, all forms of renewable energy heating 
and residential fuel use will replace 150 million TCE of fossil fuels. The 13th 
Five- Year Plan suggested expanding the use of solar thermal energy in urban and 
rural areas, actively promoting the development of solar heating technology, 
and accelerating biomass heating and other non- electricity resources such as 
geothermal energy for use in buildings.
 The National Plan of Heating in Winter in Northern Regions 2017–2021 
is a policy that promotes the green energy pathway for northern regions in 
China, where heating traditionally relied on coal- burning boilers in urban 
areas and small coal ovens in rural areas. The plan has required ‘2 + 26’ cities 
to replace coal- fired boilers with natural gas and electricity- powered heaters 
since 2018. (All the ‘2 + 26’ cities lie within the smog- plagued northern 
regions, the two cities being Beijing and Tianjin and the other 26 cities 
including Hebei, Henan, Shandong, and Shanxi Provinces. This plan also set 
up ambitious targets for clean heating: 50% by 2019 and 70% by 2021. By 
2019 clean heating rates in urban areas should reach 90%, fringe areas 70%, 
and rural areas 40%. By 2021, the clean heating rate in urban areas should 
reach 100% (removal of all coal- burning boilers less than 30 t/h), fringe areas 
80% (removal of coal boilers less than 20 t/h), and rural areas 60%. According 
to the statistics from the China Ministry of Environmental Protection, over 
4.7 million households in 21,516 villages in the inspected area have com-
pleted coal- to-gas or coal- to-electricity conversions, 3.94 million of which fin-
ished the replacement in 2018 (Xinhua, 2018).
 However, converting to electric heating will also need to be complemented 
with energy efficiency actions such as improving building insulation. Many 
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buildings in the peri- urban areas (e.g. fringe areas) have poor insulation per-
formance and the homes are often larger than city apartments. Heating in the 
peri- urban residential buildings should consume electricity five times more than 
the city. Additionally, the indoor temperature may not be comfortable for chil-
dren and the elderly. Greening the heating system needs to consider indoor 
comfort of inhabitants and their perceived norms, and should also be supple-
mented with actions from other components of the energy efficiency pathway 
and the electricity system supplying buildings.
Green electricity
Integrating renewable energy sources into buildings can transform the building 
sector from an energy consumer to a power generator that supplies energy to the 
grid (IEA, 2013). Renewable energy generated by the building itself, or from its 
surroundings, can be used to supply thermal and/or electrical energy where tech-
nically feasible and economically viable. For instance, electricity can be gener-
ated via photovoltaic (PV) systems and mini wind turbines on the roofs of 
certain buildings or in neighbourhoods. This could be used for water heating 
and powering heat pumps, and surplus electricity can be transferred to the 
power grid.
 The 13th Five- Year Plan will help to trigger the long- term development of 
decentralised renewable energy systems in buildings. By 2020 the building areas 
that allow for solar hot water installations should have increased to 30 million 
square metres of construction area, with heating from grounded- thermal supply-
ing 20 million square metres. This national target is enhanced in some cities, for 
instance in Beijing where buildings with renewable energy should account for 
16% of the city’s total buildings by 2020.
 In China, due to the limited roof access of residential apartments, the main 
focus of the renewable energy component of the pathway will be on installa-
tions in public and commercial buildings. Notice on Related Policies to Further 
Implement Distributed PV, released by the National Energy Administration in 
2014, encouraged the development of various forms of distributed photovoltaic 
power generation applications and making full use of qualified building roof 
(including affiliated free site) resources. Furthermore, local governments at all 
levels have been required to support the installation of PV power generation 
applications via financial subsidy policies, paying special attention to combing 
these projects with poverty alleviation to ensure an income increase of ¥3000 
per household per year in poor areas.
 In addition, micro- grid and renewable energy power projects have also been 
mentioned in 13th Five- Year Plan for Solar Power Development. It would be 
useful to construct micro grids for renewable energy in the areas where the dis-
tributed renewable energy penetration rate is higher and building conditions 
suitable for the utilisation of solar resources.
 Considering these components of energy efficiency in the building sector and 
promoting renewable energy in the building sector and the electricity system, 
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the next section will explore the potential barriers to promoting these compon-
ents as well as the possible unintended negative outcomes of these pathways.
Risk and uncertainty analysis
Stakeholders identified key risks and uncertainties associated with these green 
building transition pathways and their main components: energy efficiency for 
new green buildings, energy efficiency for retrofitting existing buildings, and 
renewable energy. Implementation risks and consequential risks are considered 
for each building category in the planning, design/construction, and operation 
phases, as well as for the renewable energy component of the pathway in the 
installation and operation phases (Figure 10.1).
Implementation risks (barriers)
Stakeholders identified several barriers that may occur before or during the 
transition process. These include risks from different areas such as incentive pol-
icies, regulations, application of energy- efficient technologies, economic factors 
(market pricing or financing), social factors (behaviour change), and environ-
mental factors. Different stakeholders attribute different levels of concern to 
these risks (Figure 10.2).
 For government stakeholders, the top implementation risks centre on the 
policies and technologies. They frequently brought up issues with the imple-
mentation of energy efficiency certification policies for operations. As of 2014 
there are roughly 1500 buildings in China certified by the Three Star System, 
out of which only 107 had the operation label (Li et al., 2014). In 2015, the 
operation labels only represented 4.4% of the total certified buildings in Shang-
hai (MCOHURDM, 2016). The growth of green buildings has largely been 
fuelled by government policies and targets (Kong et al., 2012), but the green 
building principle cannot be implemented as expected. The main barriers 
include both immature green certification and weak policy monitoring and 
enforcement for the operation of new buildings. The lack of policy incentives 
for the certificated operation label corresponds with a lack of leadership from 
the construction industry to meet the standards.
 The technological innovations to promote energy saving in the building 
sector primarily involve two aspects: enclosure structure (doors, windows, roofs, 
floors, and walls) and equipment systems (heating, cooling, lighting, ventila-
tion, and operation management optimisation). For the enclosure structure 
parts, stakeholders indicated that the technological innovation and application 
for enclosure structures, such as envelope materials and roofing insulation, did 
not consider local demands and energy efficiency goals. Technological innova-
tion should respect the environmental, social, and economic conditions in 
different local areas otherwise the benefits can be limited as the energy effi-
ciency technologies can increase the costs of construction while having limited 
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to improve energy efficiency because of the social habits of occupants. Also, in 
some cases, rather than taking a technological approach, similar impacts may be 
achieved through cheaper non- technical efforts, such as taking advantage of 
natural environments.
 Furthermore, other risks raised by stakeholders from governmental groups 
focused on behaviour lock- in, not only for the new building but also for retrofit-
ted buildings. New buildings in Shanghai mostly met energy efficiency codes; 
however, the city has seen a rapid growth in energy consumption of more than 
55% in 2016 due to huge economic development and improvements in living 
standards (especially building heating). Even though the building sector is tran-
sitioning towards green buildings, energy saving in the building sector is thought 
to be diluted by high- energy consumption behaviours. For instance, more and 
more residents in the Shanghai area are installing central air conditioning for 
heating and cooling in order to improve indoor comfort. Energy consumption 
for heating in southern areas is now increasing.
 For energy- efficient building retrofitting, the perception and acceptance of 
households also play very important roles in the process of a low- carbon trans-
ition. The 12th Five- Year Plan (from 2011 to 2015) specified that the northern 
district should carry out ‘heating management’. Heating management includes 
indoor temperature control and installing net metering in existing residential 
buildings to promote energy saving in an area of more than 400 million square 
metres. However, the achievements of retrofitting projects have differed among 
the different climate zones. The target had been almost overachieved in 
advance in northern areas – 750 million square metres of housing in the north-
ern heating zone has been retrofitted since the end of 2014. However, in con-
trast with the northern district, retrofits of existing buildings in southern areas 
has been hindered by several complicated factors. The energy- saving retrofits of 
existing buildings in these districts are still maintained in the small- scale pilot 
phases of large public buildings, especially retrofits of external walls’ insulation 
membranes and coatings.
 Furthermore, regarding the barriers to renewable energy installations, some 
stakeholders from the general public had a low acceptance of renewable energy 
installations. However, subsidies for solar PV installations have been provided 
by national, municipal, and district level government respectively, providing a 
subsidy of more than ¥1 per kilowatt hour in Beijing. Under these incentives, 
the benefits are being recognised by the public. Each solar power installation 
project is required to operate for at least five years (from 2015 to 2019) in 
Beijing. Participants in these projects include not only distributed generation 
companies but also households. Some households involved in this project con-
sidered that the cost would be recouped in ten years through governmental sub-
sidies, self- consumption, and selling excess electricity not consumed in the 
household to the grid.
 For government stakeholders, the economic and financing risks are related to 
energy efficiency of retrofitted buildings. The retrofits of existing buildings 
mainly refer to buildings built before the year 2000 which cannot meet the 
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current energy efficiency standard. In 2015 there were almost 60 billion square 
metres of existing buildings in China, and less than 10% are rated as an energy 
efficient building. Residential energy efficient buildings accounted for 23.1% of 
existing build area of all types (Lu et al., 2018). Residential buildings in Shang-
hai have exceeded 600 million square metres, with about 200 million square 
metres of them built before 2000 and more than 5.5 million households living 
there. Residential buildings aged over 50 years have reached 14.77 million 
square metres. Thus, the investment necessary for retrofitting existing building 
is very high and will rely on the participation of many stakeholder groups from 
both the market and the public sector. However, stakeholders representing the 
general public and construction markets perceived low benefits or returns in 
their expectations for investments in green buildings and showed a lack of will-
ingness to participate in the retrofitting projects.
 Stakeholders indicated that changing coal- fired boilers to electric power or 
natural gas heaters would not lead to reductions in carbon emissions. They also 
suggested that behaviour change needs to be consider in order to reduce energy 
consumption and decarbonise the electricity system. For instance, China’s 
smog- plagued northern regions have been replacing coal- fired boilers with 
natural gas and electricity- powered heaters. Over 4.7 million households in 
21,516 villages in the inspected area have completed coal- to-gas or coal- to-
electricity conversion, 3.94 million of which finished the switch in 2018, 
according to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Bo, 2018). The pro-
gramme, as discussed earlier, is mainly implemented in the rural area of north-
ern China, including the 2 + 26 cities. Experts warned that if coal- fired boilers 
are simply replaced with electricity- powered heaters, there may be no energy 
saving because over 70% of electricity is generated from coal and the efficiency 
of coal- burning power generation is less than 40%. Better alternatives would 
include heat pumps. Clean heating with gas, electricity, clean coal, and renew-
able energy including biomass, wind, solar, etc. cover about 34% of the total 
built area now; however, completing this transition is a great challenge for 
China, especially in rural areas. Beijing and Tianjin have almost completed 
their transitions, but other cities may have difficulties.
Consequential risks (negative impacts) and uncertainties
A low- carbon transition in the building sector may bring unintended negative 
impacts on economic efficiency, social development, technological innovation, 
and environmental sustainability. All are risks related to energy efficiency and 
renewable energy components of the green building pathway (Figure 10.3). 
There are fewer consequential risks identified compared to implementation 
risks, since many of the negative impacts are not yet known for these relatively 
new energy initiatives in the building sector.
 Stakeholder concern is mainly focused on potential negative impacts on eco-
nomic and social factors, along with environmental conditions. Stakeholders 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































increasing land demands and increasing living costs associated with increasing 
green buildings to cater for the growing urban population. Even though build-
ings are becoming greener, increasing urbanisation may trigger an influx of 
energy consumption in the building sector (Kim and Jeong, 2018). Furthermore, 
the construction cost of green buildings can drive up the price of real estate, 
which forces urban residents to suffer from increasing living costs and may result 
in social inequality or climate poverty such as ‘green gentrification’ in the 
process of urban renewal. Furthermore, the cost of retrofitting of around US$30 
per square metre would be subsided by the central and local governmental 
funding in northern areas. Without abundant policy support, residents in 
southern areas may need to pay for part of this cost due to lack of subsidies and 
support from local governments, which may also increase their living costs.
 However, regarding the risks related to social justice and climate poverty, 
some stakeholders and experts have suggested that proper institutional arrange-
ments and social welfare policies, such as public rental housing for urban 
poverty, could offset the negative impacts of the low- carbon transition pathway.
 Energy efficiency efforts generally help to improve thermal insulation 
through the transformation of the external envelope, reducing power consump-
tion by air conditioning use in summer and electric heat in winter. However, 
residents in southern areas have entrenched behaviours that reduce the impact 
of energy efficiency behaviour. For instance, in Shanghai and other southern 
areas with a humid climate, residents often keep their window open in all 
seasons. In this case, retrofits of thermal insulation have very limited impact.
 The main uncertainties raised by the stakeholders derived from the environ-
mental cluster. For instance, intermittency of renewable energy supply for 
heating and cooling can lower resilience to heat waves or cold spells. Stake-
holders also raised climate exposure for green building technologies and renew-
able energy installations, and increasing climate vulnerability (e.g. cutting off 
heating/cooling systems to reduce energy consumption). In addition, some 
stakeholders from the construction markets mentioned there was an uncertain 
shift for employment in the building sector due to shrinking profits in the con-
struction industries, resulting from the higher costs of innovation, prefabricated 
technologies, and applying Building Information Modelling (BIM) systems.
 Both implementation and consequential risks in the green building transition 
pathways highlight some of the challenges linked to the application of energy 
efficiency measures and new green technologies that could have adverse social- 
economic as well as environmental impacts. The next section synthesises our 
findings.
Conclusions
The proposed low- carbon transition pathway in China’s green building sector 
emphasises the present policy ambition to scale up green buildings through 
increasing energy efficiency and promoting renewable energy in buildings. The 
pathway considers the existing energy policies and urbanisation strategies in 
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China, and explores the risks and uncertainties in the green building transition 
pathway, drawing on examples from cities in northern and southern climatic 
regions.
 Implementation risks identified differed according to stakeholders’ perspectives, 
from governments, construction firms, public residents, and the area experts. That 
said that implementation risks are mainly derived from four clusters including: 
policies, technology innovation, financing, and energy consumption behaviour. In 
the low- carbon building pathways, the stakeholders highlighted the lack of pol-
icies for green building operation and financial policies to incentivise renewable- 
energy use as a priority risk. However, the locked- in behaviour of building end 
users and technological innovation would be the main barriers in the future trans-
itions of green new buildings and retrofitting buildings.
 Stakeholders also mentioned that energy- efficient building technologies for 
the enclosure structure and equipment systems did not often consider local 
needs to control indoor temperature based on the local climate zone. Energy 
efficiency measures in northern regions, which has relatively dry cold and hot 
conditions, cannot be directly replicated in the more humid southern regions 
where building require additional ventilation.
 Aside from different user needs, awareness of cost–benefit analysis for green 
buildings is still weak in the design of Chinese buildings. Besides this, stake-
holders from the government and public groups considered that the efficiency of 
equipment systems still suffer from a lack of innovation. This especially applies 
to passive energy- saving technology and heating (air conditioning) systems 
based on the full use of renewable energy such as solar and wind (Zhang, Kang, 
and Jin, 2018). For instance, most buildings still rely on air conditioning for 
cooling, but buildings can be more effectively designed to keep cool by natural 
winds. Stakeholders indicated that the technological innovation in equipment 
systems (heating or cooling) needs to move forward in this direction.
 Furthermore, the consequential risks considered by stakeholders mainly 
focused on economic and environmental impacts from the low- carbon trans-
ition process. They especially highlighted how the potential cost burdens of 
green building may play a negative role on social and economic development, 
such as increasing unemployment and inequality. In addition, stakeholders were 
concerned that green building developments that do not allow user control 
could also reduce the environmental benefits. The scaling up of building devel-
opment could place pressure on land use in the transition process.
 Regarding uncertainties, stakeholders argued more about the impact of 
increasing climate change and extreme climate events such as heat waves and 
floods on urban environments. Even though we still cannot be sure if climate 
shocks will bring negative impacts on a low- carbon transition in the building 
sector, stakeholders still mentioned the potential possibility of increasing expo-
sure of renewable energy installations under climate shock. There were also 
some uncertainties which prevented market participation, due to perceived 
investment risks in green buildings and the low acceptance and awareness of 
green buildings.
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 Even though mixed quantitative and qualitative methods have been applied 
in this research, the outcomes have been limited by missing data for some of the 
target areas, such as Shanghai and other cities in southern areas. This may 
create barriers to the comparative analysis of transition risks and uncertainties 
among different climate zones. Currently there are overarching energy efficiency 
objectives at the national level, and some city- level energy efficiency initiatives 
in Beijing and Shanghai, but limited guidance on energy efficiency actions in 
different climate zones. The preferences and indoor behaviour of stakeholders 
are not well understood at the higher policy levels, thus a ‘blanket’ approach is 
taken to address energy efficiency issues in the same manner in all regions. More 
time needs to be taken to understand buildings’ end users in different climatic 
zones and to design policies that reflect the different conditions and behaviour 
in order to maximise the impact of energy efficiency measures. Overall, this 
research has listed and discussed certain implemental and consequential risks in 
the green transition, but there is still uncertainty about what the priority risks 
are that need to be addressed in the present and future green transition.
 There were some limitations to this study, as the risk and uncertainties assess-
ment assumed that there were no drastic changes in the political environment 
and regulations. Stakeholders did not make reference to the impacts of political 
factors on green transitions. This could be due to the fact that China’s political 
system has been stable over past decades and there has been strong policy 
support from the central government to push forward decarbonisation efforts. 
However, there are still uncertainties linked to how provincial government may 
implement national policies considering the varied socio- economic conditions 
and institutional capacity across provinces.
 Moving forward, there are synergies linked with promoting energy efficiency 
pathways and addressing broader environmental initiatives and challenges. For 
instance, energy efficiency efforts can be promoted to reduce air pollution in 
Chinese cities. Air pollution is linked to emissions from energy generation and 
consumption for both private and industrial uses. Decarbonising the energy 
systems and improving energy efficiency in the energy system, as well as the trans-
port sector, will therefore also lead to reducing air pollutants in cities. Addition-
ally, China’s Nationally Determined Contributions for the Paris Agreement 
specifically promote a ‘low- carbon way of life’ through behavioural changes that 
are directed at society and public institutions. Changes can occur through educat-
ing citizens to have more green, sustainable, and healthy ways of life, along with 
promoting low- carbon consumption patterns. Public institutions, including gov-
ernment buildings, hospitals, higher education campuses, and military buildings, 
are to take lead on promoting low- carbon initiatives and reducing waste.
 This chapter introduces key elements to understand China’s low- carbon 
transition trajectory. However, there are other related but hidden drivers of 
China’s low- carbon transition, such as technology transfers from other advanced 
economies, which in turn created a wave of technological start- ups. For 
instance, local governments and fierce competition among regions created 
business- friendly environments driving the rise of the PV industry.
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Introduction
At both the community and the member state level, the European Union (EU) 
has committed to actions focusing on enhancing energy efficiency in pursuit of 
mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and enhancing security of energy 
supply and socio- economic sustainability. Drawing from its respective national 
commitments as well as the need to respond to the European and global efforts 
on climate change, Greece too has recently been striving to design and imple-
ment an effective and sustainable energy efficiency policy framework.
 These efforts have been a dynamic learning process through which the policy 
framework is redesigned along the way. Such a framework encompasses policy 
instruments, measures, and interventions, including financial incentives and tax 
breaks, in the energy efficiency area. These actions primarily regard the built 
environment but to some extent are also focused on the energy efficiency of the 
transport sector. At the same time, since energy efficiency programmes in the 
building sector also include initiatives for residential micro- generation from 
renewable sources, this framework has implications for energy policy and is syner-
gistic with further diffusion of renewables. So far, the policy framework has been 
oriented towards financial incentives for the diffusion of renewable energy as well 
as a building renovation strategy across all scales: residential, public, and private.
 In respect to progress in implementing the Energy Efficiency Directive, 
Greece, among other countries (Fawcett, Rosenow, and Bertoldi, 2017), appears 
to be on track to achieving its energy efficiency goals of 20%; it does, however, 
lag behind its goals in respect to achieving new savings of 1.5% of the annual 
energy sales to final consumers every year until 2020 (Nikas, Ntanos, and 
Doukas, n.d.). On the renewable energy front, the country appears not to be on 
track either (Capros et al., 2016), with respect to achieving the Community- set 
Greece  181
target of 18% (Directive 2009/28/EC), which has since been amended to 20% 
in the more ambitious Greek legislation (Law 3851/2010). This has implications 
for energy efficiency in buildings since various energy- efficient actions are 
focused on electricity generation from building- integrated photovoltaics (PVs). 
According to the European Commission’s annual progress reports, there is a 
significant divergence between the intermediate targets and the actual achieved 
savings, resulting from the inadequate implementation of poorly designed previ-
ously proposed actions. In fact, the latest official Greek report acknowledges the 
socio- technical infeasibility to meet the predefined objectives, with an expected 
gap of 35% (1176 kTOE) of the overall energy savings target by 2020 (Ministry 
of Environment and Energy, 2017).
 It is noteworthy that, despite the reported progress, there exists large poten-
tial for improving energy efficiency in the country. The building sector, in par-
ticular, has significant room for decarbonisation as 25–30% of the final energy is 
consumed in the residential sector (Centre for Renewable Energy Sources and 
Saving, 2015). Considering the current building stock has predominantly poor 
energy performance, with about six out of ten buildings having been constructed 
before 1980 (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2011), it is consequently in need of 
immediate renovations. The same can be said of the transport sector, with a 
share in final energy consumption of about 35% during the last decade, accord-
ing to the International Energy Agency, and a 15- to 20-year old transport fleet 
(Tsita and Pilavachi, 2017).
 Given this potential, it is evident that current difficulties in delivering on 
the national energy- efficiency commitments can, at least in part, be attributed 
to the underlying risks and uncertainties that essentially did not allow for the 
successful implementation of the policy framework. At the same time, there has 
been little provision for potential negative outcomes of relevant policies, 
thereby allowing adverse consequences to manifest. For example, despite their 
positive impacts (HELAPCO, 2016), policies aimed at further developing the 
solar power sector have had detrimental economic side effects (Tselepis, 2015) 
and a series of amending regulatory efforts have created an uncertain invest-
ment environment in the energy front.
 Until recently, the national policy framework on energy efficiency has com-
prised actions, incentives, and interventions, the design of which had been based 
on quantitative modelling exercises. By looking at the inadequacy of this frame-
work, as reported in the latest national energy efficiency action plan (Ministry of 
Environment and Energy, 2017), it seems that scientific and policymaking pro-
cesses have ignored a number of implementation risks and uncertainties. They 
have also failed to foresee the manifestation of negative consequences resulting 
from the policy framework’s implementation. These risks and uncertainties, if 
overlooked, could jeopardise both the national energy efficiency framework 
towards 2030 and overall efforts towards long- term decarbonisation. Con-
sequently, the resulting failure to accomplish the near- term energy efficiency 
national goals raises questions, not only about the country’s capacity to realise 
long- term decarbonisation visions, but also about the existence of such visions. In 
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this context, it is necessary to carefully examine the risks and uncertainties before 
reviewing and redesigning the strategies to contribute to a sustainable transition 
pathway in both the near and the longer term.
 The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to discuss underlying uncertainties and 
risks threatening the transition to an energy- efficient Greek economy. We focus 
mainly on the built environment yet with some implications for transportation 
and power generation. Such a transition prospectively looks at a future Greek 
building stock consisting of near- zero-energy buildings in the residential, 
private, and public sectors, with autonomy- oriented infrastructure, based on 
decentralised power (micro-)generation and electricity storage technologies. 
Acknowledging their capacity to help identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
current and future policy frameworks (Nikas et al., 2017), this discussion is 
carried out from a stakeholders’ point of view, focusing on the risk and uncer-
tainty dimension. This includes the potential negative effects of these strategies 
as well as the perceived barriers that may hinder the successful uptake of energy 
efficiency measures, both in the short and longer term.
 The following section features a discussion of the context of the study, high-
lighting the uncertain environment characterising the Greek case. Then, the 
immediate implementation risks that jeopardise effective uptake of near- term 
policy instruments are discussed, followed by an analysis of how stakeholders 
perceive both implementation and consequential risks associated with a trans-
ition over the longer term. Finally, the conclusions of the chapter are presented, 
in addition to the limitations and future prospects of this study.
Research process and methods
For the purposes of exploring policy strategies for meeting near- term energy effi-
ciency targets, the most critical implementation risks were identified in a 
meeting with experts from the Ministry of Environment and Energy, during 
which the above uncertainties were extensively discussed. Subsequently, a 
number of policy instruments found in the latest National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plans (NEEAPs) of Greece were evaluated by means of a multi- criteria 
group decision- making (MCGDM) methodology. In a series of interviews, seven 
stakeholders from the ministry were asked to assess the vulnerability of each of 
the policy measures against the identified risks and, based on their input, the 
MACE- DSS tool (Nikas et al., 2018) was used to rank the policy instruments in 
terms of risk vulnerability. This approach, (similarly to Doukas, Karakosta, and 
Psarras, 2009), gave us a good overview of how key experts from the ministry 
view the proposed measures, in respect to the actual capacity of the country to 
implement them. The analysis was used to complement a portfolio analysis 
(PA) approach for determining the optimal near- term policy mix, the findings 
of which are also discussed.
 When considering a low- carbon transition over the longer term, experts are 
able to identify a different, richer set of risks. From this perspective, a policy 
strategy aiming to promote a pathway is not only prone to implementation risks 
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but may also lead to foreseeable negative outcomes (consequential risks). Using 
the same MCGDM methodology, a different, more diverse group of ten stake-
holders was interviewed in order to elicit their knowledge and assess the risks 
themselves, this time against specific evaluation criteria. The engaged expert 
group comprised of three policymakers from the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy (also included in the first stakeholder engagement process), two research-
ers, one representative of the financial sector, one representative of electric utili-
ties and regulators, one member of associations involved in the provision of GHG 
emissions, and two technology suppliers (including manufacturers and importers). 
This process gave us a good overview of how different experts perceive the under-
lying implementation and consequential risks, providing us with insights into 
which of these risks appear to be more critical for the successful promotion of a 
sustainable transition pathway. Furthermore, this analysis was used to complement 
a fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) approach (Nikas and Doukas, 2016) for deter-
mining, from the experts’ perspective, the policy focus that appears to be most 
robust, the findings of which are also discussed.
Context: an uncertain environment
The policy framework in Greece is uncertain per se: an overview of the past 
pathway indicates that, as far as energy efficiency is concerned, the country has 
seen significant delays in adopting European directives into the national policy 
framework. After the early determination of thermal insulation requirements for 
buildings in 1979, the first notable policy in the country was the late adoption of 
the 1993 EU directive on limiting carbon emissions by improving energy efficiency 
(in 1998). Respectively, National Law 3661/2008 brought Directive 2002/91/EC 
into effect by defining minimum energy performance requirements, introducing 
energy performance certificates and referring to qualified and accredited energy 
inspectors. It was amended in 2010 so as to provide for the gradual implementa-
tion of energy management systems in all public buildings. Although the adoption 
of the Regulation on the Energy Performance of Buildings (KENAK) in 2010 is 
considered to have set a milestone in national energy efficiency policy – and has 
since been updated based on European regulatory advancements – it was the 
belated Law 4342/2015 that adopted the Union’s 2020 objectives (Directive 
2012/27/EU). This record of significant delays in adopting European directives 
into the national policy framework can itself be considered as an uncertainty for 
future developments in both energy and climate policy.
 On the micro- generation front, which could prove instrumental in accom-
plishing renewable energy targets and is included in energy efficiency improve-
ment programmes, large investments took place in a period of strong fiscal 
incentives for boosting solar power development (2008–2012). This eventually 
led to an excessive burden on the operator. Due to the ever- growing deficit, the 
government proceeded with a 12.5% cut in the support scheme for solar instal-
lations commissioned after February 2012 and a larger (44%) cut on feed- in 
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tariff (FIT) rates for solar PV plants installed after January 2013. In fact, it was 
only the attractive FIT contracts still in effect that sustained the momentum of 
solar power growth in 2013, despite the economic recession and the unfavoura-
ble changes to the incentive system. The latter, in combination with a freeze on 
the receipt and processing of new solar power investment applications between 
August 2012 and April 2014 as well as an unexpected shift towards new lignite- 
fired plants, constitute the background to an ever- changing regulatory environ-
ment and the consequent caution and mistrust in the policy framework.
 Moreover, public perception of climate change and the urgency of the need 
to mitigate its impacts also appears to change in a period of economic crisis. In 
particular, Greek citizens seem to perceive the problems associated with climate 
change as a matter of priority. The vast majority of the Greek people are aware 
of environmental problems and, at the break of the recession, considered 
climate change as the ultimate global problem (European Commission, 2008). 
However, five years later, trends were reversed as poverty and the economic 
situation dramatically gained on climate change in terms of prioritisation (Euro-
pean Commission, 2013). At the same time, citizens now appear to have very 
low confidence in authorities and big enterprises with regard to their capacity 
and willingness to deal with climate change (Papoulis et al., 2015). Uncertain 
societal cohesion adds to the already volatile context of Greek efforts towards 
energy efficiency and decarbonisation, since a lack of public acceptance could 
potentially halt the introduction and diffusion of technically and economically 
feasible technological options, as well as the successful implementation of other-
wise prominent policy instruments. Especially with regard to enhancing energy 
efficiency in the residential and commercial sectors, many of the measures con-
sidered depend on behavioural change and rely heavily on initiatives that deci-
sion makers, at the small scale, are free to implement or disregard.
 Last but certainly not least, Greece also faces challenges and respective 
uncertainties in the political and economic areas, with impacts on the energy 
front (Doukas et al., 2014). It is a country hit hard by the 2008 crisis, which led 
to a cumulative output loss of 30% since the beginning of the recession, 45% of 
the population living below the poverty line (when considering a poverty 
threshold anchored to 2008 in real terms), and consequent inequality and 
decline in average living standards. This has implications for long- lasting soci-
etal consequences (Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2018). As a result, Greece also 
went through significant political instability and is still mired in a crisis of polit-
ical representation (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2018). A by- product of this 
instability was an unexpected approval of the construction of new lignite- fired 
power plants, namely Ptolemaida V and Meliti II, of combined capacity of more 
than 1 GW (Simoglou et al., 2018), giving rise to doubts about how determined 
the Greek government is to actually deliver on its energy and climate 
commitments.
 Based on these conditions, many critical questions emerge. Will Greece be 
politically and financially capable of incentivising near- term advancements and 
long- term transitions? Even if this is the case, will citizens have the economic 
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capacity and adequate trust in the stability of the policy framework to take 
advantage of the support mechanisms? It is evident that these uncertainties can 
foster the manifestation of severe implementation risks to any policy framework, 
or allow for negative consequences of the latter to realise.
Challenges in the short to medium term
In light of the country’s near- term energy efficiency commitments, experts from 
the Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy were mostly interested in exog-
enous factors that pose challenges to the successful implementation of a new 
policy framework, i.e. implementation risks. This can mainly be attributed to 
the fact that the time horizon discussed, i.e. 3–10 years, was not perceived to be 
long enough to accommodate a reliable evaluation of negative consequences.
 Ministry experts agreed that a significant challenge for any strategy oriented on 
enhancing energy efficiency in Greece lies in public perception. Citizens must, 
first and foremost, comprehend the benefits of sustainable energy use; this has not 
been done successfully in the past, and this type of limited awareness threatens 
the implementation of respective measures in the residential sector, which covers 
about 79% of the national building stock (Gaglia et al., 2017). There appears to 
be a cognitive trade- off between the benefits of adopting a sustainable energy 
behaviour and a household’s trust in a consistent and rewarding regulatory 
environment, i.e. in the government’s ability to maintain a stable regulatory 
framework that compensates citizens for taking up energy efficiency measures. 
Despite this, compared to other possible actions, energy- efficient housing- related 
subsidies and policy instruments (and, therefore, any initiative aiming at the resi-
dential sector) currently present the highest level of satisfaction, and are thus not 
considered a priority for the state to do more (Zerva et al., 2018).
 Lessons from failures of the past, such as the first ‘Save Energy at Home’ 
financial mechanism for residences, must be used to optimally design future 
financial support schemes. So far, financial institutions, with an established role 
as the broker, have not properly supported the processes, adding to the already 
overburdened bureaucracy associated with applications for such programmes. 
Due to the adverse economic environment, the banking sector is also seen to be 
inadequate in promoting energy- efficiency-targeted renovations from a financial 
capacity point of view.
 Along the same lines, experts collectively pointed out the current difficulty 
for the vast majority of the population of investing in building renovations, let 
alone in constructing near- zero-energy buildings. The construction sector has 
almost completely shut down due to the ongoing recession, as well as the severe 
tax burdens imposed in the context of austerity. In fact, these burdens appear to 
be among the few constant regulatory priorities throughout this period, which 
are described by experts as politically unstable, to a point that they can severely 
jeopardise the consistent implementation of the energy efficiency policy frame-
work. Some experts, in particular, suggested that policymaking per se has lately 
been carried out recklessly, without looking far ahead, and almost exclusively in 
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compliance with the austerity- driven financial commitments of the country. 
This is an interesting suggestion, coming from the policymaking stakeholder 
group. Eventually, this gives rise to the risk of a regulatory framework that is too 
demanding in relation to the maturity of the market and does not successfully 
attract investments.
 Most measures in the past focused on energy efficiency in public buildings, 
for both central government and local authorities and municipalities. Although 
this is not generally perceived as an example of poor prioritisation, the risk of 
not managing to align the interests of local governments with the national com-
mitments and directions should be acknowledged. A recent example can be 
found in the issuing of Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs), where no co- 
ordination actions among stakeholders and/or between the central and local 
governments reportedly took place to ensure coherent and transparent imple-
mentation (Spyridaki et al., 2016).
 Ultimately, in order to take proper mitigation action, it is important to 
understand the risks associated with the individual policy instruments con-
sidered by the ministry for its previous and new Energy Efficiency Action Plans 
(Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2014, 2017) – see Table 11.1. These 
included: the ‘Save Energy at Home II’ financial programme for incentivising 
energy upgrade actions in the broader residential sector; the energy upgrade pro-
gramme for public buildings, with regard to building shells, lighting, and build-
ing energy management systems (BEMS); energy efficiency and demonstration 
projects for small- medium enterprises (SMEs); the implementation of an energy 
management system in the broader public building sector, in accordance with 
the ISO 50001 standard; an interest rate subsidy for funding energy improve-
ment actions in commercial buildings, through energy service companies 
(ESCOs); a wide- scale deployment of smart metering systems; a series of large- 
scale environmental infrastructure projects and other interventions at the 
national level, as part of the operational programme Environment and Sustain-
able Development (OPESD); the offset of fines on illegal residential buildings 
with costs for services, tasks, and materials used for the energy upgrade of these 
buildings; the definition of energy management duties and the implementation 
of action plans in municipal buildings; the extension of the district heating net-
works from the integrated expansion of the Ptolemaida and Amyntaio network, 
as well as the planned expansions of the Florina and Kozani district heating net-
works; the replacement of old public and private light trucks; incentives for the 
replacement of old private passenger vehicles; a retrofitting programme for street 
lighting; financial support for retrofitting pumping systems at the municipal 
level; and dissemination activities for behavioural change oriented on the bene-
fits of EPCs.
 Eight specific implementation risks are associated with one, several, or all of 
the policy instruments. These included: the inability of local governments to 
align their priorities with the obligations of the central government; political 
instability; complex bureaucratic processes; demanding regulatory framework in 
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acceptance; inexperienced personnel and lack of technical skills; and unfavour-
able market conditions. They can be distinguished as primary and secondary risks.
 The most critical risk appears to lie in the complexity of bureaucratic proced-
ures necessary to approve, apply for, and secure funding for or implement most 
of the considered policy instruments. The most interesting observation is that 
this risk appears to be the most critical among all eight risks not only for the 
policies targeted at the residential and commercial sectors, but also for some of 
those involving responsibilities of and actions by the central government and 
local authorities. It is also noteworthy that, especially with regard to the latter, 
experts appear to stress the importance of transparent and effective communica-
tion and co- ordination between the central and local governments for almost 
all policy instruments acting at the municipal level.
 Risks of a financial nature, namely the inadequacies of the involved financial 
institutions (banks) to support renovation actions and the unfavourable eco-
nomic environment, can also prove critical to successfully implementing policy 
instruments targeted at the residential and commercial sectors. Inexperienced 
personnel and poor technical skills required at all stages of renovation work is 
another crucial risk. Interestingly, this was considered not only to potentially 
hinder the successful installation and management of BEMS in public buildings, 
but also to constitute a barrier to the successful communication of the benefits 
of energy efficiency actions to citizens.
 Among the remaining implementation risks, political instability was not 
considered among the most critical for any of the 15 measures. This can in part 
be attributed to the fact that any turbulence in the political scene may be con-
sidered to be reflected in societal acceptance, given the short time horizon and 
the equally limited time and capacity to drastically change the regulatory 
framework.
 The most ‘at risk’ policy instruments appear to be the offsetting of fines on 
illegal buildings with energy efficiency- related interventions, and the replace-
ment of old private passenger vehicles. These are closely followed by: the imple-
mentation of the OPESD programme; the energy upgrade of buildings in the 
broader (central and municipal) public sector; and the appointment of energy 
managers in public buildings. In other words, stakeholders appeared to view pol-
icies targeted at the residential sector as more vulnerable to existing implemen-
tation risks. This is mainly because of the complexity of the associated 
bureaucratic processes and the adverse economic conditions, followed by policy 
instruments targeting buildings of the broader public sector and especially those 
at the municipal level (Doukas and Nikas, 2019).
 This is also why only one of these highly vulnerable instruments among the 
measures, namely appointing energy managers at the municipal level, appears to 
be beneficial to achieving near- term energy savings, in an approach aiming to 
both maximise cost effectiveness and minimise risk. Aside from this risky instru-
ment, the other two most beneficial instruments were found to be the ‘Save 
Energy at Home II’ programme and the energy efficiency and demonstration 
projects in SMEs. It is also worth to note that a policy portfolio mainly 
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 comprising these three instruments targets all sectors (residential, commercial, 
and public). Other instruments found to appear in the most robust portfolios 
include the deployment of smart metering systems and the promotion of EPC 
benefits at the residential sector, as well as the retrofits of street lighting and 
pump stations at the municipal level (Forouli et al., 2019). Regarding the wide- 
scale deployment of smart meters, although not as cost, energy, or risk efficient 
as other instruments considered, they were included in the resulting optimal 
policy mixes as a fixed budget has been secured by the Hellenic Electricity Dis-
tribution Network Operator exclusively for this instrument.
Challenges, opportunities and risks in the longer term
All stakeholders acknowledged that the Greek building sector is the sector with 
the largest potential for easy- to-implement improvements in energy consump-
tion, along with power generation. For a country with Greece’s potential for 
solar and thermal solar system exports, there are many opportunities in promot-
ing solar heating and cooling systems. Rational energy use is also based on the 
installation and management of optimised BEMSs, replacement of old devices 
and motors of low energy performance, investments in building shells and insu-
lation, diffusion of other renewable energy sources in the built environment (e.g. 
geothermal power), and wide- scale development of building- integrated photo-
voltaics, which constitute both available and efficient technological solutions 
but are expensive. Especially in the Greek islands, where demand varies signifi-
cantly throughout the year, use of large solar power storage batteries could 
potentially help overcome the current challenges in promoting sustainable 
energy without heavy investments in linking the mainland and non- 
interconnected networks or new power plants.
 This sectoral preference, however, is concerned not only with energy effi-
ciency but also with the vision of the overall Greek low- carbon transition in 
general. This can be partly explained by the perceived infrastructural challenges 
associated with the transformation of the transport sector; the limited financial 
capacity to invest in decarbonising practices in either an otherwise small heavy 
industrial sector or a practically non- existent light industrial sector, with negli-
gible potential for emission reductions; and the limited interest from those 
involved in the agricultural sector.
Implementation risks
Stakeholders agreed on ten major implementation risks with regard to existing 
barriers posing direct or indirect threats to the successful design, funding, and 
implementation of a sustainable and effective energy efficiency policy frame-
work. On the social axis, stakeholders considered that societal participation is 
the major barrier to achieving an energy- efficient economy; however, they dis-
associated the lack of public awareness from distrust of government or institutions 
and respective societal opposition. From a political perspective, instability in the 
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Greek political scene appears to be a severe implementation risk. This is prim-
arily seen as a short- term risk; however, it is also associated with longer- term 
uncertainties, such as the economic environment. This instability is also 
reflected in recent high abstention levels, frequent movements of members of 
parliament among elected parties, an inability to form single- party governments, 
as well as the weak ruling of coalition governments and a record of snap elec-
tions. In the longer run, the main concern of stakeholders appears to be the poor 
prioritisation of climatic change and action, and political inertia. Amidst the ongoing 
economic crisis, and in light of the respective national commitments, all polit-
ical parties’ priorities are perceived to be mainly of socio- economic nature and 
to orient on addressing the recession, rather than climate change mitigation and 
sustainable energy use. This is why policymaking in Greece is believed to focus 
on a short- term perspective without a clear and solid strategy, mainly driven by 
commitments to the austerity- oriented memoranda.
 With regard to the Greek economy, all stakeholders are significantly con-
cerned with the adverse economic environment in Greece and the respective 
lack of financial capacity. This began with the difficulties in overcoming what 
appeared to be a short- term recession at a global scale but is still in effect and is 
estimated to have long- lasting economic implications for the average Greek 
household. This concern refers not only to the capacity of the state to incentiv-
ise a low- carbon transition in the longer run, but also to the capacity of citizens 
to make use of available incentives and invest in energy upgrades for their 
dwellings. Additionally, this particular implementation risk is even more com-
plicated in the context of the built environment since the economic situation is 
also a key driving force for the construction sector.
 When looking at the transition pathway itself, rather than a number of 
policy strategies designed specifically with the aim of promoting such a pathway, 
stakeholders are also concerned with the possibility of a general lack of economic 
incentives, subsidies, and tax breaks. The latter, however, is deemed to be of lower 
importance since incentives and other financial mechanisms are considered 
primarily dependent on the will, determination, and financial capacity of the 
government, rather than on a multitude of exogenous factors. It is noteworthy 
that the three engaged policymakers almost rejected the possibility of lack of 
economic incentives actually happening and found its potential impact on the 
pathway negligible. This was not the case with a perceived probable continu-
ation of the economic recession and the consequent lack of financial capacity.
 From a regulatory perspective, the main reservations regarded the fuzziness/
complexity of the regulatory and policy framework. This is closely related to the 
instability of the political scene, but mostly reflects an ever- changing frame-
work as a result of the deficit- amending modifications and the hitherto short- 
term nature of energy and climate action planning. What appeared to matter 
equally as much to stakeholders, in terms of severity and impact on the trans-
ition pathway, is the inherent bureaucracy of the processes necessary for incen-
tive programme applications, energy upgrade certifications, etc. However, 
complicated bureaucratic processes appear to be more critical, given that all 
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stakeholders deem that the capacity to mitigate their impacts is significantly 
better when compared to a fuzzy regulatory framework. This is why, with the 
exception of the representatives of the research community and of electric util-
ities, all stakeholder groups appeared to be significantly more concerned with 
regulatory bureaucracy than fuzziness.
 On the technological axis, the main concerns expressed revolved around the 
current lack of storage technologies; poorly equipped, inexperienced personnel; and 
geographic barriers. The latter include difficulties in implementing actions in city 
centres, as well as poor infrastructure risks such as the saturation and security 
level of the power grid and the absence of interconnections necessary for proper 
penetration of renewables in the built environment.
 Other implementation risks were only mentioned once or twice and as insig-
nificant. These include the inadequacy of business models for the residential 
sector, plus the limited liberalisation of the internal electricity market and 
respective operators. An interesting example lies in the limited reference to the 
ageing Greek building stock, which could be considered either as a risk hinder-
ing the diffusion of energy- efficient technologies or overburdening the trans-
formation costs, or as an opportunity for the success of the transition pathway 
(given the large underlying potential), depending on the perspective.
 The identified implementation risks can also have synergistic effects. For 
example, poor prioritisation of climatic change and action, political instability, 
and frequent changes to a consequently fuzzy regulatory environment can all be 
intertwined, as well as linked to a sceptic, distrustful, even hostile society. 
Drawing from the unique characteristics of the Greek economy, another 
example can be found in the financial capacity. An ongoing recession can have 
detrimental impacts on all other dimensions and significantly expand the 
ground for the manifestation of the remaining implementation risks. This adds 
not only to the likelihood of their occurrence but also to the level of their 
impact and the capacity to mitigate either.
 In the MCGDM analysis on the perceived performance of the ten implementa-
tion risks against their likelihood to occur, the level of their impact on the trans-
ition pathway, the capacity to mitigate their impacts, and the level of the concern, 
as perceived by the involved stakeholders, the latter appear to be mostly worried by 
political inertia, closely followed by the lack of financial capacity and the bureau-
cratic complexity of the energy efficiency- associated processes (Figure 11.1). They 
feel that both of the perceived risks on the societal axis are of medium importance 
and relevance to the effective design of a sustainable and robust pathway to an 
energy- efficient and climate- resilient Greek economy. Finally, non- provision for 
economic incentives, tax breaks, and subsidies, along with risks of technological 
nature, were considered the least critical by the engaged stakeholders.
Consequential risks
The tariff deficit is the most prominent concern in the discussion of potentially 






















































































































































































































































































efficiency- oriented policy framework aimed at promoting this pathway. This 
focus can, to a large extent, be attributed to the sum of legislative mistakes made 
when designing the financial support mechanisms of the past. This refers to the 
pace of renewable energy penetration into the power generation mix, causing an 
equally high pressure of liquidity demands for compensating producers, based on 
the design of the FIT mechanism. Coupled with delays in relevant payments, 
these liquidity gaps created a large deficit in the Renewable Energy Sources 
Fund. Further legislative advances in an effort to reduce the deficit mostly 
revolved around tariff cuts and heavy taxation (Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2015), 
and eventually managed to freeze licensing applications and connection requests 
at the cost of solar power development and of public trust in the policy 
framework.
 This case is an illustrative example of the life cycle of a barrier and the inter-
play between its implementation and consequential nature. Poor policy designs 
of the past, after giving rise to a large deficit in the renewables fund that in turn 
led to an ever- changing policy framework, eventually developed mistrust of the 
government for its ability to vote and retract policies and mechanisms. This is 
now largely considered as a significant implementation risk to any relevant 
action in the future. At the same time, the knowledge of such a consequential 
risk among policymakers and relevant stakeholder groups creates cognitive bar-
riers to introducing mechanisms that can potentially allow such a risk to mani-
fest. In other words, the perception and consideration of the consequential risk 
of developing a deficit in a support fund may also act as an implementation risk, 
hindering the design of appropriate support mechanisms.
 Another risk that evidently concerns the stakeholders is potential implica-
tions for poverty as a by- product of climate and energy efficiency actions. 
Although an adverse economic environment is considered one of the main 
exogenous barriers to realising a low- carbon transition, stakeholders are largely 
worried about the possibility of such a transition further impoverishing Greek 
households. For example, according to an expert coming from the private- sector 
energy industry, well- funded yet poorly designed infrastructure and building ren-
ovation projects may lead to widening inequalities – the opposite result to that 
intended. Funding programmes and financial support must be strictly prioritised 
and planned in the long term in order for the transition to boost the economy, 
instead of aggravating the existing crisis. Furthermore, a stakeholder working in 
the banking sector acknowledged that, so far, financial incentives aimed at the 
residential sector primarily targeted lower- income households. These enabled 
them to apply for loans at a low interest rate, yet the loans became hard to pay 
in a time of recession. A similar approach may overburden the middle class and 
further impoverish the working class.
 Finally, two consequential risks arose during the discussions on employment 
and investments. Some stakeholders mentioned the possibility of a low- carbon 
transition having negative implications for employment, especially with regard to 
the energy transformations brought about by further development of the solar 
power sector, e.g. in the fossil- fuel extraction and transformation sector. The 
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interviewed policymakers practically rejected any notable impact, but neverthe-
less expressed their concern of such a probability. Although most experts agreed 
on the possibility that an energy- efficient transformation of the Greek economy 
might discourage new investments, about half of the engaged stakeholders con-
sidered that such an impact would be virtually non- existent. Besides, as most of 
the involved representatives of the banking and policymaking community 
noted, the capacity to mitigate such an effect is relatively high, provided that 
the policy strategies promoting the required transformations are effectively and 
sustainably designed.
 Stakeholders compared these risks of the envisaged transition pathway along 
multiple criteria including the likelihood for them to occur and the severity of 
their impact. They also examined respective policy strategies with regard to 
these risks, including the capacity to mitigate their impact and the level of the 
stakeholders’ concern. From their perspective, the most critical concern is the 
possibility of another tariff deficit, followed by a potential negative effect on 
poverty in the country. Following these, stakeholders collectively found that 
other negative socio- economic implications of actions towards an energy- 
efficient economy for private investments and unemployment are relatively 
insignificant.
 Finally, stakeholders believe that sustainable future strategies, in a scenario 
where climate change remains contained, should be based on behavioural 
change. However, under scenarios with considerable mitigation and adaptation 
challenges, with higher probabilities of the identified implementation risks 
manifesting, they consider improving energy efficiency in the public building 
stock to be the most robust strategy (Nikas, Ntanos, and Doukas, 2019).
Conclusions
This narrative illustrates the uncertainties and risks associated with energy effi-
ciency actions towards a future autonomous, nearly- zero-energy building sector, 
drawing from the expertise of and tacit knowledge embedded in experts coming 
from relevant stakeholder groups. Based on the conditions characterising an 
environment that is highly uncertain across the economic, regulatory. and 
socio- political axes, this research highlights the most important implementation 
and consequential risks of a transition pathway aiming to enhance energy effi-
ciency. It does this over two different time horizons.
 In the near term, stakeholders worry mostly about the current adverse market 
conditions, the bureaucratic nature of the processes associated with the imple-
mentation of measures and funding or incentivising investments, and the dif-
ficulties in aligning municipal priorities with the obligations of the central 
government. These are the main perceived implementation risks hindering 
Greek efforts to meet the national commitments on energy efficiency targets.
 In the longer term, broader sets of risks appear to jeopardise the success of a 
low- carbon and energy- efficient transition of the Greek economy. On one level, 
a multitude of implementation risks are identified, the most important of which 
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appear to concern poor prioritisation and political inertia as a result of an 
ongoing political crisis and, once again, a bureaucratic and complex regulatory 
framework coupled with limited financial capacity to incentivise and invest in 
energy efficiency actions. On another level, stakeholders’ concerns over the 
potentially negative consequences of such a pathway appear to almost exclu-
sively focus on the recurrence of a tariff deficit and the possibility of further 
impoverishing lower- income households.
 It should be noted that the study is based on two different series of stake-
holder engagement approaches, involving different stakeholders. This differenti-
ation may be another reason, apart from different considerations of the time 
horizon, why so many differences were observed between the sets of risks identi-
fied. In fact, discussions on near- term energy efficiency targets were carried out 
only with stakeholders from the policymaking group; bringing in representatives 
from other expert groups and exploring differences in perceptions across all 
stakeholder groups would add valuable insights into the discussion.
 The participation of a diverse set of stakeholders in the long- term perspective 
part of the study allowed for such differences to be highlighted, providing a 
broader picture of risk perception on the Greek energy efficiency front. 
However, only three of the original policymaking group participated in the 
second part of the study, and this may have been instrumental in obtaining such 
a differentiation in risk mapping and evaluation. Another reason behind this 
may be found in the abstractness of the policy framework discussed on the long- 
term perspective. When they were aware of the exact policy instruments, stake-
holders appeared capable of matching each measure with its associated risk and 
were therefore provided a better context to identify the risks. Discussions on the 
long- term vision, by contrast, oriented on the transition pathway rather than 
the policies promoting it. The study also lacked the iterative dimension that 
would enable consensus building among the participating stakeholders. Finally, 
although the discourse mainly draws from detailed discussions with the engaged 
stakeholders, the multi- criteria analyses rely on questionnaire- like evaluations, 
for which a significantly larger sample size could have been used.
 In order to reach its full potential, this kind of research can be linked to 
quantitative risk assessment. The more standardised results underlying this nar-
rative have been used as a basis for other analyses, namely a portfolio analysis 
for optimising the near- term policy mix and a fuzzy cognitive mapping study for 
exploring different long- term transition strategies. Further potential lies in their 
transformation and incorporation into quantitative systems’ model- driven ana-
lyses, to produce fruitful insights with specific policy implications.
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Introduction
Indonesia’s energy needs and policy ambitions
Indonesia’s significant economic growth in the past decade, due to increasing 
investment and export growth, has been accompanied by increasing energy 
demand that is met by oil, gas, coal, and renewables (World Bank, 2018; Secre-
tariat General of National Energy Council, 2016: 51). Of these, coal is Indone-
sia’s most important energy resource for domestic power production and also 
garners vast export earnings. Nearly 80% of the nation’s coal productions were 
exported in 2015, making it the largest coal exporter in the world despite pos-
sessing only 2.2% of the global coal reserves (Atteridge, Aung, and Nugroho, 
2018; BP, 2018; Cornot- Gandolphe, 2017). As a result, the increasing energy 
demand and consumption have made Indonesia the eighth- largest greenhouse 
gas (GHG) global emitter (Friedrich, Ge, and Damassa, 2015). In 2012, CO2 
emissions were distributed across three main sectors, with power generation, 
industry, and transportation accounting for roughly 33%, 30%, and 29% respec-
tively (Republic of Indonesia, 2015).
 In 2016, Indonesia introduced its Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC) targets of a 26% and 29% GHG emission reduction by 2020 and 2030 
respectively, in comparison to the business- as-usual scenario. However, capacity 
additions have been in favour of coal and most of the planned renewables come 
in well after 2020 (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). A high- carbon pathway, 
evidenced in these energy plans and GHG emission trends, is far from being 
consistent with NDC targets. Indonesia’s policies are currently rated as ‘highly 
insufficient’ to meet its NDC targets (Climate Action Tracker, 2018). Like 
other countries, it faces several challenges to mainstream and integrate climate 
change into national planning and development processes.
 Indonesia’s main strategy for development is formulated in the National 
Long- Term Development Plan (RPJPN) which is divided into four five- year 
National Medium- Term Development Plans (RPJMN). The current RPJMN 
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applies from 2015 up to 2019. One of its aims is to increase the contribution of 
renewable energy to help move the renewable energy share to 23% of total 
primary energy supply by 2025 as mentioned in the NDC. Although the target 
for the national energy exists, there is no clear implementation plan from the 
government for how the country will meet the goal. Moreover, other policies in 
the energy sector often run counter to these commitments, suggesting that 
mainstreaming is challenged by other priorities. For instance, Indonesia has 
started shifting coal from international markets to meeting domestic energy 
demand (IEA, 2014). These targets need concerted efforts and strong support 
from the government to better integrate emissions and renewable energy plans 
into energy policy frameworks.
 Indeed, policy support for fossil fuel undermines meeting both the NDC targets 
and the SDGs as the fossil- fuel sector plays a prominent role in economic devel-
opment for Indonesia. Shifting to a more sustainable economic pathway including 
clean energy production faces many barriers as economic growth is prioritised over 
other issues. This contradiction is portrayed by the ongoing construction of non- 
renewable power plants. Over the past five years, coal capacity has increased by 
around 13.6 GW compared to only 1.8 GW of renewable energy (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2018). Furthermore, the new power plants do not use the most modern 
energy- efficient technologies. The expansion of coal mining also risks the poten-
tial lock- in of carbon- intensive infrastructure and financial assets (Atteridge, 
Aung, and Nugroho, 2018). As one of the world’s largest coal exporters, Indone-
sia stands to lose much of this revenue when other countries implement their own 
mitigation measures. Other problems, such as low tax revenue and low commod-
ity prices, combined with complex bureaucratic and transparency issues, also 
hinder clean energy infrastructure investment (OECD, 2015).
Rethinking renewable energy solutions in Indonesia
Renewable energy solutions, including bioenergy, need to be geographically and 
culturally appropriate, low- cost clean fuels that meet energy needs and provide 
co- benefits; they also need to be practically advantageous by offering, for 
example, simple implementation, good technological availability, and a strong 
base of experiential knowledge (Blenkinsopp, Coles, and Kirwan, 2013; Brent 
and Kruger, 2009; Urmee and Md, 2016). Expanding the use of renewable 
energy sources (RES) is essential to meet future domestic energy demands and 
to achieve policy targets. In Indonesia, hydro, geothermal, and biomass are 
among the promising sources to develop further. However, to date the combined 
installed capacities of these alternatives remains approximately 7.8% of the 
total optimum capacities (cited in IEA, 2015).
 Bioenergy, the initial object of interest in this narrative, offers many 
options that have not yet been widely used. Furthermore, the greater avail-
ability of land, favourable climatic conditions for agriculture, and lower labour 
costs also support this focus (Widodo and Rahmarestia, 2008). Focusing on 
biomass, the nation’s bioenergy comes in many forms of value chains, such as 
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biomass gasification (Asadullah, 2014), which have been developed so far 
with the power capacity of 10–100 kWe (Singh and Setiawan, 2013). Addi-
tional potential value chains include synthetic gas using pellets from various 
species of trees and palm- oil solid waste (Kusumaningrum and Munawar, 
2014; Siregar et al., 2017) and anaerobic digestion using agricultural and live-
stock waste. The latter has been considered successfully implemented by a 
programme called BIRU (see BIRU, 2018).
 Biogas as the focus of this chapter, especially when produced through agricul-
tural waste, is one viable alternative since it can be implemented in rural, and 
sometimes remote, areas where many of Indonesia’s populations reside and make 
a living in small- scale agriculture. Biogas provides GHG emission mitigation 
benefits by lessening demand usage of conventional energy. According to an 
estimation by BIRU, two million small biogas digesters could potentially be 
installed in Indonesia, being equivalent to a reduction of 6.4 million tons 
CO2/year (cited in Devisscher et al., 2017). Meanwhile, the estimated potential 
capacity for large- scale biogas- to-electricity production is 2.6 GW (Government 
of Indonesia, 2017). For this reason, biogas pathways are of increasing interest 
to policymakers because of their carbon and energy benefits and numerous 
potential co- benefits, such as suppressing unmanaged firewood collection, pro-
moting waste management, and helping with the use of biogas slurry as organic 
fertiliser (Bedi, Sparrow, & Tasciotti, 2017).
 Overall, biogas offers some promising practical and feasible alternative energy 
options for Indonesia. But how could this technology be rolled out across as eth-
nically and culturally diverse country as Indonesia, spread across more than 
17,000 islands? What about the suitability, the social acceptance, and the 
gender and equity dimensions of biogas? What do stakeholders see as the main 
opportunities and risks of biogas, and what can the latest research tell us? This 
narrative investigates the potential of biogas to help meet domestic energy 
needs and to comply with Indonesia’s climate mitigation commitments and 
development planning. At the core are experiences with four biogas programmes 
taking place in Bali; each having different motivations, practices, outcomes, and 
lessons. A better comprehension of the risks and uncertainties associated with 
biogas development pathways can help support future dialogue and planning on 
climate, energy, and development.
Research process and methods
A range of stakeholder engagement activities were used to understand how stake-
holders perceive and manage risks. Risks were discussed during different types of 
meetings, using different research methods as described in Table 12.1.
 Activities included a series of workshops and a period of in- depth fieldwork. 
The team also conducted continuous dialogues with national- level policymakers 
to discuss the pathways of choice. The dialogue was a result of a collaboration 
with the Ministry of Development and Planning (Bappenas), which also involved 
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the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) and Indonesia’s 
 state- owned electricity company (PLN), which runs the nation’s monopoly market 
in electricity distribution and generates the majority of the country’s electrical 
power. We made use of the bioenergy workshops to present and gain information 
about the pathways and conduct research validation. We also involved additional 
stakeholders, including an NGO called Yayasan Rumah Energi (YRE), sub- 
national agricultural and energy agency officers, local farmers (users and non- 
users), researchers from the local university, banks, and business/private sectors.
 We initially focused on the small- scale biogas for rural households as the first pri-
ority chosen by the participants. Further potential pathways were formulated based 
on the earlier stage of the research, as well as the economic and political drivers in 
Indonesia (Devisscher et al., 2017). Later on, interest divided to a large- scale biogas- 
for-electricity production pathway and this was discussed during the third workshop 
and policy dialogues. More information about the research methods used, the devel-
opment of a ‘toolkit’ for data collection and analysis, and the applicable framework 
for integration of concepts and methods can be found in Devisscher et al. (2017).
Table 12.1 Chronology of events and activities and research methods
Event or activity Stakeholders involved Methods applied
1st Bioenergy Workshop 
on ‘Scoping and 
Envisioning’, Bali, May 
2016
Local farmers, NGOs, 









Field work in Bali and 
Jakarta, October–
November 2016
Local farmers, NGOs, 
local government 
officials
Focus group discussions, 
interviews
2nd Bioenergy Workshop 
on ‘Solutions, Business 
Models and Enabling 
Conditions’, Bali, May 
2017
Local farmers, NGOs, 
private sectors, local 
government officials, 
research agencies
Focus group discussions and 
exercises for 
Q-methodology









3rd Bioenergy Workshop 
on ‘Green Business and 
Synergy Action’, Bali, 
April 2018
Local farmers, NGOs, 
local and national 
government officials, 
research agencies
Focus group discussions, 




Focused on finding ways to meet energy needs, NDCs, and development targets, 
the Indonesia TRANSrisk narrative aims at improving the understanding on 
how biogas alternatives could effectively contribute to a low- carbon energy 
transition and what changes are required to achieve it. Bali is the target area 
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due to its high potential feedstock for bioenergy production, which could 
support up to 30% of its current power plant capacity (Government of Indone-
sia, 2017; Kementerian ESDM, 2017). Furthermore, several biogas programmes 
have operated in Bali, especially at the small- scale level. These programmes 
were implemented by the Bali Provincial Agricultural Agency (i.e. SIMANTRI 
programme), the Agency of Public Works, the West Bali National Park, and an 
NGO called Yayasan Rumah Energi (YRE, i.e. the BIRU programme). All pro-
grammes installed individual biogas digesters except SIMANTRI, which carried 
out communal installations. Also, the government’s programmes went for fully 
subsidised operations while the BIRU programme used a market- based approach 
with partial subsidies (Devisscher et al., 2017). The guarantee period of 
SIMANTRI and Public Works programmes was set to three months, while 
BIRU’s was up to three years including maintenance services. However, no clear 
guarantee scheme existed in the West Bali National Park pilot project. Further-
more, the SIMANTRI programme targeted economic development for the 
farmers’ livelihood, in which biogas was a supporting system of the whole 
project; and the Public Work’s programme aimed to support the national policy 
mandate of renewable energy deployment. Both the others aimed at addressing 
environmental issues including carbon emissions, with the BIRU programme 
also focused on energy access and West Bali National Park on reducing forest 
degradation.
 The two selected pathways in this chapter explore options for a low- 
investment/short- term scenario and a high- investment/long- term scenario. The 
first is an easily implementable, low- cost household- scale biogas digester system 
supplying household energy needs. This pathway also foresees the transfer of 
these systems and the know- how to other geographical areas. The second 
pathway focuses on large- scale biogas systems that produce electricity, require 
higher investment, and generate high benefits in the long run. The first pathway 
uses experiences by farmers (biogas adopters) in Bali, while the second one was 
developed in discussions with policymaker experts from Bappenas (Ministry of 
National Development Planning), PLN (Electricity Company), and ESDM 
(Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources).
Household biogas transition pathway
The household biogas transition pathway is concerned with meeting domestic 
energy needs for cooking and lighting, which also intersects with issues of health 
in rural areas, community social structure, as well as smallholder productivity. 
These issues are important for understanding the pathway.
 Nearly one- third of Indonesia’s working population consists of farmers in 
rural areas (BPS, 2017) where solid fuels are mostly used for cooking and are 
often associated with health problems (Gall et al., 2013). Indoor pollution in 
the home from solid fuels utilisation contributes to respiratory infections and 
diseases. Biogas for household cooking and lighting is clean and safe while also 
fitting the profile of the rural areas. It can also provide fuel for cooking, give the 
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benefit of waste management, reduce the indoor pollution risk, produce biogas 
slurry for organic fertiliser, and even provide lighting where possible.
 With low population density in Indonesian rural areas, a household- level or 
individual system to provide fuel for cooking and lighting could potentially be a 
better option than a centralised or communal system that requires greater 
material input as well as management co- ordination. Moreover, an individual 
system could be deployed without having to formulate a gas (or electricity) dis-
tribution system plan within the community, thus potentially reducing the 
amount of investment.
 In addition, biogas offers a potential means to increase farmers’ resilience by, 
for instance, the use of biogas slurry as organic fertiliser. These could generate 
new sources of supplementary or additional income for the smallholder, who 
may trade organic coffee beans with organic fertiliser made on the premises. 
These benefits to the smallholder farmers should be added to the savings made 
from reducing the reliance on fossil- fuel-based energy. Additionally, if the gov-
ernment decided to suppress the liquid petroleum gas (LPG) subsidy, those 
savings will be further increased. These potential benefits add value to the 
pathway, not only to help the country achieve its NDC target by reducing rural 
households’ fossil- fuel consumption but also to increase people’s resilience.
Large- scale biogas- for-electricity transition pathway
The large- scale biogas transition pathway is mainly concerned with meeting 
renewable energy and carbon emission targets, as well as a means of addressing 
the development goal of providing electricity access in remote areas. It has eco-
nomic potential for the creation of small energy- generating enterprises.
 Since 2014, the government of Indonesia has focused on increasing electri-
city access to rural areas, including remote islands. As it stands, Indonesia has 
achieved above 94% of its electrification ratio target of 92.75% in 2017 through 
the Energy- saving Solar- powered Lighting Supply (LTSHE) programme in rural 
areas (Kementerian ESDM, 2017), although doubts remain over the sustain-
ability of the programme. However, and in contrast, the majority of Indonesia’s 
current and planned power plants are coal- powered generators. A new approach 
to investment in electricity generation that has longer- term objectives of sup-
porting low- carbon development may be needed. Currently, one of the most 
notable initiatives comes from PLN which, under ESDM policy, is opening its 
doors to private companies by purchasing their services to operate in different 
areas to generate and sell electricity.
 Responding to this policy, many private sector actors are working on renew-
able energy initiatives but they are less active in biogas- to-electricity enterprises. 
Stakeholder dialogues elaborated that the current policy is not totally support-
ive of electricity generation from the RES due to their higher initial and operat-
ing costs, especially from biomass. Thus, companies selling electricity generated 
by biogas will face challenges when competing with the existing electricity price 
set by the government. There was, however, growing political support to 
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improve the policy, such as by planning for electricity production using renew-
able energy and strengthening the feed- in tariff implementation.
 Currently, biogas plants are utilised in some areas of Indonesia that are 
claimed to have performed successfully both as waste management reactors and 
energy generators. Based on these experiences, the government representatives 
acknowledged that an approach to increase the number of larger communal 
biogas plants to produce electricity would be beneficial. They indicated that 
large biogas plants could potentially support electricity accessibility, apart from 
its main goal of reducing the emissions from the power generation sector.
Risks and uncertainties associated with biogas development 
in Indonesia
It is important to first note the subjective nature of risk perception. How risk is 
experienced and understood encompasses personal arguments of possible events 
and their consequences (Aven, 2012). What may pose a risk for one group of 
stakeholders may be totally satisfactory and unproblematic to another. For 
example, government researchers identified unfiltered H2S (hydrogen sulphide) in 
biogas installations as a potential danger, while farmers did not recognise it as a 
risk due to their different concerns and the lack of knowledge about such facts.
 To mitigate some subjectivity, this narrative utilises a widely understood and 
shared category- based risk assessment to summarise and convey risks. Fourteen 
risks were identified and formulated into six risk categories (Table 12.2). From 
this, it is clear that the highest number of risks are associated with technological 
Table 12.2 Classified risk perceptions
Social Technological Economic
1  Collective management 
issues in the case of larger 
biogas systems
2  Imbalance time spent 
between men and women
3  Accessibility and 
sustainability of feedstock
4  Poor maintenance and 
infrastructure
5  Unfitting technology 
choice for local 
conditions
6  Leakage of methane gas 
emissions
7  Lack of long-term 
incentives to aim for 
value-added activities
8  Subsidy on fossil fuels
Environmental Political Regulatory
9  Unfiltered hydrogen 
sulphide in biogas 
installations
10  Different goals on 
biogas installations
11  Varied monitoring 
practices in different 
programmes
12 Initial investment needs
13  Lengthy and 
bureaucratic process to 
apply for support form 
biogas programmes
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aspects such as feedstock, infrastructure, and electricity reliability. These risks 
will later be introduced as implementation risks, also understood as barriers, and 
consequential risks, also understood as negative outcomes (Figure 12.1). All 
policy decisions and actions carry some potential risks that need to be con-
sidered in the context of multiple uncertainties.
Uncertainties in the development of biogas as a renewable 
energy option
Four key uncertainties underlying the energy transition to biogas were identi-
fied: (i) the unclear role of public and private sectors; (ii) the changing focus 
over each political term; (iii) the unspecified national biogas target; and 
(iv) different views on biogas development. Otherwise understood as ‘epistemic 
uncertainty’, the first three risks are a result of incomplete or insufficient know-
ledge of the system, while the fourth one is rather classified as an ‘ambiguity’ 
due to the existence of multiple knowledge frames.
 First, the blurred lines between the roles of public and private sectors are 
responsible for a situation where overlapping and even contrasting context 
and goals of biogas development exist. This undermines the ability of all 
actors involved to form innovative partnerships, intensify engagement, or 
effectively collaborate on programmes. Second, the end of each political term 
in Indonesia creates a significant uncertainty as there is an absence of know-
ledge whether the new government will continue or abandon previous/existing 
programmes. Both of these uncertainties are compounded by a third uncer-
tainty: the lack of biogas development targets. This lack of leadership from 
the government affects commitments to biogas development by the civil 
service and the private sectors. If the national biogas target was set, it would 
motivate ministries and other actors to better co- ordinate biogas programmes 
to pursue a common objective (Devisscher et al., 2017). Fourth, we found 
three different perspectives or ‘worldviews’ on the development and value of 
biogas. They include a technological- based paradigm in addressing barriers, a 
scale- based paradigm that put forward the agricultural benefits, and independ-
ence prioritisation through biogas. The lack of consensus and differences in 
viewpoints, framings, and perspectives may be implicit or tacit, thus adding 
additional layers of uncertainty. This uncertainty is present in the different 
objectives of biogas programmes in Bali, for example the BIRU programme 
that undertook market- based approach that emphasised technological services 
and the SIMANTRI programme that put forward the sustainable agriculture 
and economic profit approach.
 Out of the four sources of uncertainty, three stem from the influence of gov-
ernment. The fourth source of uncertainty is a consequence of institutional 
complexity and the diversity of actors and their experiences and priorities. 
Investigating this complexity can nonetheless reveal important patterns, such as 
distinctive views on biogas development and the ways in which different con-
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 These findings illustrate the possible barriers that policy actors and develop-
ment planners need to be aware of and sensitive to when designing biogas pro-
grammes. To be acceptable to stakeholders with a plurality of perspectives, plans 
need to include different ways of providing benefits and incentives that motivate 
participants, while mitigating the perceived drawbacks.
Implementation risks of biogas development in Indonesia
Different motivations as a result of different ‘worldviews’ of biogas development 
were fundamental causes of further incoherence in the monitoring processes, 
there being no overall consensus on biogas monitoring procedures. We revealed 
that most of the rural biogas digesters had been abandoned due to the lack of 
investment in monitoring and evaluation (Devisscher et al., 2017). Monitoring 
practices are required to assess the current situation of the programmes in order 
to ensure their sustainability and to help identify technical issues, one of which 
includes proper infrastructure maintenance. However, appropriate maintenance 
is lacking in the government- led programmes, which is identified as another 
risk. When farmers faced constraints in operating biogas or suffered faults in the 
technology, they gave up using it, especially in the cases where they had no war-
ranty and were not technically trained (Devisscher et al., 2017). Moreover, 
highly subsidised digesters with little investment in maintenance and monitor-
ing were less successful due to a lower sense of ownership of the biogas digester 
and a trade- off with the maintenance cost. The representative of ESDM stated 
that the adequacy and reliability of the overall technological infrastructure 
should be able to reduce the risks where maintenance is lacking.
 In addition, the government- run programmes also presented a barrier in 
terms of the biogas technology distribution to beneficiaries. The farmers as the 
targeted beneficiaries stated that the process of obtaining a biogas digester was 
overly bureaucratic and time consuming (Devisscher et al., 2017). In other 
words, there are various stages farmers need to undergo to obtain the digesters 
and, even when offered with no costs, this acts to prevent the farmers from 
adopting and fully utilising the technology.
 Furthermore, accessibility to feedstock was also considered to be a barrier by 
both users and policymakers (Devisscher et al., 2017). This risk is worth being 
discussed because, as repeatedly emphasised, the abundance of feedstock is often 
given as a main justification for biogas development. Yet the farmers reported 
feedstock shortages, besides considering the collection process as time consum-
ing. The barrier concerning the feedstock availability is also noticed by the 
ESDM representatives with a similar reason; thus they recommended a system 
to ensure the feedstock sustainability.
 Some risks specifically relate to communal biogas installations. In the 
SIMANTRI programme, barriers arising include management issues of the 
digesters (Devisscher et al., 2017). Unsuitable and ineffective management will 
create risks in biogas deployment since in many cases the farmers did not seem 
to be committed to managing the biogas as a team. This appears to be correlated 
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with the lack of familiarity with and sense of belonging to a relatively new tech-
nology. Another contributing factor to limited use of communal biogas systems 
was the location of digesters, which is often far from the communities. A con-
sequence is that they only use biogas for shared needs such as water heating for 
drinking during community meetings, but not to benefit from cooking in their 
households.
 Finally, a further barrier was suggested to stem from the lack of long- term 
incentives to engage in household biogas. Some stakeholders, especially policy-
makers, perceived the need for biogas adoption to go beyond ‘cooking only’ and 
rather to target value- adding activities to keep farmers engaged in the long run. 
This sentiment is related to the ‘outscaling’ pathway suggested in terms of co- 
benefits generated that can become increasingly attractive in the longer term; 
the policymakers questioned the potential of household biogas to deliver these 
benefits.
 The high initial investment cost is a further barrier or implementation risk, 
according to the representative of Bappenas. Whether sufficient government 
funding is available to meet the investment costs for renewable energy is 
dependent on the political situation. However, the future situation and its 
impact on investment are far from predictable. This type of investment relies on 
clear renewable energy targets, an appropriate policy framework, and strong and 
clear co- operation between public and private actors, where each actor plays its 
own key roles (Masini and Menichetti, 2012). In this case, the role of policy-
makers is to create incentives in order to achieve effective investment (IEA, 
2007), while the private sector is expected to buffer the financial requirement 
towards the low- carbon economy (Masini and Menichetti, 2012). However, 
while the roles of the public and private sectors are either overlapping or leaving 
gaps, the investment risk remains higher. The risk on the initial investment is 
thus closely related to the three identified uncertainties that stem from the gov-
ernment influence.
 The representatives of ESDM, Bappenas, and PLN stated their specific 
interest in larger- scale biogas and electricity generation. However, the govern-
ment and the electricity companies have made limited advances in generating 
electricity from biogas. Concerns over technology development and infrastruc-
ture included the limited capacity of biogas- to-electricity plants to generate 
energy and electricity tariffs. The representative of PLN was concerned about 
whether or not electricity generation would be as sustainable in terms of con-
tinuity of feedstock supply. This needs to be ensured before buying the electri-
city from the providers, especially when entering into a long- term contract or 
partnership. Feed- in tariff schemes could play a critical role in this regard. Also, 
a PLN representative suggested that if the regulations were weak and techno-
logy remained inadequately developed, then production costs would continue to 
be too high for wide market penetration. The high associated production cost 
may also result in a higher electricity tariff and thereby be passed on to the end 
users. Under this scenario, electrification in remote areas would become very 
difficult to achieve.
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 Fossil- fuel subsidies present another challenge because they work against 
biogas development. Challenges posed are fossil fuels being more affordable 
compared to renewable energy systems. As stated by the Bappenas representa-
tives, farmers, local businesses, and policymakers alike are more likely to favour 
fossil fuels. Nevertheless, in many rural or isolated areas subsidised fuels are not 
accessible or rarely available, causing the price to constantly fluctuate.
Consequential risks of biogas development in Indonesia
Environmental aspects were a central concern among the consequential risks. 
For example, some rural biogas digesters were not installed with H2S filtering, 
which may harm the environment or even human and livestock health accord-
ing to researchers in Udayana University (Devisscher et al., 2017). It also runs 
the risk of corrosion to the digesters (Chaiprapat et al., 2011). Large quantities 
of manure in the biodigester may release this gas, unless it is fitted with filtering 
technology. Unfortunately, in many cases the observed biogas digesters were not 
equipped with this technology.
 Similarly, some methane leakages in the biogas digesters might occur when 
users do not burn the biogas produced. There have been some debates on 
whether or not the methane leakage is less harmful to the atmosphere than 
abandoning the manure on the ground or in the barns. Bruun et al. (2014) 
argued that a small amount of methane leakage could offset the emissions 
savings from faulty or improperly used digesters. Also, from the perspective of 
technological efficiency, biogas technology should be used as optimally as pos-
sible in order to take advantage of the feedstock and to reduce the overall GHG 
emission.
 Besides the environmental risks, we identified a specific consequential risk 
within the social domain. The women in rural Bali tend to have significant roles 
in collecting the firewood and providing meals, while men’s roles are mainly 
taking care of livestock and managing organic waste as feedstock for biogas 
technology. Substitution of biogas for firewood therefore has the effect of redu-
cing the women’s working time while increasing the men’s. Such a role reversal 
has a positive aspect because women and their families can benefit from women 
spending more time doing other things. However, it was also recognised that 
this carries a risk of imbalance and turmoil in the household. Some debates 
arose around this perception as it is mostly a viewpoint of male farmers, while 
other stakeholders, such as the policymakers and some researchers, do not view 
it as a significant issue, suggesting it does not represent the entire situation in 
Indonesia. Yet such gender- based role division is embedded in many customs 
across Indonesia.
 Despite interesting discussions on the gender role, the representative of PLN 
seemed to be more concerned about the other pathway, especially the reliability of 
electricity generation. Conditions may induce a risk to system stability within the 
interconnection grid. The current state of biogas production tends to fluctuate, 
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Figure 12.2  Risks on both pathways: household biogas and large-scale biogas for 
electricity.
recommended three potential solutions: (i) utilisation of a smart grid; (ii) a co- 
generation/hybrid system; and (iii) the biogas system for off- grid or isolated areas.
Comparison of pathways
Both pathways aim to assist the government of Indonesia in meeting its emis-
sion reduction targets while providing energy access. Against these targets, this 
section will apply a cross- analysis by classifying each risk under each pathway. 
The interest in risks on the biogas- to-electricity pathway were stated by the 
policymakers after the detailed investigation on the household biogas had been 
delivered to them. Therefore, the risks on large- scale biogas were not identified 
in depth. Nevertheless, we obtained at least higher- level perceptions on this 
pathway. The risks from both pathways were either identified as exclusive or 
overlapping to each other (Figure 12.2).
Risks associated with both pathways
Chief among the risks associated with both pathways is the high initial invest-
ment needs (Figure 12.2). This was particularly on the minds of policymaker 
stakeholders. A representative of Bappenas suggested that the investment cost is 
a risk to both the small- scale household pathway or the large- scale electrifica-
tion pathway as limited financial or monetary reliability (with the possibility of 
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a budget constraint being subsequently imposed) will create obstacles for the 
overarching development. The lack of investment is likely to create a domino 
effect on supporting measures such as installation, maintenance, training, and 
incentives. The risk is identified in both pathways and heavily depends on the 
national policy on renewable energy. Initial investment is also shaped by 
enabling policies and regulations concerning the private sector. For example, 
the latest electricity law (UU no. 30/2009) and its implementing regulation (PP 
No. 14/2012) allowed the private sectors to be actively involved in the power 
sector, such as by running a power generation business (Kuvarakul et al., 2014). 
Suitable laws and regulations would mitigate this risk by attracting more private-
 sector investment in either pathway, thereby financially supporting the low- 
carbon economy, as suggested previously (Masini and Menichetti, 2012).
 Other important risks are related to how the comparative advantages of the 
main alternative energy options stack up. In this respect, one of the main chal-
lenges is the cheaper fossil- fuel energy. For example, a three- kilogram LPG tank 
for households is subsidised, as regulated in ESDM’s ministerial decree no. 2458 
K/12/MEM/2017. The effect of such subsidy should not be underestimated as, 
for many rural residents that use LPG, there is a risk of preferring LPG to biogas 
in this pathway. The main causes are cheaper conventional energy with lower 
initial investment at the household level, as well as fewer technological barriers. 
When it comes electricity generation, PLN also faces challenges in purchasing 
the renewables in general since they are more costly than coal, which is subsi-
dised by the government (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
2018). This subsidy itself is one of the rooted reasonings behind the more afford-
able current electricity tariff.
 Other risks relevant to both pathways concern the choice of technology, 
which is not always appropriate. For instance, it was noted that in some cases 
household biogas installations had developed cracks or leaks in the tanks due to 
unsuitable local biophysical conditions (Devisscher et al., 2017). Taking into 
account the local conditions is a necessity according to the policymakers who 
emphasised that not all Indonesian regions are suitable for biogas. Bappenas 
gave the example of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) province – a semi- arid area 
where biogas development would be difficult, since continuous water supply is 
essential to operate the technology. On the other hand, the island of Sumatra, 
one of the world’s largest palm- oil producers, would make a promising biogas 
generator (Rahayu et al., 2015). The abundance of palm- oil mill effluent 
(POME) waste and the local conditions may favour choosing technologies for 
electricity generation from biogas.
 We found that risks of possible leakage of methane emissions and unfiltered 
H2S would occur on both pathways, as they are based on similar technological 
principles. Both risks were observed in the household biogas digesters 
(Devisscher et al., 2017) and large- scale ones, such as the POME installations 
(Promnuan and O- Thong, 2017).
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Risks associated only with household- level biogas
Risks associated to household biogas are different from the large scale for electri-
city, which will be explored in this section. For example, the barriers of col-
lective biogas management at the community level would be unlikely to factor 
in the large- scale biogas- for-electricity pathway, since the plants would be run 
as a larger- scale operation with suitable management mechanisms and practices. 
Similarly, household- level gender discrepancy relates to unpaid work on the 
smallholding, and likewise, accessibility of the feedstock relates to shortages in 
the quantity of feedstock for household biogas.
 Other risks in the household biogas pathway result mainly from the way the 
biogas distribution schemes have been designed and implemented. These risks 
include poor maintenance and infrastructure as well as bureaucratic issues 
among the potential beneficiaries. The lack of support for maintenance of 
household systems prevents the rural users from fully benefiting from their 
biogas installation. According to Berhe et al. (2017), the successful utilisation 
and maintenance of biogas infrastructure is commonly the joint responsibility of 
the owner and technical personnel. Clearly, when the capacity of the farmer 
(financial, skills, knowledge, etc.) is lower, the likelihood of this risk is higher. 
Increasing the capacity of these actors is necessary for mitigating the risks asso-
ciated with poor maintenance and infrastructure.
 Additionally, there are a number of risks on this pathway that may trigger 
the users to immediately revert back to conventional energy. For example, 
when biogas collective management is not well organised, it will create a 
higher likelihood of the users to seeking easily accessed firewood or even LPG. 
This is similar to other risks, such as poor maintenance, bureaucratic issues, 
inadequate incentives, and gender issues: where the farmers face limited 
options of biogas usage, there is a higher chance for them to seek a more 
familiar energy option.
Risks associated only with biogas- for-electricity generation
Risks exclusively attached to the biogas- for-electricity pathway concern the reli-
ability of the electricity generation, as well as the increased electricity tariff, 
both of which were suggested by PLN. PLN actually purchased 1 MW of POME-
 based electricity in 2015 to distribute it through on- grid channels (Pasadena 
Engineering Indonesia, 2014). PLN was concerned about whether or not the 
electricity delivered to the consumers would be as stable as the existing com-
mercial electricity generators (hydroelectricity, thermal, diesel, gas, and geo-
thermal power). Moreover, the quality and quantity of POME could also have 
implications for the methane proportion in biogas (Yacob et al., 2006). While 
the common efficiency of natural gas- generated electricity ranges around 
38–42% (Breeze, 2014), biogas- generated electrical efficiency ranges between 
28% and 40% (Firdaus et al., 2017; Shi, 2011). Second, it was thought that the 
high operational costs would also contribute to the risks of on- grid electricity. 
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This might create difficulties in raising finances and it may also necessitate a 
higher tariff that could be damaging for consumer demand.
 Overall, there were higher proportions of discussions on the risks related to 
household biogas than large- scale electrification, as household biogas was the 
starting point of the Indonesia narrative. For Bappenas, PLN, and MEMR, being 
the most familiar with the pathway of large- scale biogas for electricity, there was 
a knowledge discrepancy during the stakeholder dialogues, leading to a tend-
ency to discuss this pathway less. This situation led stakeholders to focus more 
on the household biogas pathway. If the risks of the electrification pathway are 
less well understood, they may also have been underestimated here. In addition, 
differences in ‘worldviews’ as a part of the uncertainties centred on issues related 
to biogas installations at household and communal levels. There did not appear 
to be a lack of consensus around biogas for electrification that resulted in ambi-
guity and contributed to uncertainty. Stakeholders all thought that producing 
electricity from animal waste will increase electricity access in remote Indone-
sian islands, but all disagreed that upscaling biogas for village- wide power gener-
ation or commercial scale generation is realistic.
Conclusions
This research identified two pathways of biogas development to reduce emis-
sions and to supply energy needs that could be potentially relevant in Indonesia, 
namely household biogas and large- scale biogas- for-electricity development 
pathways. Four sources of uncertainty were salient: (i) the unclear role of public 
and private sectors; (ii) the changing focus on each political term; (iii) lack of a 
national biogas target; and (iv) differences of perceptions among the stake-
holders. These uncertainties give context to the risks perceived by stakeholders.
 Of the risks identified, a higher number were classified as technological risks. 
The stakeholders tended to focus on the implementation risks (i.e. barriers) 
rather than the consequential risks (negative outcomes). Moreover, most agree 
that biogas development has not yet become a government priority. As a result, 
biogas is not being developed evenly across the country. This situation created a 
tendency to highlight and criticise current efforts in terms of the barriers 
experienced.
 A comparison of pathways was conducted to increase awareness about what 
kind of risks to expect, and what kind of uncertainties might interact with 
and exacerbate these risks. Interestingly, both pathways include some 
common or similar risks, among them the suitability of technological choices, 
the possible technological constraints, and the cost of initial investment. 
Other risks exclusively pertained to one pathway or another. However, 
further studies on the electricity pathway are needed to identify a wider range 
of risk perceptions. The severity (potential impact) of each risk is not studied 
in this narrative.
 The risks of the household biogas pathway may lead to difficulties for rural 
residents to continue using biogas, thus may result in unattainable renewable 
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energy targets and prevent potential co-benefits such as protecting the 
environment and improving human health. On the other hand, the biogas- 
to-electricity pathway risks could create negative impacts on the economy, 
either commercially (on the market) or at the macro/national level. There-
fore, to achieve the national target through these pathways, it is important to 
suppress the uncertainties at the higher level, or those mainly related to the 
governance scope, which could include, for example, making progress in for-
mulating targets complemented with clear pathways and providing clarity in 
how biogas development should be perceived, valued, and approached. It is 
also recommended that policymakers implement supporting actions to miti-
gate risks, such as strengthening the institutions that manage the national 
biogas development.
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Risks and uncertainties around low- 
carbon energy pathways
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Introduction
Like many countries in sub- Saharan Africa, Kenya has high development ambi-
tions, aiming to become a middle- income country by 2030 (Government of 
Kenya, 2007). These ambitions are based upon a low- carbon, climate- resilient 
development pathway, as set out in Kenya’s Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDC) to global climate change mitigation under the UNFCCC (Minis-
try of Environment and Natural Resources, 2015). These ambitions depend on 
rapid expansion of the energy sector to increase the access, security, and afford-
ability of energy service provision (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2016). 
There are multiple, complementary pathways that Kenya might pursue to 
achieve these goals. In this chapter, we focus on two of those pathways: expan-
sion of geothermal power development and development of greater sustainable 
charcoal production.
 In the power sector, the country’s abundant renewable energy resources offer 
significant opportunities for pursuing low- carbon development pathways. Geo-
thermal in particular is poised to play an important role in such pathways. Having 
already moved from niche technology to the mainstream, geothermal power 
development now sits at an important threshold: after years of public- led invest-
ment in development of the geothermal sector, Kenya is seeking more private- 
sector-led expansion of its vast remaining geothermal resources (Musembi, 2014). 
As a world leader on geothermal energy, the Kenyan experience offers valuable 
lessons for research and has already been analysed in global comparisons of 
sustainability indicators (Shortall, Davidsdottir, and Axelsson, 2015).
 At the same time, Kenya is seeking to modernise its cooking sector, which 
remains dominated by traditional biomass fuels with significant negative impacts 
on land, ecology, and emissions. Increasing urbanisation will have significant 
implications for forest resources if charcoal continues to remain the most afford-
able and accessible urban cooking fuel. However, more research is needed to 
better understand the complexities and uncertainties around greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in land- use and biomass sectors (Dalla Longa and van der 
Zwaan, 2017). Through a mix of regulation, promotion of improved kilns and 
cookstoves, and support of alternative fuels, Kenya seeks a dual approach of 
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increasing the sustainability of charcoal production, trade and consumption, 
and providing opportunities for fuel switching (Ministry of Environment, Water 
and Natural Resources, 2013; Wanjiru, Nyambane, and Omedo, 2016).
 In this chapter, we explore the risks and uncertainties associated with expan-
sion of geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production and 
trade, framing them within the discourse around Kenya’s energy future. We first 
situate the development of geothermal and sustainable charcoal sectors within 
the context of Kenya’s low- carbon transition pathway and the country’s chang-
ing political landscape. We then present analyses of risks and uncertainties 
around further development within both sectors, followed by a discussion of 
their implications. We conclude with policy recommendations for the two 
sectors.
Research process and methods
To explore the risks and uncertainties around developing geothermal power gen-
eration and sustainable charcoal production and trade in Kenya, we analysed the 
technological innovation system (see Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007), 
including the market system and actors. We used stakeholder attribute matrices, 
stakeholder engagement in the form of interviews and focus group discussions 
(FGDs), and field observations to identify the risks and uncertainties faced by 
different actors across the market system. We undertook 17 semi- structured inter-
views and three FGDs with geothermal- sector stakeholders, including three 
national government officials, one county government official, three employees of 
state- owned utilities, two representatives of independent power producers, one 
representative of the regulatory authority, two members of research institutions, 
five representatives of development partners, and seven members of the local com-
munity in the Olkaria region. We also undertook seven semi- structured interviews 
and targeted discussions during two workshops with charcoal- sector stakeholders, 
including six national government officials, two county government officials, rep-
resentatives of three charcoal producer associations, representatives of one char-
coal transporter group, four members of research institutions, and two 
representatives of development partners. Data collection took place over the 
course of June 2016 to May 2018.
Low- carbon energy pathways for Kenya
Kenya is one of East Africa’s major economies, with a population of almost 50 
million and a GDP of roughly US$75 billion.1 The country’s high dependence 
on natural resources makes its GDP very sensitive to impacts of climate change 
on the natural environment (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 
2016). In 2007, the government established Vision 2030, its blueprint for 
becoming a newly industrialising, middle- income country providing a high- 
quality life for all its citizens by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007). The notion 
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of a green economy resonates through Vision 2030, merging the imperatives of 
contributing to global climate change mitigation, meeting the increasing energy 
demands of a growing population and economy, sustainably managing the coun-
try’s valuable natural resources, and enhancing climate resilience.
Committing to climate change mitigation and adaptation
In 2015, Kenya submitted its NDC to the UNFCCC, noting that land use, land-
 use change, forestry, and agriculture contributed 75% of the total GHG emis-
sions in 2010 (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 2015). By the 
year 2030, Kenya’s GHG emissions under a business- as-usual scenario – exclud-
ing future exploitation in the extractive industry – are estimated at 
143 MtCO2e,2 based on the per capita emissions of about 1.26 MtCO2e (Minis-
try of Environment and Natural Resources, 2015). Therefore, the country has 
announced mitigation and adaptation actions to abate its GHG emissions by 
30%. To achieve a low- carbon, climate- resilient development pathway, some of 
the mitigation activities relate to promoting clean energy technologies to reduce 
overreliance on wood fuels; achieving a tree cover of at least 10% of the land 
area; and expansion of renewable sources of energy. Geothermal power develop-
ment and sustainable charcoal production and trade both form important ele-
ments of Kenya’s mitigation priorities and, as such, both were the focus of two 
recent proposed Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions for Kenya submit-
ted to the UNFCCC (Falzon et al., 2014; Wanjiru et al., 2016).
 Meanwhile, as with many developing countries in Africa that are vulnerable 
to climate change, adaptation measures will continue to receive support, includ-
ing ‘climate proofing’ infrastructure as well as supporting innovation and devel-
opment of appropriate technologies that promote climate- resilient development. 
These measures have come out of Kenya’s consecutive strategies and plans for 
addressing climate change, starting with the National Climate Change Response 
Strategy (NCCRS) developed in 2010, followed by the National Climate 
Change Action Plan (NCCAP) launched in 2013 and revised in 2018, the 
Climate Change Act passed in 2016, and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 
which was finalised in 2016 (Government of Kenya, 2010a, 2013, 2016a, 2016b, 
2018a).
Powering the nation and fuelling its cities
As shown in Figure 13.1, renewable energy has always played a major role in 
Kenya’s electricity supply. Hydro has typically dominated the electricity mix, 
but over the last 15 years geothermal has taken an increasing share and wind 
has started to become prominent. By 2018, hydro, geothermal, and wind made 
up 35.3%, 27.9%, and 1.1% respectively of the country’s 2,333 MW of installed 
grid- connected electricity (Kenya Power, 2018).
 As electricity access expands, the middle class grows, and industrial activity 
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Figure 13.1 Electricity generation and consumption in Kenya, 1990–2015.
Source: www.iea.org.
Since 2011, a number of plans have been established to meet this demand, the 
latest being the updated Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) 
2017–2037, published in 2018. In it, the long- term target for generation expan-
sion is around 7213 MW by 2030 and 9932 MW by 2037, as shown in Figure 
13.2 (Government of Kenya, 2018b). Also in 2018, the government announced 
its third Medium- Term Plan (2018–2022) – its economic development vehicle 
anchored within the Vision 2030 – giving great priority to expanding the 
renewable energy sector.3 Figure 13.2 shows how renewable energy is expected 
to feature in electricity generation expansion over the next 20 years.
 Both the LCPDP 2017–2037 and the third Medium Term Plan envisage a 
four- fold expansion of geothermal power generation from 650 MW to around 
2500 MW in 20 years. Abundant, low carbon, and climate resilient, geothermal 
power is an attractive resource with potential for additional heat applications in 
industry. And over the past four decades, considerable technical expertise in 
geothermal has been established within the country’s state- owned utilities and 
ancillary services. However, attracting the private investments needed to 
develop the country’s geothermal resources at a swifter pace remains a 
challenge.
 Meanwhile, in the cooking sector, a rising and increasingly urbanising popu-
lation is demanding more charcoal, exerting increasing pressure on forests, farm-
lands, and community rangelands from where it is sourced. Charcoal – produced 
in kilns by carbonising wood by pyrolysis – meets the cooking energy needs of 
over 80% of Kenya’s urban population (Wanleys Consultancy Services, 2013). 
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But the growing gap between supply and demand of the commodity will only 
expand unless action is taken. Imports from neighbouring countries meet some 
of this gap, but not all. Ecological impacts and land degradation from the 
remaining unsustainable charcoal production in Kenya add to its GHG emis-
sions and threaten future livelihoods due to declining yields, decreased biodiver-
sity, and other impacts (Kiruki et al., 2017; Ndegwa et al., 2016a).
 Putting the Kenyan charcoal sector on a more sustainable pathway calls for 
innovative approaches across the charcoal market chain that can improve effi-
ciency in harvesting, production, transport, distribution, and consumption. Yet 
doing so is not easy: the sector remains informal with little recognition in 
national economic reporting despite employing hundreds of thousands of people 
and generating hundreds of millions of US dollars (Njenga et al., 2013). 
Although it is an important source of livelihood for some, the economic returns 
tend to be concentrated among larger producers and wholesale traders, while 
small- scale producers may effectively be trapped in poverty (Ndegwa et al., 






















Figure 13.2 Projected electricity generation in Kenya, 2017–2037.
Source: www.iea.org.
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Navigating the changing political landscape
As Figure 13.3 shows, there is a range of legislation, policies, and strategies 
influencing the development of the geothermal and charcoal sectors in Kenya, 
some broad in scope and others with a sectoral focus. But in recent years, deci-
sions around how to manage geothermal power generation and charcoal pro-
duction and trade have also been heavily influenced by the changing political 
landscape associated with the devolved government system that was estab-
lished in the wake of a new Kenyan constitution in 2010 (Government of 
Kenya, 2010b). Debate continues over how governance of the energy sector at 
county and central governments will be managed in practice. The devolved 
system in Kenya is still new, hence a lot of learning and adaptation still needs 
to take place before effective means of ensuring citizen participation are 
established.
 With energy planning and development mandates, county governments have 
a substantial role to play with regard to shaping energy development priorities 
and politics according to their local resources (Johnson et al., 2016). For 
instance, most geothermal steam fields lie within the Rift Valley – an area 
spreading across Turkana, Baringo, Nakuru, and Kajiado counties. Local gov-
ernments in these counties want a role in decision making over geothermal 
development in their constituencies to embrace its benefits, rather than risk dis-
ruptions in their county and local community (Matara and Sayagie, 2018). 
Meanwhile, some charcoal production hotspot areas, such as Tharaka- Nithi, 
Kitui, Narok, Kajiado, and Kwale counties, have already developed regulations 
to manage how their woody biomass resources are used and preserved (Wanjiru 
et al., 2016). However, county- level budgets generally support roads or other 
infrastructure rather than energy provision. Large- scale energy infrastructure 
remains outside the purview of county governments, while small- scale solutions 
and household use of biomass energy receive little political attention (Johnson 
et al., 2016).
 Much hinges on the 2017 Energy Bill – first put forward in 2015 and cur-
rently under consideration by the Parliament – which will give legal clarity as to 
what local- level governance would mean within the counties when it comes to 
energy issues (Government of Kenya, 2017). For example, each county govern-
ment is expected to develop a county energy master plan that will be used by 
the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum to formulate an 
integrated national energy master plan for purposes of national energy planning. 
In addition, county governments will have the power to enforce certain provi-
sions for efficient use of energy and its conservation, to undertake inspections, 
and to issue directions, all in relation to national energy laws and provisions. 
Furthermore, for geothermal projects, county governments will receive 20% of 
the royalties from geothermal power produced in their jurisdictions, and the 













































































































































































































































































Risks and uncertainty in Kenya’s energy pathways
Geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production and trade 
both form important energy pathways in Kenya’s quest to become a middle- 
income country based on a climate- resilient green economy. But implementa-
tion and consequences of these pathways are by no means certain: understanding 
the risks and uncertainties around these pathways is essential to overcoming 
barriers and minimising negative impacts.
Geothermal power development
The technological innovation system life cycle for geothermal encompasses 
roughly six phases, taking place over up to a decade (see ESMAP, 2012; 
Ng’ang’a, 2005). Geothermal development starts with geo- exploration through 
surface studies followed by exploratory drilling, a practice that involves drilling 
three to six narrow wells to about 2000–3000 metres. Once the resource is 
proven viable, around a dozen production wells are drilled to extract steam, and 
a system of pipes is constructed to gather the steam at one location and to then 
reinject it back into the steam field reservoir. The gathered steam is most com-
monly used indirectly in a steam turbine for power generation. It can also be 
used directly for a range of heat applications, such as spas, district heating, and 
industrial and smaller- scale processes requiring heat. In the case of steam turbine 
power generation, power is typically transmitted and distributed through the 
national grid to residential, commercial, and industrial end users. In both cases, 
steam field management is crucial to ensure the resource is not depleted and 
that hazardous chemicals in the steam are properly managed. Decommissioning 
of geothermal steam fields and power plants has yet to be experienced in Kenya.
Historical perspective on geothermal
Kenya’s geothermal resource is located within the country’s Rift Valley, with 
recent estimates suggesting a resource potential of between 7000 MW and 
10,000 MW spread over 14 sites (Ngugi, 2012). Exploration in the Olkaria 
steam field in the late 1960s to mid- 1970s by the state- owned Kenya Power 
Company Limited and supported by the UNDP led to the drilling of production 
wells in the Olkaria I block and commissioning of a 15 MW geothermal power 
plant in 1981. Drilling continued, with up to 20 wells added by 1985, and two 
additional 15 MW power plants were commissioned in 1982 and 1985 (Omenda 
and Simiyu, 2015; Riaroh and Okoth, 1994; Simiyu, 2008).
 Reform of the power sector in 1997 led to the unbundling of Kenya Power 
Company Limited into two entities: Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) 
– later rebranded as Kenya Power – responsible for transmission and distribution, 
and Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) responsible for generation 
(Kapika and Eberhard, 2013; Karekezi and Mutiso, 2000). In its new form, 
KenGen remained in control of the Olkaria I block and began drilling in Olkaria 
228  Oliver W. Johnson et al.
II. In the meantime, the first private- sector concession was awarded to OrPower4 
in 1998 to explore and develop Olkaria III. Additional Olkaria II steam turbine 
units were commissioned in 2003 and in 2007; the 140 MW Olkaria IV was com-
missioned in 2010; and current work is ongoing to develop another 140 MW in 
Olkaria V (Kenya Power, 2018; Ngugi, 2012; Omenda and Simiyu, 2015). Since 
serious geothermal exploration first began 40 years ago, geothermal has evolved 
from niche technology and resource to being a major contributor to the national 
electricity mix, with an installed capacity of 652 MW providing almost half of 
Kenya’s power (Kenya Power, 2018).
 Geothermal capacity is projected to reach over 5500 MW by 2030, but only 
if greater private- sector involvement can be achieved (Ngugi, 2012; Omenda 
and Simiyu, 2015). To help accelerate geothermal development, the govern-
ment established the Geothermal Development Company (GDC) in 2009, with 
a mandate to carry out rapid exploration and development of geothermal over 
the next 20 years, encouraging further private- sector-led expansion in geother-
mal power generation, and removing the high risks associated with expensive 
exploratory drilling (Ngugi, 2012). A decade later, acceleration has been 
limited. GDC is currently developing a geothermal field in Menengai providing 
steam sales to three independent power producers (IPPs), but the project has 
experienced delays related to finalising the steam sales agreement and getting 
government letters of support, both of which are essential to convince investors 
that financial and political risks are manageable. Other fields are promising but 
much hinges on progress in Menengai (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013; 
Ngugi, 2012).
Implementation risks
Geothermal development faces a range of barriers or potential risks to imple-
mentation (Figure 13.4). In terms of economic feasibility, geothermal devel-
opment on ‘greenfield’ sites – where no previous development has taken place 
– requires considerable upfront investment. One exploration well costs over 
US$1 million to drill, and three wells are required simply to prove the resource. 
This high investment is prohibitively risky for both private companies looking 
to ensure a return on investment and state- owned utilities with limited budgets. 
In Olkaria, representatives from KenGen and OrPower admit they have been 
very lucky to find steam so easily and that the quality of steam has remained 
consistent for so long. This might not be the case elsewhere in the Rift Valley, 
and delays faced by private companies in Akiira and Longonot show the dif-
ficulty in finding investors patient enough to finance additional exploration. 
Stakeholders highlight that GDC was created precisely to bear this risk on 
behalf of the private sector, undertaking exploration and steam field develop-
ment in greenfield sites and selling the steam to IPPs, which invest in power 
generation only.
 But even once the resource is proven, the financial risk does not disappear. 
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wells, the steam gathering system, and steam turbine technology – can reach 
almost US$80 million (GEOCOM, 2015). Recent slow growth in demand due 
to limited economic and industrial development4 has led to growing concern 
among government and Kenya Power officials that they will not have enough 
customers to be able to pay for the electricity that the company has agreed to 
purchase.
 This economic risk associated with inability of the ‘offtaker’ – Kenya Power – 
to pay for electricity it has contractually agreed to purchase is a key political and 
institutional risk facing the geothermal sector. This may, in turn, greatly increase 
the cost of borrowing capital for investment. In the private sector, investors with 
a high tolerance for risk may be more amenable to investing in geothermal, but 
they typically require strong guarantees before they are willing to lend to green-
field project developers or IPPs. In Menengai, GDC developed the geothermal 
field and will sell steam to three IPPs. To mitigate investment risks, the IPPs have 
a project and steam sales agreement with GDC to guarantee the steam they will 
receive, and a power purchase agreement with Kenya Power to buy the power they 
produce. But delays in closing financing for the IPPs have continued as letters of 
support from the government have been slow in forthcoming, leaving some polit-
ical risks unresolved. Investors, private developers, and government stakeholders 
all appeared to have very different perspectives on who should bear which risk. As 
such, geothermal remains dominated by grants and concessional loans (high 
interest and long tenors) from development finance institutions, such as the Euro-
pean Investment Bank, the KfW Development Bank, the World Bank and the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
 Another political risk from the perspective of many different stakeholders is 
the distribution of responsibility for energy planning and project approval 
between the national and the county governments. County government repre-
sentatives felt that too much national control was a risk to their ability to 
manage their own affairs and ensure that the voice of county citizens was repres-
ented. National government representatives viewed added bureaucracy and 
potential for political manoeuvring as a risk to project development and 
approval, which many deemed was already overly convoluted. Meanwhile, 
private developers sat on the fence, appreciating the role county government 
could play in managing local issues but remaining wary that increased levels of 
bureaucracy might lead to increased avenues for corruption, which already per-
vades so much of the Kenyan economy. The 2017 Energy Bill, still awaiting 
final approval, may do much to clarify the allocation responsibilities among 
national and county governments; however, limited capacity at the county 
level, and ambiguities in the details, will take years to resolve.
 The final risk associated with achieving further geothermal development is 
community opposition to construction both at the geothermal site and for the 
associated transmission lines to connect these sites with distant demand centres, 
such as major cities and industrial areas. In the face of relocation – which occurred 
in 2010 to facilitate development of the Olkaria IV power plant – or other restric-
tions on land use, communities are understandably often resistant to geothermal 
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development. Geothermal is not special in this regard: many other large energy 
infrastructure projects, including various wind power and transmission line pro-
jects, have faced community opposition, spanning from written complaints to 
roadblocks and open protests. Government, state- owned utilities, and private 
project developers take community concerns seriously. For example, GDC has 
enlisted support from the New Zealand government in how to manage engage-
ment with Indigenous groups on infrastructure development and land issues: the 
two countries have had some common and comparable experiences (Shortall, 
Davidsdottir, and Axelsson, 2015). Meanwhile, development partners, such as the 
World Bank, place considerable pressure on their projects to minimise social risks 
and show compliance with international standards such as the Equator Principles.5 
Efforts to ensure the local community shares some of the benefits of infrastructure 
development typically include compensation, relocation to upgraded housing and 
additional community facilities, and job opportunities for unskilled labour in 
project construction and post- construction security. But the complex financing 
arrangements of geothermal projects often impede or limit on- the-ground imple-
mentation of international standards of development finance (Ole Koissaba, 
2018). The benefits are often incomparable to the losses or unevenly distributed: 
for instance, it might be impossible to weigh improved access to a medical clinic 
with loss of fertile land for grazing livestock.
Consequential risks
Geothermal brings many benefits in terms of a low- carbon, climate- resilient 
source of electricity, with the potential for high output into the national grid. 
But there is also a risk of a range of adverse consequences (refer back to Figure 
13.4). With careful management of steam reservoirs – as is currently the case in 
Olkaria – geothermal is a renewable source with little financial burden once 
initial capital costs are paid back. This results in competitive electricity tariffs 
that can help to reduce the consumer cost of electricity, as already experienced 
in Kenya. However, if supply does not match demand, then higher unit costs 
may prevent Kenya Power from lowering tariffs or may require them to raise 
tariffs to cover the costs of meeting obligations in power purchase agreements. 
This is a risk for the consumers who may have to pay more, for Kenya Power 
who may lose money and reputation, for the government and taxpayers who 
may have to subsidise Kenya Power, and for the energy regulator who may find 
it impossible to balance cost recovery with affordable tariffs.
 Risks of negative social impacts of geothermal development – beyond those 
associated with higher electricity costs – largely revolve around negative impacts 
on livelihoods and the culture of local communities in the vicinity of steam field 
and power plant infrastructure. These negative impacts may perpetuate existing 
social inequalities and the marginalisation of traditional societies. While the 
urban middle class, industries, and manufacturing businesses benefit from 
cheaper and more reliable electricity, access of local communities to training 
and skilled employment at geothermal sites might remain limited. The new 
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Energy Bill currently awaiting final approval will establish a community fund for 
development activities, which is likely to help significantly to achieve greater 
benefit sharing (Government of Kenya, 2017). But until this comes into being 
and is proven to help, it remains unclear whether devolved government – with 
its added layer of political dynamics – will mitigate or exacerbate social impacts.
 The environmental risks of upscaled geothermal development include con-
tamination from poor handling of toxic chemicals in the steam; withdrawal of 
water from lakes, rivers, and wells beyond their capacity; and degradation and 
disruption to natural habitats and migratory routes of wildlife inside and outside 
protected areas (see Kubo, 2003; Mariita, 2002; Mwangi, 2005; Ogola, Davids-
dottir, and Fridleifsson, 2012). These risks are largely the concern of conserva-
tion groups and others dependent on clean and available land and water 
resources. They can be – and often are – allayed by enforcing extensive environ-
mental impact assessments and strong risk mitigation measures, such as control-
led reinjection of steam into reservoirs; regulated water withdrawal; 
wildlife- friendly steam piping designs; use of noise- reduction technology; and 
cautious management of toxic chemicals using the latest technology and pro-
cesses. However, non- compliance can result in severe impacts. The situation 
calls for extra measures to enforce the set regulations, and perhaps giving more 
positive visibility to those who pursue best practices.
Sustainable charcoal production and trade
The charcoal technological innovation system life cycle encompasses six phases. 
Charcoal production begins with harvesting woody biomass from communal 
land, government forest, and private land (Njenga et al., 2013). The woody 
biomass is then carbonised by pyrolysis in a kiln to produce a certain charcoal, 
with typical kiln ‘efficiencies’ – the ratio of charcoal mass output to dry wood 
mass input – ranging from 10% to 30% (Bailis, 2009; Ministry of Environment, 
Water and Natural Resources, 2013). Charcoal is then transported in 50–90 kg 
sacks from production sites to urban and peri- urban demand sites. From there it 
is then distributed to consumers in a range of sizes, from whole sacks to 20-litre 
buckets to two- litre tins. Efficiency in final use of charcoal for cooking depends 
on the stove technology that consumers own and prefer to use. Some entrepren-
eurs have started to make charcoal briquettes from charcoal dust created during 
production, transportation, and distribution – amounting to roughly 25% of 
total original charcoal volume.
Historical perspective on charcoal
The increase of charcoal use in Kenya is largely a function of two factors: urban 
population growth and limited switching to alternative fuels. Between 1960 and 
2017, Kenya’s population rose over sixfold, and the proportion of the population 
living in urban areas more than tripled.6 In the 1980s, charcoal was used by 50% 
of the urban population (O’Keefe, Raskin, and Bernow, 1984) but by 2002 this 
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figure was reported to have reached 82% (Kamfor Company, 2002). Although 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), electricity, and pellets burned in gasifier stoves 
are available as alternative fuels for cooking in urban centres, they have 
remained the preserve of high- income households only. As such, charcoal con-
tinues to be a major source of cooking fuel for urban households across all 
income levels (Dalberg Advisors, 2018; Kojima, Bacon, and Zhou, 2011).
 Rapidly rising demand for charcoal has led to a widening supply–demand 
gap resulting in unsustainable charcoal production. Current demand, estim-
ated at 16.3 million m3, is far above the current supply of 7.4 million m3 
(Wanleys Consultancy Services, 2013). And by 2032, demand is expected to 
increase by 17.8% while supply is expected to increase by only 16.8%, widen-
ing the supply- demand gap from 8.9 million cubic metres (m3) to 10.6 million 
cubic metres. The charcoal market chain is a vital source of employment for 
over 500,000 people and generates over US$427 million, yet it is barely recog-
nised in formal national economic reporting and forecasting (Njenga et al., 
2013).
 Charcoal conservation efforts started in earnest in mid- 1990s with the pro-
motion of a more efficient charcoal stove – the Kenya Ceramic Jiko – by GTZ, 
the Kenya government, universities, and other development partners (Karekezi 
and Turyareeba, 1995; Tigabu, 2017). But efforts to make the charcoal sector 
sustainable – i.e. ensuring the charcoal that reaches homes and businesses is 
produced in a way that does not contribute to degradation of forests, lands, and 
ecosystems – has only become a focal point for action in the last decade. A legal 
framework regulating the production of charcoal, the Forest (Charcoal) Rules, 
was established in 2009 (Government of Kenya, 2009). Community forest 
associations or other common interest groups that register as formal charcoal 
producer associations with the Kenya Forest Service receive a registration certif-
icate. Transporters buying from these registered charcoal producer associations 
receive a certificate of origin, which they present to their local Kenya Forest 
Service office to obtain a charcoal movement permit costing 500–1,000 KES 
(US$5–10) per trip.
 In 2013, the National Environment Policy highlighted charcoal burning as 
a major threat for arid and semi- arid land and national forest degradation 
(Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 2013). In parallel, the 
National Climate Change Action Plan 2013–2017 highlighted charcoal pro-
duction as a main contributor to GHG emission in Kenya and proposed the 
introduction of more efficient kilns as the most significant low- carbon oppor-
tunity to reduce emissions; these proposals were also included in the recently 
revised National Climate Change Action Plan 2018–2022 (Government of 
Kenya, 2013, 2018a). Meanwhile, a similar observation was reported in 
Kenya’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC on its NDC in 
2015, with sustainable charcoal production considered to be a key part of 
Kenya’s commitment to global climate change mitigation (Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources, 2015).
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Implementation risks
Figure 13.5 highlights the risks to implementation of sustainable charcoal. The 
financing risks relate to covering the cost of forest management interventions and 
supporting the purchase of improved technology for charcoal production (kilns) 
and charcoal consumption (cookstoves). Charcoal production is widely con-
sidered to be a significant cause of deforestation and forest degradation, although 
the precise causal pathway is distorted by links to other drivers of forest degrada-
tion such as timber extraction, grazing of livestock, and clearing of forests to make 
way for crop production (Bailis et al., 2017; Hosonuma et al., 2012). According to 
many stakeholders, there is almost no financing available to fund the farm forestry 
and reforestation interventions necessary to establish a sustainable supply of 
biomass for charcoal production and to maintain forest cover. Meanwhile, char-
coal producer associations note that efficient charcoal production technologies 
present a considerable financial expenditure for their members, who typically earn 
a low and unstable income and have little formal access to credit. Innovative 
financing mechanisms were widely considered vital to facilitating purchase of 
these improved production technologies, but stakeholders acknowledged that 
making formal lending solutions work within a largely informal sector presents a 
considerable obstacle. Those working on the charcoal demand side noted greater 
success in consumer- financing schemes for efficient charcoal consumption tech-
nologies, such as improved cookstoves, but warned of a distribution market marred 
by a wide variation in product quality. The irony of these financial risks is that, if 
the sector were streamlined, the government would retain about US$60 million 
with a 16% VAT rate, which potentially could be reinvested into the sector and 
thus used to manage financial risk (Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources, 2013; Mutimba and Barasa, 2005).
 Another risk is weak enforcement of the formal permitting system under the 
2009 Forest (Charcoal) Rules. The system has done little to disincentivise pro-
duction, transport, and use of charcoal from unsustainable sources. Kenya’s 
informal system of bribes – so well- established that producers, transporters, and 
wholesalers have come to view it as an acceptable component of the charcoal 
trade – exacerbates the situation. Meanwhile, the formal permitting system is 
new, and the compliance requirements are often misunderstood by the traffic 
police and Kenya Forest Service officers tasked with verifying the validity of all 
movement permits. Officers are often individual beneficiaries of bribes and thus 
may have little incentive to enforce a formal permit system that instead benefits 
the local or national government. Since devolved county governments were 
created in 2013, counties with charcoal production hotspots – such as Kitui, 
Narok, and Kajiado counties – have started to establish and enforce their own 
regulations with which local charcoal producer associations and transporters 
have to comply. It is yet to be seen if they will prove more effective and enforce-
able than the national regulations.
 The third risk is associated with competition from alternative cooking fuels. 
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within the energy, public health, and environment sectors view charcoal as a 
dirty fuel that should be fully replaced by much cleaner alternatives, such as 
LPG, ethanol, and biomass pellets burned in gasifier stoves. Interventions to 
make these alternative fuels more available and affordable, particularly in urban 
areas, may pose a significant risk to sustainable charcoal production activities. If 
alternatives capture a sizeable share of the urban household energy market, it 
might reduce demand for charcoal, with potentially negative implications on 
charcoal- linked employment and livelihoods.
 The final risk to greater pursuit of sustainable charcoal production is limited 
capacity within charcoal producer associations to ensure compliance with 
formal regulations. These regulations require registered charcoal producer 
associations to establish a written constitution, develop a conservation and 
reforestation plan, and document the kiln technologies and tree species they use 
to make charcoal. But tracking biomass resources and developing forest manage-
ment plans require significant expertise that many members of these associations 
lack. Meanwhile, creating a constitution that all members agree upon is a chal-
lenge, especially as many fear formal regulation of informal and unregulated 
livelihoods.
Consequential risks
Despite its potential benefits, greater sustainable charcoal production poses 
some consequential risks (refer back to Figure 13.5). Many stakeholders perceive 
a streamlined increased market price of charcoal as a potential consequential 
risk to the long- term viability of sustainable charcoal, with actors along the 
market chain likely to pass along to consumers the additional costs of doing 
business formally. This includes transporters who may also continue to include 
the cost of bribes due to strong enforcement of informal practices and weak 
enforcement of formal rules.
 There is also significant potential for loss of livelihoods if stricter enforce-
ment of sustainable charcoal production takes place. The half a million people 
actively engaged in the charcoal market chain support an estimated two million 
dependants (Mutimba and Barasa, 2005). While the sustainable practices are 
meant to support more livelihoods in the long run with minimal environmental 
impacts, some stakeholders felt that only established businesses or community 
organised groups are likely to benefit.
 Finally, development of more efficient charcoal kilns and cookstoves might 
lead to a rebound effect whereby more efficient use leads to fuel savings that in 
turn increase fuel use. For example, people might use charcoal to boil water or 
cook more often than they previously did (see Mwampamba et al., 2013). Reli-
ance on biomass may increase, but scant research explores how greater efficiency 





Geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production form com-
plementary but very different pathways which can contribute to Kenya’s vision 
of a low- carbon, climate- resilient future (Table 13.1). Geothermal power gener-
ation is a large- scale industry, boasting only a few main actors that are part of, 
or fit well into, the existing centralised electricity system. Transmission and dis-
tribution of geothermal power is similarly large in scale with limited actors. On 
the other hand, sustainable charcoal production is a cottage industry comprising 
a myriad of decentralised, small- scale actors. Transport, wholesale, and distribu-
tion is similarly small in scale and undertaken by thousands of different actors.
 The technological capabilities required for upscaling geothermal power devel-
opment lie partially within Kenya – where there has been significant accumula-
tion of expertise and process innovation – and partially within foreign firms that 
possess the most advanced technology used in drilling and power generation and 
the most sophisticated knowledge of steam reservoir modelling and steam field 
management. The technological capabilities required to upscale sustainable char-
coal production, on the other hand, can nearly all be found in Kenya. Local 
manufacturers of more efficient (and appropriate) charcoal kilns exist, although 
their products are not necessarily widespread. And the knowledge required to 
Table 13.1 Selected aspects of energy pathways
Component Geothermal power generation Sustainable charcoal 
production
Structure Centralised Decentralised
End use Electricity, industrial 
heating
Cooking
Investment needs High capital cost by big 
investors
Local actors/small capital 
cost, although relatively 
high 
Sector structure Top-down Bottom-up
Technological capabilities Local innovation in 
processes but foreign 
technology
Local innovation in 
technology
Implementation risks High cost and high chance 
of failure




Non-harmonised policy and 
weak enforcement
Competing alternative fuels
Limited capacity of 
charcoal producer 
associations
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develop and manage forests in a sustainable manner certainly exists, although it is 
not necessarily in the hands of those who need it most, namely the owners or 
users of land where charcoal is produced. Both pathways face considerable chal-
lenges in obtaining the finance needed for upscaling. Both have trouble accessing 
capital due to perceived risks.
Distribution of risks
It is not easy to identify risks associated with implementation and consequences 
of geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal production – and 
neither are the distribution and comparisons of those risks. The fairly rudimen-
tary framework used in this study, in which we separated risks associated with 
each energy pathway into implementation and consequential risks, has limita-
tions given that different actors clearly frame risks and benefits in different ways. 
Indeed, it is possible to separate the risks according to how they are distributed 
between private economic interests, duty bearers, and rights holders.
 Within geothermal, many of the financial risks fall upon private investors 
and project developers seeking to invest debt and equity into exploration, drill-
ing, and power generation ventures. Investors and developers are typically 
willing to shoulder risks that are internal and inherent to the project, such as 
those related to failing to prove the steam resource. But in order to mitigate 
against external risks, such as the inability of the offtaker to meet the terms of 
the power purchase agreement or nationalisation of private assets, they often 
seek guarantees from the national and county governments that their invest-
ments will be protected. Meanwhile, sustainable charcoal production offers an 
opportunity to better clarify and manage the distribution of financial risks com-
pared to the dominant informal and unsustainable charcoal trade, where traders, 
distributors, and government officials pursue their own private economic inter-
ests at the expense of the public interest. Promoting sustainability in the char-
coal sector can support income generation for the producers and generate tax 
revenue for the government, which can be reinvested in reforestation pro-
grammes or other livelihood initiatives.
 The social and environmental risks of geothermal power development and 
sustainable charcoal production are largely borne by local communities, which 
are rights holders of the land where the activities generally occur. Kenya’s strong 
land rights mean that traditional communities even maintain some access rights 
on privately owned lands. Since the livelihood of many of these communities is 
so closely tied to the land, the national and county governments – as duty 
bearers for the citizens they govern – have a responsibility to uphold these 
rights. This is particularly the case where the capacity of rights holders to 
manage social and environmental impacts is limited. For geothermal, this means 
effectively regulating private project developers and state- owned electricity util-
ities. For charcoal, this means ensuring charcoal producer associations maintain 
established standards and that forest resources are sustainably managed. 
Environmental and social impact assessments, with associated resettlement 
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action plans, are the typical tools used by duty bearers to hold private economic 
interests accountable for minimising risks to local communities. But there is 
potentially a greater role for monitoring by local citizens who might be better 
placed to identify changes in their local communities and environment.
Weighing risks and benefits
The distribution of risks among powerful and marginalised stakeholders affects 
how these risks are weighed against benefits during decision- making processes 
around certain actions (or inaction). In the geothermal sector, the financial 
benefits accruing to private companies or government from the sale of electri-
city, along with the political benefit of ensuring reliable power from a clean 
energy source for the middle and elite classes, appear to have much more weight 
than the concern over the livelihoods of a few local communities with little 
influence. But with devolution and the prospect of greater benefit sharing, more 
weight may be given to those local concerns by the county government.
 In the charcoal sector, meeting the growing household energy demand of an 
increasing urban and peri- urban population appears to hold more weight than 
concerns over degradation and deforestation in distant locations as a result of 
unregulated production of charcoal. In the past, more weight has been given to 
financing demand- side measures to reducing charcoal consumption, such as 
adoption of efficient cooking technologies. Supply- side measures that poten-
tially have more impact on forest cover and GHG emissions are only recently 
gaining political attention.
 The ways in which risks and benefits are weighed in decisions around geo-
thermal power development and sustainable charcoal production and trade 
differ depending on the perspective of the stakeholder. And clearly the risk/
benefit perspective of those stakeholders who are both more removed from the 
local landscape, where geothermal power generation and charcoal production 
activities occur, and more closely connected to where profits from these activ-
ities accrue have more influence in decision- making processes. Addressing these 
spatial and equity dimensions should be of serious concern for those seeking to 
ensure that Kenya’s low- carbon, climate- resilient development pathways benefit 
all citizens of the country. More transparent and participatory dialogue between 
private economic interests, duty bearers and rights holders is one way in which 
the balance could be shifted as Kenya pursues its future development pathways.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we explored the implementation and consequential risks associ-
ated with scaling up geothermal power development and sustainable charcoal 
production, both of which are widely considered core elements of Kenya’s low- 
carbon and climate- resilient development ambitions.
 Our research shows that optimism around the potential for greater geother-
mal power development needs to be tempered with serious action to mitigate 
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against potential social and political risks. Geothermal development in Kenya 
has largely focused on nurturing a new industry and building technical exper-
tise. But as the sector has grown, so too have the challenges it faces, placing 
increased pressure on both the government and the private sector to pursue 
further development in a responsible manner, to ensure the benefits of geother-
mal development are shared equitably. In the sustainable charcoal sector, bar-
riers to greater adoption of efficient and sustainable forest management, charcoal 
production, and charcoal consumption practices require co- ordinated efforts to 
strengthen the capacity of the implementing entities and charcoal producer 
associations, and to ensure that the enforcing agencies speak to each other in 
order to address any concerns that may be raised by the market chain actors. In 
the long term, other cleaner and more sustainable fuels may replace charcoal 
but, in the short and medium term, investments in the sustainability of this 
important urban fuel are imperative to ensure that Kenya’s natural forest 
resources are responsibly managed.
 Our analysis of implementation and consequential risks associated with pursuit 
of greater geothermal power development and more widespread adoption of sus-
tainable charcoal production and trade identified a clear distribution of risks across 
spatial and equity dimensions. The risks and benefits accruing to those marginal-
ised stakeholders located close to natural resource landscapes, and who were often 
the poorest of all stakeholders, tended to be given less weight than the risks and 
benefits accrued by those in positions of relative economic and political power. 
Indeed, our analysis could benefit from action research following how risks and 
benefits are really weighed by different stakeholders and how that affects decision 
making in practice. We also advocate further research on the political and social 
dimensions of low- carbon and climate- resilient energy pathways in Kenya to 
better understand how these pathways might be realised in an equitable manner.
Notes
1 See https://data.worldbank.org.
2 MtCO2e = million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
3 See www.mtp3.go.ke/.
4 For example, a number of plans under Vision 2030 – such as electrification of the new 
Mombasa–Nairobi railroad, establishment of the hi- tech Konza City, and development 
of industrial parks close to geothermal sites – have so far failed to materialise.
5 See equator- principles.com.
6 See https://data.worldbank.org.
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14 Transition pathways, risks, and 
uncertainties
Jenny Lieu, Susanne Hanger- Kopp, 
Wytze van der Gaast, Richard Taylor, and 
Ed Dearnley1
Introduction
Transition pathways to reduce carbon emissions and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) in energy- related sectors are often portrayed as inherently positive 
changes to support climate mitigation efforts. The most significant concerns 
around them are generally whether we successfully implement the necessary 
technology, policies, and behavioural changes needed to follow the pathway. 
However, transitions may also involve potentially negative impacts on the 
economy, society, and environment, for example in the form of hidden costs, 
unemployment, or the loss of biodiversity. This implies two dimensions of risk, 
as we discuss in Chapter 2 and employ across the case studies presented: The 
first is the risks associated with designing or implementing the pathway, and the 
second is the unintended yet potentially negative consequences resulting from 
following a pathway.
 We used narratives as an enriched form of insight to provide comprehensive 
knowledge from a wider systematic research and engagement process carried out 
over three years of the TRANSrisk research project. These narratives from 
Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America discuss a diverse set of 
pathways that may contribute to low- carbon transitions. In some cases the focus 
is on the past and how lessons learned may influence future transition efforts 
(e.g. Spain, Greece). In others, pathways were designed as high- level strategies 
through a top- down approach but require additional bottom- up knowledge and 
consideration to be successfully implemented (e.g. China, Switzerland). Finally, 
in some cases pathways were created based on stakeholders’ perceptions and 
preferences, or co- created with stakeholders reflecting desired futures for a 
certain technological innovation or sector (e.g. Austria, Indonesia, Canada).
 We synthesise our findings across narratives in three nested dimensions 
present in all pathways: technological innovations implemented in an existing or 
new market; policy mixes supporting these technologies; and society where 
impacts are felt, perceptions created, and support or opposition is determined. 
All three dimensions are interrelated, but as conceptual boundaries they provide 
a starting point to explore risks identified as barriers to transitions and potential 
negative consequences of a pathway.
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Technological innovations: a starting point towards  
low- carbon transitions
Each case begins with one or more technological innovations that have the 
potential to support a low- carbon transition. They roughly can be summarised 
under four major technology- related themes: (1) technologies to reduce emis-
sions for incumbent, large- scale sectors that are dependent on non- renewable 
resources; (2) renewable energy technologies to support a country’s mainstream 
electricity generation mix; (3) energy efficiency technologies to reduce emis-
sions, primarily in the building sector; and (4) technologies linked to livelihood 
activities and the corresponding supply chains (Table 14.1).
Financial barriers to deploying technological innovations
Across the board, the narratives highlight how innovation not only needs to be 
technically feasible but also financially feasible. The majority of stakeholders 
identified high upfront costs and unstable market situations (compared to those 
for fossil- based alternatives) as major barriers to the investment needed for both 
incumbent large- scale centralised technologies and new decentralised, small- 
scale technologies. More specifically, investors consider investment in renewable 
technologies to be a higher risk compared to incumbent technologies, which 
increases the cost of borrowing capital. Investors willing to take on this risk 
require reassurance, for example by revenue guarantees. This was highlighted for 
both the diverse cases of geothermal in Kenya and new nuclear power in the 
UK. Large- scale solar projects in the Netherlands face similar investment 
challenges, and stakeholders additionally highlight the costs for changes and 
upgrades to the existing electricity infrastructure. This may seriously affect the 
financing capacity of both public and private stakeholders, who might look for 
lower opportunity costs and higher revenues elsewhere. Private investment is 
also crucial for energy efficiency measures in the building sector, yet in some 
cases is not readily available. In China only some city authorities provide 
funding for energy efficiency measures, while in Greece there is recognition and 
will to push forward energy efficiency technologies in buildings but a lack of 
public funds.
 Small- scale technologies that have a direct interface with end users can 
encounter cost barriers at the household level, where the upfront cost of these 
technologies is born. Programmes to overcome cost barriers are often regionally 
specific and have a limited timeframe. This fails to overcome challenges in 
scaling up deployment of the technology, which is required to make a more 
substantial impact on emissions. In Bali, the cost of biogas systems was identified 
as a barrier as most farmers cannot afford biogas without a government subsidy. 
While cost is not a key barrier for solar rooftop installations in the Netherlands, 
households critically consider payback times and rate of return when comparing 
competing investments.
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Unintended environmental impacts of low- carbon technologies
Many stakeholders expect low- carbon technologies to lead to positive 
environmental impacts compared to the status quo. These most obviously occur 
through climate change mitigation but also through national and regional 
environmental benefits. However, as various stakeholder groups at the local 
level have explained, when implemented and/or scaled up these technologies 
can also lead to consequential risks with environmental impacts. These are a 
Table 14.1  List of country studies and technological innovations to support low carbon 
pathways
Country study Technology sector
Pathways for incumbent large-scale technology systems
Austria Potential to switch to a hydrogen-based energy 
system for the iron and steel sector 
Canada, Alberta (Athabasca oil 
sands)
Promoting technological innovations to reduce 
emissions that include carbon capture and storage 
and reductions in methane flaring
United Kingdom Considers nuclear power expansion with potential 
for small modular reactors
Pathways towards renewable electricity systems
Chile Explores a mix of renewable energy including solar 
power and hydropower
The Netherlands Potential to scale up solar PV in the built 
environment and for larger scale solar PV in parks
Spain Evaluates the roll out of renewable energy and 
highlights the role of solar
Switzerland Options to scale up renewable energy for solar, 
wind, and geothermal
Kenya Considers an expansion of renewables through 
geothermal energy 
Pathways energy efficient building sectors
China Considers incorporating energy efficiency 
technologies within its built environment in the 
residential building sector
Greece Explores energy efficiency technologies in both 
public and private (residential and service) 
buildings
Pathways using renewable household-level technology at the community level
Indonesia (Bali) Investigates the potential for biogas applications in 
its agriculture sector for cooking
Kenya Explores efficient retort kilns and cook stove 
improvements based on sustainable charcoal 
technologies
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consequence of a variety of factors but most often are linked to land- use changes 
and other knock- on impacts in the value chain of technology production, 
installation, operation, and dismantling.
 Land- use change and a varying set of associated impacts on natural habitats, 
migratory routes, and environmental pollution can occur from fossil- based 
energy production, such as negative impacts for the oil sands in Alberta. 
Stakeholders also highlight negative impacts with the expansion of renewables, 
including geothermal power in Kenya and renewables in the UK.
 In Alberta, the development of the oil sands, even with reduced emissions, 
will continue to affect the environment. Locally, these impacts result from 
land- use changes in the oil sands extraction processes, which causes damage 
to ecosystems. Additionally, oil sand waste products pollute the air and local 
rivers. Land- use changes can also occur with the development of renewable 
energy, as seen in the UK renewable energy sector and Kenyan geothermal 
development. In the UK, stakeholders highlighted negative impacts on nature 
preservation with the expansion of renewable energy installations, rather 
than environmental concerns linked to nuclear accidents and waste. In 
Kenya, geothermal power facilities were the cause of unsustainable water 
abstraction from lakes and rivers, as well as disturbances to natural habitats 
and wildlife migratory routes.
 In Bali, biogas installations, which turn animal waste into household biogas 
for cooking and lighting, reduce CO2 emissions but also emit methane if the 
biogas is not burned. Methane has a much higher global warming potential per 
unit emitted than carbon dioxide. The efficient use, rather than an over or 
underuse, of cookstoves technologies is necessary to ensure a sustainable 
transition. In Austria, hydrogen- based steel technology, supported by a clean 
electricity mix, is anticipated to be a crucial part of the low- carbon energy 
transition in the iron and steel sector. As part of decarbonising the electricity 
mix, energy storage solutions need to be scaled up, which could lead to negative 
environmental impacts due to the extraction and disposal of materials including 
lithium for batteries. Additionally, the disposal of renewable energy systems also 
needs to be considered, for example wind turbine rotors built with composite 
materials that are difficult to recycle. These impacts can be expected in most 
cases where renewables will be scaled up but are rarely considered by the wider 
stakeholder community.
Policy mixes to support low- carbon technological innovations
Technological innovations rely on public and/or private policies to gain trac-
tion for eventual upscaling. All of our narratives discuss existing and/or new 
policies that would support decarbonisation technologies at different scales. We 
observed some trends on the discussion of risk in policy mixes across the country 
studies. We will draw from specific examples to highlight policy- related risks in 
different pathways. Across countries, policies aim to create a favourable climate 
for investment supporting implementation of individual technology projects or 
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scaling up deployment. During the implementation of policies, monitoring and 
enforcement are identified as important elements that could create or enable 
barriers against supporting the innovation. Additionally, policies and politics 
are often intertwined. If a technological innovation is essential to the current 
political agenda, policies are often advanced to support it.
Policy instruments to encourage private investments for 
technological deployment
We highlighted that most stakeholders emphasised the need for substantial 
public and/or private investments. Investors are known to be keen on stable 
markets with reliable revenue streams, while renewable energy options are char-
acterised as unstable or unreliable in terms of revenue. Policy instruments and 
initiatives backed by government provide an indication for the longer- term 
market potential of a specific technological option; for example, governmental 
guarantees about project- level revenue streams can reduce financial implemen-
tation risks.
 Policy instruments discussed in our case studies include economic incentives 
to support low- carbon technologies such as: subsidies for renewable energy (the 
Netherlands, Indonesia); feed- in tariffs (FITs) for renewable electricity genera-
tion (Spain, Greece, Switzerland) or other price guarantees (UK nuclear power) 
backed by government- endorsed policies. There are also policy disincentives 
such as carbon or energy taxes (Chile and Canadian carbon tax), which are used 
as a means of penalising high- carbon emitters. While economic policies are 
widely applied across case study countries, there are also non- economic policy 
instruments that can drive forward a transition. These include high- level energy 
plans, for example Kenya’s national and sectoral acts and plans and EU 
renewable energy targets impacting the Austrian steel sector. They also include 
standards and performance requirements for individual technologies or sectors 
(building codes and standards for energy efficiency in China and Greece).
 Across our case studies, stakeholders identified a set of risks in the 
implementation of different policy instruments. While the aim of policies was 
to reduce financial barriers, the policies themselves can lead to negative 
consequences, which illustrates the need for selecting and fine- tuning policy 
instruments for preventing and overcoming barriers. There are still uncertain-
ties in how policies can effectively support the scaling up of renewable technol-
ogies in different country contexts. As can be observed from previous trends, 
such as the renewable energy sector in Spain, economic incentives such as feed-
 in tariffs and premium tariffs can significantly boost renewable energy genera-
tion. However, in Spain the overheated market significantly increased regulatory 
costs and retroactive measures were put in place on renewables to cut existing 
subsidies. The absence of continued policy support for renewable energy caused 
a market collapse, an unanticipated consequential risk in the Spanish renewable 
energy sector. Hence, the case provided a clear example of the need for carefully 
selecting instruments for effective policymaking and coherent policy mixes.
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 An example of a subsidy policy is seen in the Dutch sustainable energy 
subsidy scheme to support the adoption of, among other options, large- scale 
ground- mounted solar power projects. Investors receive a government guarantee 
of a stable revenue stream for a period of 15 years, which addresses the main 
implementation risk of this technology option. While the scheme reduces risks 
for solar park investors, it creates an extra financial burden and uncertainty for 
the government around the future costs of expanding sustainable energy. The 
Dutch government mitigates this risk by maximising the annual subsidy 
amounts under the scheme. However, for the longer term, it is uncertain how 
large the subsidy schemes will become as this will depend on cost development 
of solar PV systems, electricity prices, and European energy and climate direc-
tives and how these are incorporated into national energy and climate 
policymaking.
 In Indonesia, national and regional subsidy programmes partially or fully subsi-
dise individual biogas digesters in order to reduce the barriers of initial capital 
investments for biogas digesters. However, policies do not explicitly support 
larger- scale biogas- for-electricity generation and renewable electricity generation. 
Many of the issues are linked to subsidies for coal- powered generation. Even then, 
fully subsidised programmes have not necessarily lead to the successful uptake of 
the technology. In fact, biogas programmes that were highly subsidised were often 
less successful than lightly subsidised schemes, due to limited personal investment 
and a low sense of ownership among the farmers involved. If leakage in the tank 
occurred during biogas operation, the farmer would often abandon the installation 
due to high cost of repair and lack of support. Thus, ongoing maintenance or war-
ranty, supported by a monitoring programme, is also needed in addition to sub-
sidies. This will be discussed further in the next section.
Incoherence across the design, implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement of policies
In most cases presented in this book, stakeholders see implementation risks 
through the particular lens of the policy implementation process. We observed 
a lack of coherent policy design and implementation process (including moni-
toring and enforcement) across many country studies. The design, implementa-
tion, and monitoring of policies is influenced by policymakers and their 
corresponding institutions, along with politicians and the governments who 
support the policy goals and technologies behind the low- carbon transitions. 
Challenges occur when policies are implemented, usually requiring co- 
ordination across various government institutions at different governance levels 
to ensure effective monitoring and enforcement. Finally, there may be barriers 
to implementing these policies due to poor monitoring and enforcement 
procedures within the existing governance structure. We see examples of these 
across different case studies.
 In Austria there is no clear strategy to promote hydrogen- based technologies, 
which would be important for addressing energy storage and reliable supply 
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issues. The absence of an overarching target and concrete implementation 
strategy has led to uncertainties in their low- carbon transitions. There is also a 
lack of agreement across local, regional, and national- level institutions, which 
all have different interests and prevents the co- ordination of policies. Likewise, 
in Switzerland, cantons and federal governing bodies interpret the national 
energy strategy differently, specifically with respect to objectives for energy effi-
ciency, energy supply, support for investments, and environmental protection. 
The challenge in the Swiss context is that there is no common space to har-
monise the differences across governance levels, creating risks in the policy 
implementation process.
 In Indonesia there have been challenges with implementing biogas 
programmes due to the conflicting priorities and motivations at the national 
and sub- national governmental levels. Consequently, there was no streamlined 
approach to monitor the progress of biogas programmes across different 
government institutions and implementing agencies. Monitoring is essential for 
assessing the outcomes of biogas installations and to identify barriers including 
technical difficulties in the operations of the digester. As a result of this lack of 
monitoring and support many biogas installations were abandoned, a negative 
consequence of the renewable energy programme.
 The charcoal sector in Kenya also suffers from weak enforcement of the 
formal permitting system set up to promote the sustainable production, trans-
port, and use of charcoal. Most charcoal circulates in the informal sector and 
corruption is widespread. Transporters and wholesalers are compelled to pay 
bribes to traffic police, who do not fully understand the formal permitting 
systems. Some Kenyan counties have set their own regulations with local char-
coal producer associations and transporter associations, and there are still 
uncertainties around whether local initiatives are more effective than national 
initiatives.
 Energy efficiency certification policies in China’s building sector have 
been less successful than anticipated, even though the growth of green build-
ings has been fuelled by policies and targets set by the Chinese government. 
One of the main challenges identified by government stakeholders is the 
immature green certification implementation process, along with weak moni-
toring and enforcement of policies in the operation of new buildings. 
Additionally, industry players in the construction market are not taking a 
lead as there are no policy incentives to encourage their involvement with 
the certification scheme.
 The Spanish case explicitly highlights how a low- carbon energy transition is 
by no means a linear process but is characterised by both failures and successes. 
The particular design of the chapter highlights the need for policy learning, 
which is an inherent part of the policy process and implicitly important for all 
cases.
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Influence of political will on technology selection and policy promotion
Politicians are more hesitant to support low- carbon pathways if they imply a risk 
of disrupting the socio- economic balance within their countries. The (lack of ) 
support for technologies can be primarily driven by political will, creating a 
strong enabler for favoured technologies but also high risks if political backing is 
withdrawn. We see examples throughout the country studies where policies and 
political support create barriers for policy implementation. This directly relates 
to carbon lock- in effects, i.e. barriers to new technologies, as established 
technologies have become tightly entangled with the existing institutional 
set- up (e.g. Unruh, 2000).
 As these disruptions are often noticeable in the short term and directly affect 
voters, policies supporting low- carbon pathways can be subject to change due to 
elections. An example of risks caused by political change can be observed in the 
oil sands sector in Canada. A new political party (the NDP) came into power 
for the first time in 2015, uprooting the incumbent party who were large 
supporters of oil sands development. The NDP implemented a carbon tax for oil 
sands production which has impacted profits and has been unpopular within the 
industry. If a different political party gains power through the next election in 
2019 they may reverse the carbon tax. In Indonesia, where fossil- fuel exports are 
an important source of government revenue and economic development, 
changes in political leadership can lead to significant uncertainties for the 
biogas renewable energy programmes as there is no certainty that the new gov-
ernment will continue to support programmes.
 Without financial support some low- carbon technologies, particularly those 
needing intensive capital investment, would not be feasible. New nuclear power 
stations in the UK, for instance, face a high risk in securing funding. The high 
costs of construction and nuclear waste handling requires secure long- term 
revenue streams to ensure financial viability. For that, there has been significant 
political support for the development of the new Hinkley Point C nuclear power 
plant. The government has negotiated with investors to secure long- term fixed 
electricity price contracts that are well above current wholesale prices. This 
example shows how, through a long- term guarantee scheme, the impacts of 
changes in the political context can be kept relatively small.
 In Kenya, on the other hand, the lack of strong, long- term guaranteed 
political support has led to implementation risks for geothermal plants. One of 
the barriers for these plants is securing funding. Since geothermal plants are 
viewed as higher risk investments, investors need the reassurance of financial 
and political stability for their investments. A means of reducing the financing 
risk for the project developers is to guarantee the revenue stream through a 
power purchase agreement with Kenya Power, which is jointly owned by the 
government and private investors. But there have been delays in finalising this 
financing as the government has been slow to issue letters of support for the 
projects. Due to this delay, investors face a higher risk that funding for the pro-
jects will not be secured.
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 In Greece, the overarching policy strategy for energy efficiency is in place 
but there is a lack of detailed economic incentives, subsidies, and tax exemp-
tions. These policy instruments depend on political will and the government’s 
financial capacity. The economic recession and other pressing socio- economic 
issues have impacted the government’s financial capacity to push forward 
energy efficiency initiatives and provide longer- term stability and support. 
Political instability in recent years, including snap elections and the inability 
to form single- party governments, has side- lined climate change policy and 
action on the political agenda due to more pressing socio- economic 
challenges.
 Policy mixes and their implementation, monitoring, and enforcement pro-
cesses require careful consideration in a low- carbon transition pathway. 
While policies may initially help to overcome financial barriers, they may not 
be successful in the longer run due to poor implementation, weak monitor-
ing, and poor enforcement. On the other hand, even if all of these policies 
and policy processes are set in place, politics may unravel the carefully 
chosen policy support package for a low- carbon pathway. Politics can be 
unpredictable and is itself an implementation risk, thus additional support for 
low- carbon technologies may be needed from societal stakeholders who may 
(in)directly influence politics. While the societal dimension can be an 
enabler in a pathway, it can also imply risks, such as resistance to low- 
emission technology options. This in itself adds another level of complexity 
as discussed in the next section.
Societal impact on technologies: technologies’ impact on 
society
A third critical determinant of the success of a pathway is whether it meets and 
resonates with people’s needs and priorities. While a technological and eco-
nomic focus can indicate the technical potential and economic affordability of a 
low- carbon pathway, understanding societal priorities and concerns is a key 
determinant of the realistic potential for expanding a low- carbon technology. 
The narratives in this book show several examples of this, including negative 
impacts, for example concerns about job losses and resistance to solar parks, to 
more positive support for technologies as an enabler for people to personally 
contribute to addressing the climate problem.
 The examples of societal impact on the deployment of low- carbon technolo-
gies vary from individual household behaviours to wider societal acceptance at 
the (sub)national level. Additionally, the impact of technologies and policies 
on people has been frequently highlighted as both a barrier and consequential 
risk for transition pathways. Policies intended to support low- carbon technolo-
gies often have positive environmental impact; yet policies can also lead to soci-
etal injustice if the higher cost of the technologies are borne by the most 
disadvantaged in society.
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The influence of socio- economic interests on technological selection
The socio- economic interest to maintain the steel, oil sands, and nuclear power 
sectors in Austria, Canada, and the UK demonstrate how the historical devel-
opment of sectors can be entrenched within society. These sectors become 
intertwined with the development of a low- carbon pathway despite the risks 
associated with each technology. As a consequence, when a country has a 
strongly entrenched socio- economic context, the most feasible way forward can 
be improvement of existing technologies: even when they are unattractive from 
an environmental (including climate) perspective they can nevertheless be 
more realistic from a social perspective.
 There is a long- standing tradition of high- quality steel production in Austria. 
The sector has close interlinkages with other sectors of the economy, so that 
low- carbon measures in steel production may have social implication for other 
sectors. The steel sector has long been important for jobs and prosperity and a 
transition to a lower- carbon option may cause job losses. However, the sector 
also acknowledges that technological innovation, as part of a shift to a low- 
carbon pathway, is required if the industry is to survive and thus secure employ-
ment in the longer term. A similar situation is seen in Alberta, Canada, where 
the Athabasca oil sands are located. The development of the oil production 
industry is closely linked to the province’s social and cultural identity, as well as 
its long- term economic prospects.
 Viewed through the global lens of Paris Agreement targets, supporting the 
development of both incumbent sectors in Austria and Canada may prevent a 
transition away from carbon- intensive economies as, while their carbon intensity 
can be reduced, reaching zero carbon emissions in these sectors is highly unlikely. 
Nevertheless, within the (sub)national context, both sectors will continue to be 
supported socially and thus politically for the foreseeable future. Reducing emis-
sions in the Austrian steel sector and the Albertan oil sands are viewed as feasible 
transitions for the respective local stakeholders; eliminating these high- carbon 
sectors altogether is not desirable given the existing social context, and thus not 
realistic to consider. Likewise, the UK nuclear power sector is rooted in a history 
of nuclear technology for both military and energy production stretching back to 
the 1930s. Nuclear energy currently enjoys significant political support in the UK 
and is seen as part of the transition to a lower- carbon economy, despite the risks 
associated with nuclear waste and the potential for accidents.
Societal acceptance as a driver to support low- carbon technologies
Although the risks associated with scaling up renewable energy technologies are 
known, several countries have chosen this pathway to reduce emissions. One 
example is Switzerland, which previously made large investments in nuclear 
power. The Swiss have opted to close down nuclear power plants due to the 
perceived risks of nuclear accidents, as observed by the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear accident of 2011. The conscious decision to move away from nuclear 
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power required societal consensus in Switzerland. Such a consensus is easier to 
achieve when alternatives technologies are available that fit well within the 
country’s landscape and do not have significant negative impacts on people’s 
livelihoods. In the Swiss case, social acceptance for expanding renewables was 
relatively easy to achieve as alternative resources (such as hydropower) are 
available which meet with little social resistance. Social acceptance is 
particularly important for renewable energy technologies as these tend to be 
more decentralised and are usually geographically scattered (e.g. wind power 
farms and solar PV in Spain, Netherlands, and Chile). If a technology or action 
requires individuals or households to respond, as seen in solar roof top 
installations (Spain, Netherlands, Chile), stakeholders’ perspective becomes 
critical for the success of implementing the pathway.
 Large, centralised renewable energy technologies tend to be constructed on 
green field sites. These require government and political support, and often also 
the approval from impacted communities through the planning system. In the 
Netherlands, larger ground- mounted solar power parks are being promoted by 
policy incentives (as discussed earlier) but, unlike solar rooftops on existing 
buildings, larger solar parks will need to carefully consider spatial planning 
requirements. Project developers proposing to install solar parks near 
communities need to consult with community stakeholders as early as possible 
to avoid the risk of public opposition. Opposition can delay or halt project 
implementation, as seen in some projects in the northern regions of the country. 
Consulting with community stakeholders impacted by a proposed solar park 
allows them to be part of the project process and provides opportunities for 
stakeholders to suggest modifications to benefit from the project. The Dutch 
narrative contains examples of how engaging stakeholders as early as possible in 
the decision- making process can reduce risks and act as a key enabler.
 Land use linked to energy projects can have both a negative environmental 
impact and also adverse consequences for local communities. These 
communities may protest against large energy projects, as seen with traditional 
communities in Kenya. In Kenya, the livelihoods of traditional communities are 
closely linked to the land. The county and national government are therefore 
responsible for upholding these rights. Land rights are strongly respected and 
traditional communities can continue to access privately held land. In Kenya, 
environmental and social impact assessments are required of industry players, 
including geothermal developers and operators in the charcoal supply chain. 
They are responsible for minimising the risks to the impacted communities, for 
example through adequate monetary compensation or by making jobs available 
to affected communities.
 Similarly, in Canada, Indigenous communities located near oil sands are 
adversely impacted due to land- use changes. Aside from health impacts, 
emissions and waste from these developments alters the landscape and changes 
the community’s ability to exercise their traditional hunting and gathering 
practices. Energy companies who developed close to traditional sites are facing 
litigation due to the negative impacts of their development. Failing to consult 
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with Indigenous communities prior to developing in the oil sands project has 
led to project delays and could even halt projects altogether.
Challenges in end- user behaviour: change in the uptake of 
technologies
In the narratives described, we have seen that behavioural changes often present 
a major barrier in pathways that require changes at the household or end- user 
level. End- user stakeholders often consider the immediate benefit or disadvantage 
of adopting a particular behaviour (energy efficiency) or technology (solar power, 
efficient cookstove technology). For instance, a government- funded programme 
fully paid for biogas installations in Bali, Indonesia, but the technology was not 
successful due to breakages and a lack of operational support. Moreover, ensuring 
enough feedstock to generate a sufficient quantity of biogas led to a lower sense of 
ownership on the farmers’ side. Mobilising efforts at the farmer level is 
challenging; upscaling biogas digesters as a means for village- wide generation was 
not seen as realistic by some, but there may be more potential for large- scale 
biogas applications for electricity. End- user behaviour has an important impact on 
applied technologies, which is evident in efforts to promote efficient cookstoves 
in Kenya. Efficient cookstoves are part of a wider initiative to support more 
sustainable charcoal production together with efficient retort- kilns, standards, and 
certification. Improved efficiencies in cookstoves, however, may inadvertently 
lead to rebound effects, including more intensive use of cookstoves when 
compared to previous usage patterns.
 Other impacts of end- user behaviour are seen in the case of energy efficiency 
retrofits in buildings across different climatic zones in China. Energy- efficient 
measures in the northern regions promote improved heating management, which 
involves indoor temperature control and net- metering installations. While the 
scheme was successful in the colder and drier northern regions, energy efficiency 
programmes have had limited impact in cities with different climates. In the 
southern regions, such as Shanghai, the climate is more humid and residents keep 
their windows open throughout the year to manage indoor comfort. Retrofits carried 
out to improve thermal insulation in Shanghai were offset by residents opening 
windows and negating the impact of the building’s improved thermal performance.
Impacts of low- carbon technologies on social justice
Technologies and policies intended to reduce emissions may unintentionally 
have a negative impact on social justice, including gender equality. In Chile and 
Greece there were several examples where policies and technologies led to 
financial burdens that primarily fell on the economically disadvantaged. In 
Chile, energy poverty has been identified as a consequential risk for households 
as a result of the carbon tax implemented to support renewable energy 
generation. Energy poverty reduces the ability of households to maintain 
comfortable indoor temperatures. It can have negative impacts on health, 
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particularly with a changing climate that may require more heating or cooling. 
Heating and cooling needs also vary depending on the different climate zones 
and energy resources available across Chile. The types of energy resources also 
impact the cost and extent of the economic burden on households; for example, 
solar power is costlier that traditional biomass used in the less affluent southern 
region of the country. Assessment of energy poverty in Chile does not currently 
consider the different thermal zones and varying household incomes levels. 
There are also external events that impact energy poverty, including the price 
of imported natural gas which is beyond the influence of national policies and 
actions but also increases the risk of fuel poverty in Chile.
 In Greece, poverty is viewed by stakeholders as a potential negative 
consequence of climate and energy efficiency actions. There is a risk that 
infrastructure and building renovation projects intended to support economically 
disadvantaged households could inadvertently cause greater hardships. For 
example, low- interest-rate loans for lower- income households are expected to 
provide financial support for energy efficiency measures, but the economic recession 
has made it increasingly difficult for these households to repay loans. On the other 
hand, these programmes could potentially boost the economy if a longer- term 
perspective is taken for funding programmes and providing financial support.
 Low- carbon initiatives and policies can also result in unequal gender power 
dynamics as seen in the installation of biogas systems in Balinese farms. Wood 
fuel used for cooking is often collected by women, who also prepare meals, while 
the men manage the livestock on the farms. Biogas installations would benefit 
women by reducing the time require to collect wood, while men will need to 
increase their time on the farm to collect the organic waste for biogas feedstock. 
At the household level, male farmers were concerned with the changes in time 
commitment linked to biogas installations, which policymakers did not view as 
an issue. However, while the perception is relevant for some parts of Bali, it 
does not represent the gender- roles across the whole of Indonesia.
 In Spain, researchers identified a consequential risk linked to unbalanced 
gender participation in the energy sector as well as in climate policymaking 
processes. The energy sector has the lowest proportion of women in executive 
roles compared to any other economic sector. In climate policymaking there is 
also a lack of balance, as evident in the 14-strong all- male expert panel selected 
to provide insights into the design of national energy law in Spain. The lack of 
a gender balance is also observed in the composition of stakeholder participants 
responding to the Spanish case study survey. The under representation of 
women across studies, industry, and policymaking processes can be concerning 
as decision- making mechanisms supporting the energy transition could fail to 
address gender- specific issues and needs.
Risk perception of stakeholders across space and time
We consider scale and time to be relevant in all narratives, spanning the 
dimensions of technology, policy, and society. Most prominently, scale refers to 
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socio- political boundaries, such as different governmental jurisdictions including: 
city and city- region levels (building sector in the Chinese cities), provincial level 
(oil sands production in Alberta and biogas in Bali), national level (rolling out 
solar power in Spain and Chile), and international level (European steel sector 
impacting Austria). Inconsistencies between sub- national and national priorities 
were also observed, which do not necessarily align with international priorities. For 
instance, technological innovations and the supportive policies needed are not 
necessarily co- ordinated. At the sub- national level (cities/counties/state/provinces), 
policies have been implemented with more success in some regions than in others, 
in part due to the power of regional and local governance to enact supportive 
policy or local by- laws. Additionally, polices at the EU level or national level 
broadly indicate overarching energy and climate goals, but at the local level 
implementation can come down to a specific use of space (e.g. land use). The 
perception of risk at the local level was strongly related to how stakeholders 
understood and experienced the impact of a technology or policy in their social 
space including the ecological environment. We see this in the country studies 
that highlight the importance of different climatic zones and socio- economic 
realities when implementing policies and technologies (e.g. China and Chile).
 Scale is also relevant with respect to the size of investment needed in a specific 
centralised or decentralised technology. The investment required for different 
scales of technologies (large- versus small- scale technologies) has implications on 
the magnitude of the investment risk and the level of reassurance required to 
secure the investment, or formal government support, needed to overcome the 
cost risk (e.g. geothermal in Kenya, nuclear power in the UK). Scale is also 
important when it comes to rolling out technologies across a wider geographical 
region which, although the logical next step once technologies have been 
successfully tested, is an often- neglected aspect. This scaling up can complicate 
both implementation and consequential risks as problems that occur at the project 
level can be magnified and have wider social- economic and environmental 
impacts that are more difficult to address and contain (scaling up biogas in 
Indonesia and solar power in Greece and the Netherlands).
 Time is another consideration in the pathways, where the short term (years), 
medium term (decades), and long term (century) are relevant. Time often 
intersects with other scales, as already indicated, and influences risk perception 
and the urgency of actions required to mitigate risks. Adverse climate change 
impacts are often perceived as a long- term problem from a global perspective, as 
indicated in the Paris Agreement. In the country studies, most stakeholders 
perceived their problems within the boundaries of the immediate future (several 
years) and only some considered a medium time horizon (several decades). Very 
few stakeholders framed their problems beyond mid- century and even fewer to 
the end of the century, a timeframe that energy, economy, and climate models 
often consider when assessing impacts of climate and technological changes. 
However, some technologies, including nuclear power and oil sands 
technologies, prompted much longer- term views on the environmental impact 
of the technologies’ waste products.
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The complexities of risks and uncertainties in transition 
pathways
The starting point for each low- carbon transition pathway were technologies, 
while the point of reference for the risk assessment were the policies (or policy 
choices) that enabled a certain pathway based on that technology. From the liter-
ature and initial stakeholder engagement, we found that two fundamental but 
related ideas about risks associated with low- carbon policies existed, which are 
part of scientific and public discourses in the context of climate change mitiga-
tion: risks as barriers to policy implementation and risks as consequences from 
implementing policies and supporting certain technologies. Each of the risks iden-
tified changes its character and meaning once we give up policy as the reference 
point for implementation and consequence: For example, a lack of investment, 
which may be a barrier to policy implementation, can in turn be a negative con-
sequence of bad communication of policy elsewhere. Even more complicated, 
then, is the specification of subcategories, in our case political, policy, social, 
environmental, economic, and technological risks. These categories are common 
and feel intuitive, but they also are not clearly distinct from one another. Indeed, 
most risks fit several categories or cascade across these categories. For example, 
what is first only an economic problem, such as high upfront or maintenance 
costs, is something that is then passed on to consumers, affecting them differently 
based on their wealth, education, etc. – hence, it becomes an issue of social equal-
ity; or it is passed on to the environment, potentially increasing pollution in one 
place to reduce costs elsewhere. For our work, it turned out that in some instances 
the categories were well applied, whereas in others they were replaced with more 
fitting categories. Ultimately, categories are necessary to provide structure to the 
discussion, which is what their main purpose is, and can remain if we do not put 
higher hopes in them.
 In the particular context of discussing decarbonisation policies, stakeholders 
tend to see implementation risks first and consequential risks only if prompted. 
Moreover, they frequently frame risk in economic terms, i.e. with respect to 
costs and investment needs. Environmental risks receive attention more because 
it has become an established category. Social aspects are relevant from an imple-
mentation perspective but are rarely considered in terms of consequences, 
potentially, because they are often a second- or third- order consequence rather 
than a direct result of a low- carbon transition. Chile and Indonesia were excep-
tions to this rule. Technological risks in terms of safety hazards were not expli-
citly touched on in most cases, even in the case of nuclear power.
Conclusions
In decarbonising their economies, countries of the world face a considerable 
challenge – even more so in light of the Paris Agreement and revelations of 
the 1.5°C IPCC Special Report. For this, they need low- carbon transition 
pathways which are based on: identified low- carbon technology options; 
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applicable good practice lessons from the past regarding scaling up these 
options; a supportive current national and international policy framework; 
and a deep understanding of national, regional, sectoral, and local contexts, 
including the priorities and responsibilities of stakeholders. Pathways for redu-
cing emissions can impact other areas and aspects of society (consequential 
risks). Pathway implementation can also be hampered by political, market, or 
other types of system barriers (implementation risks). Narratives in this book 
describe the diversity of pathways and identify risks for each, and uncertain-
ties where possible.
 Including stakeholders in risk assessment is important as they, from their 
practitioners’ perspective, are an important source of information for identifying 
risks associated with low- carbon transition pathways. While these risks are 
context- specific and reflect a broad range of stakeholder perspectives, common 
risks are found across the case studies, regardless of the local context, the tech-
nology promoted, and the policy mix implemented.
 There are three nested dimensions present in all pathways which help both 
to explain the source of a risk and identify solutions to address these: technolo-
gical innovations, policy mixes, and society. Each pathway is rooted in one or more 
technological innovation that often face cost barriers compared to existing tech-
nologies, as they often have not yet reached a stage of commercial applicability. 
Low- carbon technologies are promoted by policy mixes, including policy instru-
ments to overcome financial barriers through reducing the higher cost risks of 
technologies. However, policy implementation in itself can be hampered by 
risks, too, such as insufficient monitoring and enforcement, particularly if co- 
ordination is required across different governance levels. Additionally, policies 
can be heavily driven by politics, the changes in which can create significant 
uncertainties and potentially dismantle existing policy support for low- carbon 
technologies.
 Technological innovations and the associated policy mixes resonate in the 
social dimension, where their impacts are felt and support or opposition deter-
mined. Incumbent technologies are highly influenced by path- dependent socio- 
economic interests that enable them to exist, even if the technologies themselves 
present consequential risks linked to environmental impacts. Societal acceptance 
is also a crucial factor for scaling up technologies, especially when located near 
communities. Technologies that have a direct interface with end users require 
behavioural changes to ensure long- term sustainability of a pathways. The imple-
mentation of higher cost technologies can also have unintentional negative 
impacts on social justice linked to energy poverty.
 Our narratives, drawn from a comprehensive research and engagement 
effort and summarised in Table 14.2, help to make explicit the barriers and 
negative outcomes that would have otherwise stayed implicit or hidden. 
Rather than addressing risks in an ad- hoc manner as they unfold, we can 
identify risks early on in the design of a transition pathway in an attempt to 
mitigate them before they manifest. The risk categories help us to consider 
risks in areas that we otherwise might overlook due to more pressing current 
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socio- economic or political concerns, sometimes not directly linked to the 
transition pathway.
 We also note that there are multiple priorities at stake when discussing 
different types of risk. We need to more clearly define: ‘What criteria is being 
pushed through and for whom?’ Additionally, stakeholders have uneven influ-
ence and power on the transition pathways: some have the ability to influence 
the direction of a pathway, while others have little or no say but are most 
adversely impacted. We urge a more transparent, inclusive, and comprehensive 
risk assessment in transition pathways with a wide range of stakeholders to make 
explicit the risks that are unique at the local level but with overarching issues 
that are relatable in other contexts.
Table 14.2 Key risks in each country study pathway
Country study Implementation risk Consequential risk
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Country study Implementation risk Consequential risk
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This table provides a summary of risks and does not make a distinction across various pathways 
 identified in each country study.
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Note
1 With specific insights from Alevgul Sorman, Eise Spijker, Oscar van Vliet, Rocio 
Alvarez- Tinoco, and Michael Stauffacher.
Reference
Unruh, G.C. (2000). Understanding carbon lock- in. Energy Policy 28, 817–830. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(00)00070-7.
Afterword
Key insights on overarching risks across 
transition pathways
There is no ‘one size fits all’ low- carbon energy transition for all parts of the world. 
While this point is, perhaps, appreciated on a global scale, at a local level there are 
many lessons to learn. Economic, social, political, and environmental factors can 
vary enormously between different areas of a country, presenting a varied pattern of 
risks, opportunities, and challenges to the roll out of a low- carbon technology, asso-
ciated policies, and behavioural changes. The narratives in this book reflect this 
variability in the diverse set of risks identified in each country. This said, we can 
broadly identify risks that are common across many, or all, of our case studies.
 Investments in low- carbon technological innovations are often viewed as a 
high risk, which increases the cost of borrowing capital. Revenue guarantees, for 
example, can provide reassurance; however, national recognition and will to 
push forward with low- carbon technologies is not always backed up with the 
necessary funding to support it.
 Small- scale technologies can encounter cost barriers at the household level, 
where the upfront cost of these technologies is born. Programmes to overcome 
these cost barriers are often implemented in only specific sub- national areas 
over a limited timeframe, which restricts the scaling up of a technology. Coher-
ent, long- term policies are necessary to deploy these small- scale technologies at 
scale. At the same time this highlights the importance of action taken at lower 
administrative levels.
 Many industrial- scale energy industries have large sunk costs in infrastructure 
and skills development. A low- carbon pathway that suggests abandoning or 
scaling back these industries can encounter significant resistance due to the 
destruction of financial and human capital. As a consequence, a feasible way 
forward can be through improvement of existing technologies which are unat-
tractive from an environmental (including climate) perspective but neverthe-
less realistic from a social perspective.
 Stakeholders expect low- carbon technologies to lead to positive environ-
mental impacts, mainly through climate change mitigation or improved air 
quality. However, technologies can give rise to negative impacts, particularly 
when scaled up. These impacts are often linked to land- use changes but also 
include knock- on impacts in the production, installation, operation, and dis-
mantling of a technology.
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 Government support to minimise financial risk through policy incentives to 
investors and households can in itself expose both governments and energy con-
sumers to significant financial risks if the cost of the policy escalates. While gov-
ernments can implement measures to manage this risk, they have limited 
control over many factors, such as the cost development of solar PV systems, 
electricity prices, and European energy and climate directives.
 Heavy subsidies for low- carbon energy may have perverse impacts if the end 
users fail to achieve ‘buy in’ to a technology’s deployment. When end users were 
provided with fully subsidised technology installations they often took an ‘easy 
come, easy go’ attitude to the technology and abandoned them, rather than 
attempting to rectify the problem.
 Good governance is essential for successful implementation of low- carbon 
pathways. Scaling up these technologies often requires co- ordination across 
various government institutions at different governance levels. Co- operation 
can sometimes be difficult due to poor communication, differing priorities, and 
entrenched disagreements between different agencies. Good governance also 
applies to the policy support schemes. Monitoring and enforcement procedures 
are critical to a scheme’s success but are often seen as minor components and 
poorly funded or implemented.
 Dominant industries can be strongly entrenched within the socio- economic 
norms of society. Politicians are often hesitant to support low- carbon pathways if 
there are risks of disrupting the status quo, particularly if they think this will result 
in public backlash. Politicians who advocate a departure from the entrenched 
position can be great enablers of change but create high risks if political backing is 
withdrawn, particularly in countries with unstable political climates.
 Public resistance to a low- carbon deployment can be reduced through careful 
design and stakeholder involvement. Public support is easier to achieve when tech-
nologies fit within the local landscape and do not have significant negative impacts 
on people. If public resistance is anticipated, early stakeholder involvement can 
reduce risks by allowing stakeholders to modify the scheme and achieve ‘buy in’.
 Successful deployment can also be improved by considering the environment 
and social- economic context of (sub)national regions. Areas within a country 
can vary hugely in their suitability for a technology and the economic ability of 
its residents to invest in a technology. Social practices can also influence suc-
cessful technology deployment. We saw this in countries with diverse climatic 
regions which impacted programmes to improve the energy efficiency in homes.
 Technologies and policies intended to reduce emissions may also uninten-
tionally have a negative impact on social justice, including gender equality, and 
efforts should be made build a detailed understanding of their impacts.
 Finally, the timescales required to mitigate climate change and the technologies 
necessary to combat it often fail to align with those of stakeholders. Households 
often judge impacts on their finances over very short timescales, while politicians 
are mindful of their next election. These short timescales contrast with popular 
framings of climate change and low- carbon technology, with models often looking 
to the mid- century and beyond when assessing economic and climate impacts.
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